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ABSTRACT 
       Although legislative drafting processes have escaped the attention that other 
features of legislative organization have received, they produce the text—and often the 
detailed substance—of legislation in ways that articulate some voices, not others. 
Comparatively, these processes vary widely in degree of organization, centralization, and 
hierarchy, but not along obvious lines of regime type, electoral system, or legal tradition. 
Some scholars attribute cross-national divergence in choice of institutions to historical 
institutional factors such as policy legacies or the diffusion of new institutional models. 
Others attribute divergence to the motivations of key political actors, but disagree about 
the bases for these actors’ motivations (e.g. partisan, informational, or distributional 
concerns).  
I suggest that extant theories cannot fully explain legislative drafting processes: 
persistence does not because drafting processes do not predictably remain in place or 
stable at transition. Diffusion fails because innovations do not reliably follow particular 
hegemons or neighboring polities. And while theories of legislative organization explain 
how the incentives endogenous to a particular legislature shape the evolution of processes 
	  	   viii 
such as drafting processes, they do not account for cross-national variation. Legislators 
seem to follow different types of incentives in diverse countries, and we lack a theory for 
why some drafters deliver particularistic benefits in the drafting process whereas others 
seem swayed by information resources to aim for good policy.   
Drawing on cross-national analysis of sixteen post-communist states and four case 
studies, I argue that the structure of factional conflict during transition from communist 
rule produces the incentives that explain the variation in legislation drafting processes 
(and consequently, responsiveness of legislation produced). Here, “the structure of 
factional conflict” means “the identity and relative strength of competing factions as 
structured by features of the state and communication network.” When this structure 
produces partisan incentives, conservative factions tend to create centralized drafting 
processes. When it produces informational incentives, competing factions tend to create 
consensus-based drafting processes. When it produces distributional incentives, factions 
tend to choose fragmented drafting processes. The structure of factional conflict is 
mediated by persistence and diffusion, but this study gives priority of explanation to the 
structure of factional conflict.  
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PREFACE 
In the course of my professional career, I have had the great privilege to work 
with legislation drafters, ministry and parliamentary staff, Members of Parliament, and 
Government officials designing, drafting, and amending legislation around the world, 
most often in developing, transitional, and post-conflict polities. This research has been 
motivated by this experience. 
What has often struck me, and perhaps more regularly strikes legislation drafters 
themselves and other staff who translate official policy proposals into the text of bills, is 
the degree to which their work, though highly specialized and in many cases inarguably 
influential on the resulting text, is overlooked or dismissed as a source of detailed 
provisions that elected officials rarely have time even to read, much less revise. How 
could this significant labor remain so obscure? 
In advanced industrial democracies, there are often resources to support multiple 
professional departments in the legislature and in the ministries for developing, drafting, 
and assessing the quality and likely impacts of draft legislation, and MPs and executives 
frequently also have their own staff to vet draft legislation and ensure that drafters do not 
exercise unwarranted discretion. In addition, in these states MPs and executives 
themselves tend to have legal education, and the legal code itself is orderly, digitized, and 
searchable. In this sense, drafters in advanced industrial economies sometimes find 
themselves in principal-agent relationships in which they are agents without agency – at 
least agency of any import. Beyond these resources for constraining drafting discretion, 
or at least rendering it largely inconsequential, media and civil society organizations and 
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lobbyists and even individual citizens in many of these states can survey the text of draft 
legislation online as it is being developed and alert elected representatives to provisions 
they find intolerable. In many of these states, courts also exercise constitutional review, 
and in common law countries, court precedents can resolve ambiguities in the statutes, 
conflicts of law, and disputes arising from the law’s text. Anticipating judicial review can 
provide legislation drafters with an additional ex ante motivation for technical precision, 
professional discretion, and deference to political principals, and political principals with 
some motivation to develop legislation defensively against future rulings. 
While conversations with senior congressional drafters in my own country 
suggest that even they sometimes must propose draft provisions representing matters of 
legal substance – provisions that might not be read closely by political principals before 
the bill is enacted into law – in developing, transitional, and post-conflict states, the 
discretion drafters must exercise can be much greater. In one polity, a single expatriate 
lawyer drafted all Government and Private Member bills introduced to the parliament, 
and the average education of MPs was ten grades (less than a secondary diploma); many 
had not had an opportunity to gain literacy in the country’s official language and so 
depended on the drafter to summarize her work for them verbally. In other states, regime 
change or war means that newly elected politicians with minimal legislative experience 
or legal knowledge comprise the entire legislature and executive; the technocrats in the 
parliamentary and ministry offices are the only sources of continuity in the lawmaking 
process, and sometimes the only people with legal training, and consequently possess 
extensive agency. In one state where I worked, the law had never been codified, much 
	  	   xi 
less digitized (a luxury that those who interact with the law in many developing states 
still can only hope they will one day enjoy), and only the most senior lawyers and judges 
knew the scope or content of existing legislation, making quality legislative drafting 
nearly impossible for anyone else and ensuring that political principals’ preferences 
regularly ran up against unforeseen conflicts of law if they relied on less senior drafters. 
Not surprisingly, these drafters exercised a great deal of agency. 
Because the formal analytical study of legislatures has arisen in advanced 
industrial democracies with long legal and legislative traditions and extensive resources 
to support and scrutinize the lawmaking process, the assumption that drafters are mere 
transcriptionists of political principals’ decisions has perhaps directed the attention of 
political scientists elsewhere. Political principals have an interest in maintaining this 
assumption by asserting that they and they alone make every legislative decision, 
presumably through some ideal form of discursive democracy that draws on their wisdom 
as philosopher-kings; and their staff, whether motivated by a desire to comply with 
professional norms of deference to the principals or by a desire to keep a low profile to 
protect their zones of discretion, similarly have little interest in contesting these claims. 
So the questions remain largely unasked and unanswered: in developing, transitional, and 
post-conflict states, does the legislative drafting process matter? Does it influence the 
resulting legislation – especially to whose interests the legislation responds? What factors 
shape the development of legislation drafting processes at transition? 
To begin to answer these questions, this dissertation offers a comparative analysis 
of sixteen Central and East European states that transitioned from communist rule at 
	  	   xii 
roughly the same time, considering four of these cases in detail. In the course of the 
research, I spent extensive time over five years in these states, searching archival records 
on the history of drafting processes as they developed, collecting early drafts of 
legislation eventually enacted, and, most importantly, seeking out the drafters, ministry 
and parliamentary officials, and lawyers who had watched these processes develop over 
the course of more than twenty years. They do not comprise a large group: many who 
were senior enough at the “moment of transition” to have the most detailed understanding 
of what happened have since retired from their positions and from public life. Some who 
were just beginning their careers then are respected senior staff now, but they did not 
have “front-row seats” to witness decisions that were made by those who had greater 
seniority at the time. Two of the states analyzed in these case studies have spent 
significant time since transition as autocracies, and ministry and parliamentary staff have 
considerable reasons to be circumspect in what they reveal about the development and 
functioning of their legislation drafting processes. But in each state, there remains a small 
(often very small!) network of people who recall the events of these transitional years, the 
decisions and effort and setbacks, the frustrations and hard-won successes that constitute 
the development of contemporary drafting processes and of the post-communist corpus 
juris. To find these people and to understand the origins and effects of diverse legislation 
drafting processes – this is the work embodied in this dissertation. It has been a 
fascinating challenge, one that could not have been met but for the generosity of those 
who have shared their memories and insights and pointed me to documents that would 
shed light on the events they described. I find that the structure of factional conflict at 
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transition shapes the incentives that influence the choice of legislation drafting process, 
and that these processes can have important effects on the responsiveness of legislation 
and the quality of democracy. 
While this study focuses on a small set of cases that share many historical, 
linguistic, and cultural features, and that underwent transitions from communist rule at 
roughly the same time and shared the common task of replacing a body of communist 
law (lacking in property and contract law necessary in non-communist regimes), it may 
serve to open new questions for those studying other regions and other types of 
transitions. What forms does legislation drafting take? What factors influence the 
development of legislation drafting processes? Does it matter? Does the type of drafting 
process influence the responsiveness of legislation and the quality of governance and 
democracy? To what extent do the dynamics described here align with the experience of 
developing, transitional, and post-conflict states elsewhere? For example, does the 
identity-based rather than ideology-based politics of many developing African states 
make the findings of this study less relevant in these states? To what extent is the 
experience of post-communist Central and East European states unique? And does the 
experience of advanced industrial democracies – either now or in their own early 
development – bear any resemblance to the experience of polities transitioning today? 
These questions, beyond the scope of this study, present issues for further research. For 
now, I turn to these sixteen cases, to the story of how their contemporary legislation 
drafting processes developed and to a consideration of whether and why it matters. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 Early on a gray November day in Kyiv, just down the street from the Verkhovna 
Rada, the third floor of the Hotel Salute was shaking, the entire cylindrical concrete 
structure reverberating with deafening noise as if the building might dissolve into rubble, 
another icon of the late-Soviet “futurist-constructivist” streetscape meeting its post-Soviet 
fate. It was 2010, and by some accounts as many as 200,000 people1 had crowded into 
the streets, sidewalks, parks, and alleys surrounding the parliament building, spilling 
down the hill into Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Independence Square. People with cars had 
driven to the city center and were “laying on their horns”; people without cars had 
walked and taken buses and subway trains and were chanting and yelling, smashing 
utensils and sticks against pots and pans. The protest was reminiscent of 2004’s Orange 
Revolution, when Ukrainians had (as it seemed to many of them) awakened to realize 
their collective strength, refusing to leave Maidan in order to oppose what was widely 
seen as a fraudulent election outcome in favor of Victor Yanukovych, the handpicked 
successor to Communist-era holdover President Leonid Kuchma.  
 But the 2010 protest had not been provoked by a stolen election (Yanukovych had 
just won a clean election in 2010, according to international observers); or by 
Yanukovych’s moves stoking ethnic tension for electoral gain (he would do that later, 
with attempts to create special status for the Russian language in his native eastern 
Ukraine, home to many ethnic Russians who migrated from Russia in the Soviet era); or 
by violence against Ukrainians who opposed his policies or regime (he would later be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Korzun, K. (2011). Kyiv says its new tax code will snuff out corruption. TOL: Regional 
Intelligence. 
2 Ukraine ranked 112 of 189 countries on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business list, 
	  	  
2 
accused of doing that, too, turning security forces against Ukrainians in 2013’s 
EuroMaidan protests); or even by living in luxury while ordinary people struggled for the 
resources to survive (he did that as well, as Ukrainians would see for themselves when 
they wandered into his opulent estate after he fled the country). It is hardly surprising that 
provocations of this sort stirred up popular resistance. Free and fair elections, the equality 
of citizens under law, and security from state-sponsored violence – these fundamental 
democratic norms have been embraced by people in polities around the world, and 
perceived violations of these norms can provoke powerful opposition.  
But 2010’s “Maidan” arose from a much more obscure cause: a draft Tax Code, 
sitting on Yanukovych’s desk, awaiting Yanukovych’s signature and drafted through a 
process seen as chaotic, opaque, and unfairly inclusive only of the most powerful and 
well-connected interests. On the constitutional face of things, the draft legislation had 
gone through the normal legislative process: introduced on the prime minister’s initiative 
with the president’s support, debated in the Rada at each of the required readings 
(punctuated by committee hearings), passed by majority vote, and now, as the 
Constitution stipulated, the draft was to receive the president’s signature and to be 
published before coming into force. Despite this apparently unremarkable process and 
strong domestic and international agreement that Ukraine needed a new Tax Code,2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ukraine ranked 112 of 189 countries on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business list, 
in great part because of its uncodified and conflict-ridden tax legislation and 
consequently arbitrary enforcement. (See World Bank International Finance Corporation. 
[2013]. Doing business: Measuring business regulations).  International organizations and 
major national donors had widely recommended reform. See, for example, 
recommendations funded by Germany: Giucci, R., Kirchner, R., Betliy, O., & Otten, T. 
(2010). Reforming the simplified taxation for individual entrepreneurs in Ukraine (Policy 
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especially since a fifteen billion-dollar IMF loan depended on reforms, tens of thousands 
of Ukrainians converged on Maidan and on city centers across Ukraine, many of them 
camping outside the government and parliamentary buildings for two weeks. The 
problem, it turned out, lay deeper than the obvious legislative process, in the draft code’s 
origins. 
The Cabinet of Ministers had previously adopted a decree allowing entrepreneurs 
(natural persons) to opt out of the corporate tax system and to pay a “fixed tax” that 
included personal income tax, pension and social insurance contributions, trade patent 
costs, and trade taxes.3 Following this, the president had issued a decree allowing 
entrepreneurs and small businesses in an even wider array of sectors to pay a “unified 
tax” (or simplified tax) that included all of the taxes in the fixed tax as well as several 
other types, including VAT. This conflict of laws, common in Ukrainian legislation, 
meant that entrepreneurs could decide whether to pay the fixed tax, the unified tax, or 
regular corporate taxes. The system nurtured an extensive array of entrepreneurial 
enterprises, with between two and three million people employed. It also nurtured tax 
avoidance, as larger businesses broke into small legal units eligible for the lower and 
simpler tax schemes. A provision of the president’s decree also made services provided 
by these entrepreneurs tax deductible for larger businesses – and not surprisingly, a 
market in “invoices” quickly sprang up, with entrepreneurs who paid the low, flat unified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Paper Series). Berlin/Kyiv: German Advisory Group, Institute for Economic Research 
and Policy Consulting. 3	  Giucci, R., Kirchner, R., Betliy, O., & Otten, T. (2010). Reforming the simplified 
taxation for individual entrepreneurs in Ukraine (Policy Paper Series). Berlin/Kyiv: 
German Advisory Group, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting. 
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tax charging a set fee to invoice a larger company for a large amount that the larger 
company could then write off (but never actually pay). This system existed alongside the 
problem of “envelopes,” a shadow labor economy in which workers were paid (often at a 
slight premium) in cash to avoid their own personal income taxes and corporate pension 
and social insurance contributions. This “wild West” of tax noncompliance made 
revenues low and corruption in tax collection easy. As a result, few could dispute that the 
new Tax Code should reconcile conflicting bodies of law, pull together tax provisions 
scattered throughout other legislation, and deal with the perverse incentives of the triply-
divided business tax regime. 
While the situation as it stood embodied much of the legislation drafting process 
in Ukraine – dual executives, the Rada, and various executive and administrative bodies 
all drafting conflicting law and normative legal acts and issuing them without 
justification or reconciliation – the events of 2010 made this mere chaos seem tolerable 
by comparison. With Yanukovych’s Party of Regions also in power in the Rada, the new 
Tax Code was drafted in the Cabinet ministries. In early summer before unveiling the 
draft, Prime Minister Azarov called for a “national discussion” of the code. Curiously, the 
national discussion included only local bureaucrats whose own revenues would be 
affected, tax officials who enjoyed their discretion for arbitrary enforcement (and 
corruption), and large businesses in sectors tied to the government. Lobbying of ministry 
officials who were drafting the code’s provisions, opaque notice-and-comment 
procedures, and hearings that included the most connected characterized the process. 
Supporting research (such as might have existed) was not made public; likewise staff 
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expertise concerning the quality and likely impact of the draft. The resulting draft that so 
infuriated the public reflected this drafting process: provisions carved out special 
advantages like tax holidays for business sectors perceived as Party of Regions supporters 
whose representatives had participated in the drafting process. Other provisions permitted 
(often corrupt) tax auditors to perform random audits without court review. Still other 
provisions eliminated the write-off for services performed by entrepreneurs using the flat 
tax system, and applied the corporate tax system to most entrepreneurs. A deputy prime 
minister involved in the drafting process let slip that a purpose of the draft code was to 
return Ukrainian workers to the mines and factories (many “entrepreneurs” were 
independent accountants, lawyers, translators, and consultants unenamored of this vision 
for their professional futures, a goal that Ukraine’s shrinking mining and industrial 
sectors could not sustain in any case4). To many Ukrainians, it seemed obvious that the 
businesses close to the ruling party would get tax advantages, and self-employed people 
and small-business owners would be forced out of business to work for these large 
businesses at rates favorable to the would-be employers. Outrage met the draft code even 
upon its first reading in July, forcing the Rada to send it back to the Cabinet with 
thousands of requested changes. The process whereby the ministries responded was 
opaque, and anger grew, erupting in “TaxMaidan” upon the code’s final passage in 
November.  
Just to the north, post-Soviet Belarus saw a fairly coherent (if somewhat onerous) 
Tax Code passed in 2002 to virtually no opposition. Drafted in an office that reports 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Alliance Maidan. (2010). Tens of thousands protest against planned tax code 
throughout Ukraine. http://eng.maidanua.org/node/1184	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directly to the president and performs every aspect of legislation drafting from policy 
formulation and research to technical legal drafting and impact assessment, the draft code 
met with little resistance in the legislature and even less from the public. The code came 
into force nearly a decade before Ukraine’s, and the country is regarded as a simpler 
place to do business than Ukraine is.5 The coherence of the law and the administration’s 
success in avoiding a stand-off with the legislature or the population, however, has less to 
do with good governance and policy than with a cunning form of legalistic totalitarianism 
implemented through the hyper-centralized legislation drafting process. The drafting 
process in Belarus conforms all legislation to the precise preferences of the president, 
circumventing messy debate among legislators, experts, or citizens and ensuring that 
every provision, every phrase neatly legalizes even the most egregious violations of 
democratic norms by the president and the officials who surround him.6 Legislators do 
not draft legislative proposals, and they cannot suggest much criticism of the 
administration’s text.7 Belarus is inarguably undemocratic, yet its law is coherent – and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See World Bank International Finance Corporation. (2013). Doing business: Measuring 
business regulations.  
6 For example, Ales Bialiatski, a human rights activist in Belarus, was convicted on 
November 24, 2011 of tax evasion, sentenced to almost five years in prison, and deprived 
of his assets for using bank accounts in Poland and Lithuania to finance his human rights 
work. Under the Belarusian code, it is illegal for domestic NGOs to use foreign bank 
accounts, and it is also illegal for them to open domestic bank accounts unless registered 
as approved organizations. In perfect accord with every provision of the law, approval is 
denied to human rights organizations. (See Human Rights Watch. [November 24, 2011]. 
Conviction of rights defender a blow for rule of law). For more on the Belarusian case, 
see Chapters 4 and 7. 
7 Opposition United Civil Party leader Anatoly Lebedko, for example, was recently 
arrested for holding a mass action in violation of law. He was attempting to gather 
signatures in opposition to transport tax legislation newly drafted and proposed by the 
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the process by which it is drafted is designed perfectly to conceal any controversy in a 
central office that reports to the president, while the law’s inequities and authoritarian 
measures are carefully concealed in the language of legality that legitimates even 
profound abuses. 
 In these two countries sharing a long border and an even longer history, sharing 
cultural traditions and closely related languages, even until two decades ago sharing 
political institutions and administration, the legislation drafting processes could not be 
farther apart. One process is centralized, coherent, and procedurally predictable; the other 
fragmented, unruly, porous to organized interests, and shot through with contradictions 
and obvious inequities – and the text of the legislation they produce manifests these 
differences. Yet both countries have been governed by authoritarian presidents who rose 
to prominence through the ranks of the old Soviet order.  
Stranger still, post-Soviet Estonia’s legislation drafting process resembles neither 
Belarus’s centralized process nor Ukraine’s fragmented process, but is instead 
coordinated, saturated with expertise, and consensus-based. Both the Cabinet and the 
Riigikogu have staff resources to support policy formulation in drafting, research during 
legislation development, and professional assessment of draft legislation. The Ministry of 
Justice coordinates technical legal drafting. And the drafting process formalizes the 
inclusion of input from experts, representatives of potentially affected social groups, and 
the public, through participation in drafting commission, through surveys, and through 
online fora. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
administration. (See Belarusian opposition leader detained by police, faces trial. [2014]. 
RIA Novosti, January 12, 2014).  
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That these apparently similar countries’ legislation drafting processes could 
diverge so far in such a short time raises a number of questions. What factors influence 
the development of different types of legislation drafting processes during transition? 
How do we explain this puzzle? And does it matter?  
 The purpose of this study is to describe the variation in these processes and to 
uncover the origins of this divergence. I argue that the structure of factional conflict 
during the transition from communist rule produces the incentives that explain the 
variation in legislation drafting processes. The political factions (from which proto-
parties emerge) that choose the features of the legislation drafting process make this 
choice in the context of their relationships with factions in society – constituents, elite 
power brokers, organized interests and civil society organizations. These relationships are 
structured by features of the state and by the communication network. It is this structure 
of factional conflict that shapes the incentives of those who design the drafting process, 
and responding to these incentives, they create drafting processes with divergent features, 
features that can be broadly categorized as centralized, consensus-based, and fragmented.  
 One can imagine other possible influences on the choice of legislation drafting 
process: perhaps different countries have had different institutions in their more distant 
histories, legacies that re-assert themselves at the moment of transition. Or perhaps 
countries learn from each other, diffusing drafting arrangements from one to another. 
Perhaps electoral systems or legal traditions or regime types determine this choice. While 
these and other factors can play a role in the development of legislation drafting 
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processes, as the following chapters detail, they cannot sufficiently explain the evolution 
of these processes.  
The central importance of the structure of factional conflict in explaining the 
choice of drafting process raises additional questions. Is it possible that these drafting 
processes are just the penumbra of some more important political activity, mere 
reflections of the larger legislative process and unimportant in their own right? This is 
certainly the story that executives and legislators tend to tell themselves: a story with 
themselves at center stage, the light on them, and their staff, the lobbyists and organized 
interests, the international and supranational advisors and investors and civil society 
representatives in the shadowed wings. But to understand the micro-processes whereby 
the text of legislation is produced requires that we approach this view of legislative 
politics with some skepticism. Presidents, prime ministers, and legislators rarely have 
time even to read all of the draft legislation put before them, much less to assess it with 
considered expertise, and less still to draft it themselves. Unless they are intentional in 
authorizing a process, they also will not have time to hear from the range of people and 
factions whose interests might be affected by the proposed draft. To the extent that they 
delegate these tasks, a space opens between principal and agent, and in these spaces the 
agency of the supporting cast introduces new potential outcomes. Can the features of the 
legislation drafting process really shape the resulting legislative text, making it more 
responsive to some voices than to others and affecting its legal quality and impact? Even 
more profoundly, is it possible for these processes to contribute to the quality of 
democracy in transitional states? 
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In Belarus, the Tax Code is regularly used as a tool of surgical precision to punish 
and control the administration’s critics; political dissidents in Belarus have an uncanny 
penchant, or so their criminal records show, for “tax evasion,” and the charges brought 
against them are usually technically correct, since the law has been drafted specifically, 
provision by provision, to ensure that any action they might reasonably take is illegal. 
And yet the public does not protest, and the president remains firmly in power. What is 
there to contest? Duly appointed experts in a central executive office conduct legislation 
drafting according to procedure, legislation is duly passed and signed, and the resulting 
body of law is coherent and predictable. Belarusians can name profound disagreements 
with the illiberal policies of the administration, but these sources of dissent can be 
difficult to articulate as causes for mass protest, concealed as they are behind law of 
apparently unimpeachable quality and procedural legitimacy. We can contrast this 
outcome with the much happier experience of Estonia, where competing political factions 
engaged with a robust civil society created a legislation drafting process that situates 
expertise in both the executive ministries and the legislature, and that formalizes routine, 
widespread public input to draft legislation. In Estonia, the drafting process itself 
reinforces norms of coordination and peaceful alternations of political power between 
parties, and it produces, for example, tax and other legislation governing economic policy 
that has guided Estonia’s rapid, more equitable, and largely successful economic 
transition. 
And what of Ukraine, with its fragmented, more classically pluralist legislation 
drafting process? After the 2010 TaxMaidan protests, Yanukovych was forced to suspend 
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many of the offending provisions of the Tax Code. The irregularities in both the drafting 
process and the text it produced had become a cause for dissent, for contestation, for 
protest. Though few could argue that either the drafting process or the draft legislation 
was ideal, the very fragmentation of each opened space for formerly disengaged social 
factions to join the political debate that was shaping their country. Many of the 
entrepreneurs and small business owners mobilized during TaxMaidan began work to 
found the All-Ukraine Trade Union of Market and Commerce Employees and 
Entrepreneurs, an independent trade union not affiliated with the Federation of Trade 
Unions of Ukraine (an organization under the direct control of a senior member of the 
ruling Party of Regions). One activist of TaxMaidan, Oleksandr Danyliuk, led Common 
Cause, not just in working to protect entrepreneur and small business interests in the 
wake of the protests, but in organizing a range of civil society groups, an experience 
shared by other groups like The Headquarters for Saving Ukrainian Entrepreneurship. 
“Once we have mobilized enough people,” said Danyliuk, “we will start a series of 
protests that can grow into a national strike.”8 As it turned out, the people mobilized by 
their exclusion from the drafting process in 2010 (a slight made intolerable rather than 
procedural when representatives of larger, more connected interests were included) 
mobilized again in 2013. This time, these social factions were better organized, and they 
helped to fund the new protests at Maidan. What had started in an obscure 2010 meeting 
between ministers, ministry drafters, and factions connected to the ruling party had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Pastukhova, A. (April 12, 2011). Rallying non-stop. The Ukrainian Week. 
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sparked a revolution. In contemporary Ukraine, the Tax Code remains a work in progress. 
Yanukovych, on the other hand, is gone. 
  As the next chapters suggest, the structure of factional conflict at transition 
produces the incentives that explain what type of legislation drafting process political 
factions will choose. This evidence may prove useful not only to others who might wish 
to add to this initial analytical study of drafting processes, but also to those engaged in 
the larger comparative study of legislative organization. But perhaps more importantly, 
this is a story about how drafting processes can shape the detailed text of legislation in 
ways that include some people and not others, that make it more responsive to some 
voices and interests than to others, a story that has implications for the quality of 
democracy.  
The legislation drafting process and its effects on the details of legislation can 
create profound legacies for future political contestation, for equity outcomes, and for the 
further development of the legislative process and democratic discourse. In states with 
centralized drafting processes, legislation is often most responsive to the concerns of the 
ruling party’s supporters, and gaining a voice in legislation requires capturing control of 
the process, whether through voting for a responsible party (in democratic polities) or 
changing the regime (in non-democratic polities) – although the latter can be complicated 
by the fact that centralized drafting can offer procedural legitimacy to non-democratic 
rule and inequitable outcomes.  In states with consensus-based legislation drafting 
processes, legislation is shaped by expertise and by the concerns of those whom the 
legislation will address and affect, and legitimacy tends to inhere in both the procedure 
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and in the equitable features of the legislation produced; because a wide range of facts, 
interests, and expertise spanning the ideological/partisan continuum is included in the 
resulting legislation, this legislation also tends to produce relatively stable policy 
outcomes during implementation and to be grounded in the capacities of civil society. In 
states with pluralist drafting, the resulting legislation tends to reflect the process that 
created it: it is responsive (sometimes in obscure ways) to the interests that manage to be 
heard, and these voices often sing with an elite pitch – but the procedural inequities of the 
drafting process (as well as the inequitable outcomes it enshrines in legislation) create 
space for contestation and political debate. 
What factors shape the choice of drafting process at transition? What effect does 
this choice have on legislation? I turn now to these questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING PROCESSES  –  
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIVENESS 
 
“Legislative drafting is a difficult art. It is the art of expressing in concise and clear 
language the ideas of other people. It is difficult enough to express one's own ideas. It is 
much more difficult to express other people's ideas. The difficulty is all the greater when 
there is a doubt about the person whose ideas one is required to express. Whose ideas 
does a legislative enactment express? Controversy, if not confusion, commences with this 
question.”9 
Introduction 
Writing in 1964, just seventeen years after Indian independence, senior Indian 
legislative draftsman S. K. Hiranandani captured a problem central to any consideration 
of legislative responsiveness and representation, a problem that he argued particularly 
concerned his country as it consolidated its transition from colonial rule. His question 
underlies studies of representation, democratic accountability, and legislative bargaining. 
It is a question that has confronted students of U.S. congressional politics, democratic 
theorists and constitutional scholars in the world’s advanced industrial democracies, and 
citizens in transitional and developing democracies concerned with sustaining their 
countries’ transitions from authoritarian rule. Whose preferences, knowledge, and 
interests will the law express? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hiranandani, S. K. (1964). Legislative drafting: An Indian view. The Modern Law 
Review, 27(1). 
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Large though this question is, as Hiranandani observed, it bears with particular 
force on those who draft the actual text of legislative proposals. The sense that on this 
obscure activity rests much of the weight of democracy itself has long concerned offices 
of legislative counsel, ministry drafters, central drafting offices, and parliamentary legal 
expertise departments; and the judges, lawyers, and administrators whose daily work is 
shaped by the products of these drafting efforts. However, the literature they have 
produced has largely addressed professional issues of technique and judgment and 
normative questions of ethics. The comparative analytical study of the processes through 
which bills are drafted remains in its infancy. While a burgeoning literature on legislative 
organization and legislative bargaining has illuminated the incentives and strategies that 
shape the organization of and interactions between the various institutional creatures of 
the legislature—its Cabinet, its committees, its party caucuses and its committee of the 
whole—this literature has not explicitly considered the origins and evolution of various 
drafting processes, nor has it engaged the larger question of “whose ideas” various 
drafting processes privilege in shaping legislative outcomes. The expansive academic 
literature on democratic transitions and consolidation and its parallel professional 
literature on international development practice and legislative strengthening have 
similarly focused their attention elsewhere. This study will begin to address these 
deficiencies. 
The first part of this study seeks to identify the determinants of major varieties of 
legislative drafting processes during democratization, processes which include (1) 
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formulating policy concepts for translation into draft legislation; (2) conducting 
supporting professional research to guide drafting; (3) arranging public input during 
drafting; (4) technical legal drafting, and (5) non-political, formal technical assessment of 
draft legislation for legality and impact. Legislative drafting processes constitute an 
often-overlooked component of the larger legislative process. Comparatively, drafting 
processes range widely in their degrees of organization, centralization, and hierarchy. In 
some countries, drafting processes are highly centralized and hierarchical, as in the 
Westminster system (and of course, under some authoritarian regimes as well); in others 
they are negotiation- or consensus-based; in the least centralized and hierarchical these 
processes remain fragmented or pluralist. In the first part of this study, these varieties of 
drafting processes constitute the dependent variable. What factors influence the formation 
and subsequent evolution of these varieties of organization?  
While at first glance, one might guess that the organization of these drafting 
processes would vary with the electoral system or along the presidential-parliamentary 
axis, it turns out that this is not the case.10 It seems reasonable to think that electoral rules 
might produce parties capable of serving as legislative “cartels” that privilege themselves 
in the drafting process, as they do in other parts of the legislative process.11 Similarly, one 
might surmise that presidential systems would assign the executive a particular role in 
drafting legislation. Neither hypothesis is predictive. As examples from advanced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  Chapter	  3	  and	  Appendix	  A.	  
11 Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1993). Legislative leviathan: Party government in 
the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
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industrial democracies demonstrate, one parliamentary system, Britain, can have a highly 
centralized drafting process, while another parliamentary system, Sweden, has a 
consensus-based drafting process. The British drafting process also differs in type from 
that of the United States though both employ single-member district plurality electoral 
rules (and thus tend to have two-party political competition12). In fact, the British drafting 
process is closer in form to the French process than to either the Swedish or American 
process, though France is semi-presidential, uses proportional representation and a 
legislative process with complicated and robust bicameralism, and drafts for a civil rather 
than common law legal system.13 The pluralist nature of U.S. drafting differs 
significantly from the more centralized or consensual drafting processes of other 
presidential systems. Though this study does not analyze the causes or effects of variation 
in drafting processes in these advanced industrial democracies, authoritarian Communist 
successor regimes in semi-presidential Belarus and Ukraine have also produced 
legislation through widely divergent drafting processes, the first highly centralized, the 
second deeply fragmented. What accounts for this variation?  
Theories of legislative organization offer competing and useful perspectives on 
the motivations for institutional choice, but these theories focus on calculations 
endogenous to the legislature and often neglect to explain comparatively how various 
legislatures (even legislatures with superficially similar legislative processes) solve the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Duverger, M. (1972). Party politics and pressure groups. New York: Cromwell. 
13 Brown, L. N. (1988). British and French statutory drafting: A review article. The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 37, 696-701. 
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same challenges with different drafting solutions, sometimes choosing drafting processes 
during the transition to democracy before the first legislature has even been elected. 
Other literatures have considered the persistence of institutions created under previous 
regimes14 or alternatively, the diffusion of institutional rules from neighboring or 
influential foreign regimes.15  While these literatures present useful perspectives, drafting 
processes also do not consistently imitate those of previous regimes or of neighboring or 
influential polities, and further investigation is needed into other determinants of this 
institutional choice. 
This study considers factors that structure the motivations of those making these 
institutional choices. I focus on the structure of factional conflict and how it shapes the 
incentives of constitutional framers, legislators, and parliamentary staff at the “moment 
of transition” and during the first legislative sessions during democratization. I argue that 
the structure of factional conflict during the transition sets up incentives that explain the 
cross-national variation in legislation drafting processes. This structure determines 
whether those who create the legislation drafting process will find it most beneficial to 
open that drafting process to fellow partisans, to experts and technocrats, to constituents 
and local interests, or even to extranational interests (for example, foreign business 
interests, an international or supranational body, or a hegemon). While the literature on 
legislatures in advanced industrial democracies—particularly the United States—has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
15 Djelic, M., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2006). Transnational governance: Institutional 
dynamics of regulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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focused on the way Mayhew’s (1974) “electoral connection” shapes legislators’ 
strategies, the costs legislators incur relative to the benefits they gain in seeking broad 
input can create different calculations in transitional and developing democracies.16 This 
dissertation demonstrates that the structure of factional conflict shapes the benefits that 
framers and legislators gain from institutionalizing the involvement of particular voices 
in the drafting process.  
So to return to the central question, what accounts for the variation in legislation 
drafting processes, from highly centralized to deeply fragmented? Institutional 
persistence does indeed bequeath to transitional polities certain traditions of drafting, and 
these traditions do influence the initial choices framers make in establishing the post-
transition drafting process. But more significantly, framers and the executive, legislators, 
and staff in the early years of democratization exercise a great deal of agency. The 
structure of factional conflict among them creates the incentives that shape their choices.  
During transition, various factions compete (conservative blocs versus reformers, proto-
parties emerging from one-party rule in the communist era, elite versus citizen interests), 
and their competition is structured by rules (particularly district magnitude) and by the 
type of communication infrastructure connecting them. When this structure of factional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Smith and Remington (21-22) observe, “when institutions themselves are unstable or 
yet to be chosen—when the rules of the game are uncertain—goal convergence is likely 
to be more problematic. Politicians may have difficulty determining whether their 
multiple goals, or the multiple interests placing demands on them are compatible. And as 
they confront a series of choices about basic institutions, they may find that they must 
choose between valued objectives.” (Smith, S. S., & Remington, T. F. [2001]. The 
politics of institutional change: The formation of the Russian State Duma. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
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conflict produces partisan incentives, institutional designers tend to build highly 
centralized legislation drafting processes responsive to their fellow partisans’ preferences. 
When the structure of factional conflict produces informational incentives, they tend to 
build consensus-based drafting processes, responsive to expert and broad public 
preferences. And when the structure of factional conflict produces distributional 
incentives, they tend to build more fragmented drafting processes, responsive to elite 
preferences.  This relationship is complicated by other factors I explore.  
Within this theoretical framework, then, I offer empirical implications and 
hypotheses and test these in a cross-national quantitative comparison of sixteen Central 
and East European post-communist transitions to democracy (transitioning since 1989) 
and in a qualitative analysis of four of those cases. I then trace the process of further 
development of drafting capacities in these cases. Throughout, I emphasize that the 
relationship between the legislative drafting process and other features of political and 
social organization is dynamic, resulting in the co-evolution of each. As the legislature’s 
output of law touches on the interests of previously unengaged interests and the 
communication network becomes more efficient, new factions organize, triggering 
eventual changes in the drafting process and further changes in social organization.  
In the second part of this study, the legislative drafting process becomes the 
independent variable. This second part focuses on the outcomes differing types of 
legislative drafting organization produce. Does the type of drafting process matter? 
Specifically, does the organization of the legislative drafting process tilt the 
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responsiveness of resulting legislation to some interests rather than others? Controlling 
for the effects of other state structures, do these drafting processes independently affect 
the quality of governance and democracy? By design (as I demonstrate in the first part of 
this study) these processes designate specific principals for whom legislation developers 
and drafters serve as agents, and these processes also lower the cost of certain types and 
sources of information relative to others. As a result, I hypothesize in this second part of 
the study that the type of drafting process influences “whose ideas”—whose information, 
preferences, and interests—shape legislation. Within countries serving as case studies, I 
examine the effects of the drafting process on legislation governing the rights of a 
marginalized minority. I hypothesize that the type of legislative drafting process interacts 
dynamically with the evolving structure of factional conflict to influence the 
responsiveness of legislation.    
Legislative Drafting: Theories of Institutional Choice 
 In the rush of late “Third Wave”17 democratization since 1989, new democracies 
have adopted an array of legislative drafting processes, the components of which include 
(1) formulating policy concepts for translation into draft legislation (within the executive, 
within the legislature); (2) conducting supporting professional research to guide drafting 
(within the executive, within the legislature); (3) arranging public input during drafting; 
(4) technical legal drafting (within the executive, within the legislature, outside the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late 20th century. 
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 
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apparatus of the state), and (5) non-political, formal technical assessment of draft 
legislation for legality and impact (within the executive, within the legislature).  
Some countries have exceptionally centralized drafting procedures; for example, a 
single expatriate lawyer serving as Legislative Counsel in the newly-independent 
Republic of the Marshall Islands drafted all legislation for the entire country with 
unlimited discretion and virtually no oversight from the executive ministries or the 
senators themselves until 2007, when she proposed a new process to the Rules 
Committee of the Nitijela. Other states specify consensus-based drafting processes that 
involve executive and legislative contributions to drafting and require expert empirical 
analysis of, and the input of affected groups to, draft bills, although some share Estonia’s 
still-evolving adherence to such formal processes.18 Still others, such as Ukraine, have 
fragmented or pluralist drafting with overlapping and uncoordinated institutional 
responsibilities and processes that remain porous to elite interests and to highly organized 
social groups.19  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  As Narits (12) observed of the Estonian process, “An analysis of the explanatory 
memoranda of draft legislative acts with a significant social impact that were submitted 
to the Riigikogu for consideration indicates that the rate of compliance with clause 53, 
which sets for the requirements for …involvement of the target groups appropriate for the 
scope of application of the legislative act and for the presentation of the processing 
results is only 23%.” (Narits, R. [2004]. Good law making practice and legislative 
drafting: Conforming to it in the Republic of Estonia. Juridica International, 9). For 
further analysis of the Estonian case, see chapter 5. 
19  Fuley (2009) describes the Ukrainian drafting system, which gives individual 
Members of the Rada, party caucuses, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Office of the 
President rights of policy formulation and drafting: “Party members generate thousands 
of draft bills, unlike the system in the UK, where each MP can only register two draft 
laws…. Members and caucuses do not prioritize; when generating laws, they are very 
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These features of centralization versus fragmentation form a continuum of 
drafting processes, from processes highly centralized in the executive agencies (or even 
in one ministry, department, or person), to processes balanced between executive and 
legislative responsibilities for drafting, to those scattered among executive and legislative 
offices and extra-governmental actors without coordination.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
responsive to public demands….Legislators have sometimes voted ad hoc to suspend the 
rules, substituting judgment for rules of procedure. Although they have tried to amend the 
rules of procedure, this effort is an ongoing process. The rules of procedure are becoming 
sicker and more complicated…The amendment process has created discretion among 
those who know the rules.” She goes on to explain how the Office of the President 
submits proposals responsive to or even drafted by organized interests without regard to 
research conducted by its Institute of Strategic Research and notes that the U.S. State 
Department’s representatives in Kyiv have sometimes succeeded—like major national 
organized interests—in seeing favored draft bills introduced in the Rada. The U.S. 
Congress is similarly porous to draft bills—and even draft speeches—composed by 
organized interests. As the New York Times has reported, “In the official record of the 
historic House debate on overhauling health care, the speeches of many lawmakers echo 
with similarities….Statements by more than a dozen lawmakers were ghostwritten, in 
whole or in part, by Washington lobbyists working for Genentech, one of the world’s 
largest biotechnology companies. E-mail messages obtained by The New York Times 
show that the lobbyists drafted one statement for Democrats and another for 
Republicans….Asked about the Congressional statements, a lobbyist close to Genentech 
said: ‘This happens all the time. There was nothing nefarious about it.’” (Pear, R. 
[November 14, 2009]. In House, many spoke with one voice: Lobbyists'. The New York 
Times). For more on the motivations that shaped institutional choice and development in 
Ukraine, and their explicit connection to the pluralist U.S. drafting process, see chapter 7. 
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Degree of 
Centralization 
Type of Process Descriptors 
Organization, 
centralization, 
hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragmentation, 
decentralization, 
polyarchy 
Centralized/executive 
(President or Cabinet)+ 
• Coordinated responsible 
drafting authority/unitary 
initiative 
Coherence, 
accountability, efficiency 
Consensus/consultative  
(public or peak associations 
in commissions of inquiry 
or surveys)+ 
• Negotiated/consensual 
drafting 
authority/consensual 
initiative 
Negotiation, 
coordination, equity 
Pluralist/plebiscitary  
 (organized interests 
through multiple channels)+ 
• Multiple drafting authority 
with technical 
oversight/plural initiative 
Representativeness, 
accessibility, polyphony 
Table 1.1 Legislative Drafting Processes: A Typology 
 However, these processes also tend to cluster in three major types, types that 
differ not just in the degree of centralization versus fragmentation, but also in the extent 
to which the draw on expertise and allow for public participation and input. In highly 
centralized and executive-dominated drafting processes, policy concept papers 
(legislation blueprints) are formulated almost exclusively within the Office of the 
President or in the Cabinet. These states tend to concentrate research, technical drafting, 
and analysis of drafts in the executive, often coordinating the steps of the process through 
a single executive office (such as the Ministry of Justice).  Public input has often not been 
a key part of these drafting processes, as they tend to emerge in responsible party systems 
with clear legislative agendas responsive to the electorate politically (indeed, some forms 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
25 
of public input at the drafting stage would be seen as political corruption of the civil 
service), or in autocracies. In consensus-based and consultative drafting processes, both 
the executive and the parliament formulate policy, compile information and research, 
possess technical drafting capacity, and have expert resources for professional assessment 
of legality and impact. These systems actively seek out public input through coordinated 
mechanisms, including commissions of inquiry and public opinion surveys conducted by 
the research services (and in technologically developed cases, wikis for public comment 
on draft legislation). Fragmented and pluralist drafting systems are characterized by 
policy formulation not only in the executive and the legislature, but also outside the 
apparatus of the state; organized interests might even draft the text of legislation and 
lobby individual legislators or executive officials to support it. In both the executive and 
the legislature, technical drafting occurs in multiple settings (within various ministries, 
within the committees and staff departments of the legislature, in individual Members’ 
offices). Research and assessment functions exist in both the executive and the legislature 
– usually within multiple ministries, as well as in the parliamentary services. These 
drafting processes are highly accessible to organized interests (and sometimes to 
individual citizens), but their input is not coordinated institutionally.20 While advanced 
industrial democracies may rely on any of these types of drafting processes while 
maintaining broadly democratic and responsive to public concerns, in developing, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For one related conceptualization, see Kulisiewicz, W. (2003). Pluralism v. monism - 
institutional models of providing EU information to MPs - Polish experiences. 
International Conference of Parliamentary Librarians: Parliamentary Library, Research 
and Information Services of Central Europe (IFLA Satellite Meeting), Prague, 19. 
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transitional, and post-conflict states, centralization of drafting in the executive can 
support authoritarian outcomes, as Chapters 4 and 8 describe, and extreme fragmentation 
can undermine stability and contribute to cost-ineffective and incoherent legislative 
outcomes that reinforce elite privilege, as Chapters 7 and 9 describe. 
 What accounts for the variation in drafting processes? Existing theory and 
research suggest three broad kinds of determinants. First, the literature on legislative 
organization considers the motivations of the framers, the executive, and legislators as 
they make institutional choices, both during the transition from a previous regime and as 
the legislature develops. Other theories point to the persistence of institutions over time 
or alternatively, to the diffusion of institutional rules among states at each stage of 
legislative development. Finally, this dissertation offers a key to explaining the variation 
in these choices, focusing on how the structure of factional conflict shapes the incentives 
of those making institutional choices.  
Legislative Organization 
 A first broad set of competing theories considers how the interests of the 
legislature and its members shape legislative organization. At core, these theories share 
an acknowledgement of Mayhew’s “electoral connection”21: the need for parties and 
legislators to structure their activities in the legislature in ways that assure their reelection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
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and allow them to advance their own policy preferences if possible.22 The growing 
Europe-focused literature on comitology underscores this point.23  Whether they do this 
through distributing particular benefits, delivering effective policy, or improving the 
heuristic value of the party label, parties and legislators remember that they will 
eventually face a reckoning at the polls. 
Arising from the legislative bargaining literature, distributive models emphasize 
parties’ and legislators’ efforts to organize the legislature to facilitate gains from trade. 
Premised on recognition of majority-rule instability,24 these models focus on legislators’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Arnold, D. (1990). The logic of congressional action. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
23 Joerges, C., & Neyer, J. (2002). From intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative 
political processes: The constitutionalisation of comitology. European Law Journal, 3, 
273–299. 
24 Arrow famously demonstrated formally that majority rule is unable to produce 
complete, transitive social preference orderings under even minimal conditions of 
fairness.  While the Median Voter theorem (Black: 18) offers encouraging prospects for 
majority-rule voting in one dimension (when preferences are single-peaked, the median 
voter’s ideal point is a Condorcet winner), the multidimensional model provides a rather 
grim scenario for those who are not as satisfied as Schofield by potential instability in 
political outcomes (Johnson: 80). As McKelvey models, an agenda setter can lead 
shifting majorities of voters to accept proposals anywhere in the policy space—even if 
those proposals lie outside the Pareto set (the smallest convex set that includes all ideal 
points).  Schofield has shown that cycles are possible even without the “hops” McKelvey 
describes. As Shepsle and Bonchek (102) write, “from any starting point, there is a 
sequence of votes by which a majority will move the outcome to any terminal point” 
(including, say, the ideal point of the agenda setter). See Arrow, K. (1951), Social choice 
and individual values, Wiley: New York; Black, D. (1958), The theory of committees and 
elections, Boston: Kluwer Academic; Schofield, N. (1983), Generic instability of 
majority rule, Review of Economic Studies, 50, 695-705; Johnson, P. E. (1998), Social 
choice: Theory and research, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; McKelvey, R. D. 
(1976), Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models. Journal of Economic Theory, 
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desire to gain majority support for policies that return particularistic benefits to their own 
constituents. To do this, they set up rules that allow them to self-select their committee 
assignments and then engage in logrolling with other committees and members to obtain 
anti-majoritarian outcomes that nevertheless constitute equilibrium.25 Legislators 
motivated by distributional goals might create drafting processes that allow organized 
interests or constituents to make policy demands and submit or comment on draft bills 
directly to legislative committees or their members. They might avoid choosing drafting 
processes that either designate an exclusive official body to draft bills following an 
established legislative program, or require competing interests to provide information and 
participate in a consensual drafting process. 
A competing model focuses on how the legislature organizes itself to reduce 
policy uncertainty. In this informational model, the legislature wants to know that 
legislation will effectively embody its policy preferences (or more technically, those of 
the median legislator). To achieve this, legislatures reward policy specialization while 
minimizing distributional losses.26 This model fits with the expectations of the emerging 
literature on “legisprudence,” which argues that legislatures should rationalize lawmaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12, 472-482; Shepsle, K. A., & Bonchek, M. S. (1997), Analyzing politics: Rationality, 
behavior, and institutions. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
25 Shepsle, K. A. (1986), The positive theory of legislative institutions: An enrichment of 
social choice and spatial models, Public Choice, 50, 135-178; Weingast, B. R., & 
Marshall, W. (1988), The industrial organization of Congress, Journal of Political 
Economy, 96, 132-163; Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. (1989), Bargaining in legislatures. 
American Political Science Review, 83, 1181-1206. 
26 Krehbiel, K. (1991), Information and legislative organization, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press; Kiewet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1989). The spending 
power: Congress, the president, and appropriations. Unpublished manuscript. 
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processes through evidence-based policymaking and drafting.27 Legislators motivated by 
informational interests might create drafting processes that transparently compile credibly 
unbiased research on which to base drafts, assign technical drafting activities to neutral or 
balanced drafters, and require the input of competing interests in order to signal the bill’s 
likelihood of effectiveness upon enactment. They might avoid choosing drafting 
processes that designate a single official body (subject to partisan capture) to draft bills 
following an established legislative program or that allow organized interests to submit 
their own preferred draft bills. 
 Another model describes legislative organization as the result of the majority 
party’s attempts to maintain the party’s electoral appeal and control of the agenda.28 In 
this partisan model, parties essentially function as cartels that provide legislators with 
incentives to cooperate to achieve their collective goals. Gaining a majority in the 
legislature allows a party to create rules that perpetuate its interests. Legislators 
motivated by partisan goals might create drafting processes that give their faction control 
of policy initiative and legislative agenda setting, evidence gathering, and technical 
drafting—and that do not grant the minority amendment rights. They might avoid 
choosing drafting processes that require the consent of competing interests or that allow 
organized interests to submit their own preferred draft bills. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Wintgens, L. (Ed.). (2002). Legisprudence: A new theoretical approach to legislation. 
Oxford, OR: Hart Publishing. 
28 Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1993), Legislative leviathan: Party government in 
the House, Berkeley: University of California Press; Forgette, R. G. (1997). Reed's rules 
and the partisan theory of legislative organization. Polity, 29, 375-396. 
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Each of these models suggests specific types of drafting procedures legislatures 
might organize given certain motivations. A limitation of these theories, however, is their 
frequent inattention to the sources of these motivations. Because legislative organization 
here is driven by calculations endogenous to the legislature and its members, these 
theories cannot reliably explain under what circumstances we might expect to find 
legislators responding to one set of motivations rather than another. In fact, the most 
influential empirical studies in this literature tend to consider the evolution of one 
legislature and what motivation plausibly explains it, rather than to answer the 
comparative question of why different legislatures (or a single legislature at different 
times) organize to solve similar challenges in various ways. In addition, this literature 
tends to explain the evolution of legislative organization in established democracies but 
not its origins during democratization. These gaps suggest the need for a larger 
theoretical framework around these theories, one that takes into account other 
determinants and predicts when each of these models might explain institutional choice. 
As Forgette has noted, each of these theories shares certain features29; I argue that these 
features suggest a way forward. All three models explain legislative organization as a 
product of the “electoral connection.”30 They also share the recognition that legislative 
organization designates certain agents and principals. Forgette notes that the logics for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Forgette, R. G. (1997). Reed's rules and the partisan theory of legislative organization. 
Polity, 29, 375-396. 
30 Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
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doing so can change over time; following this lead I argue that the logics can also vary 
across cases.31 This leads to a second broad set of competing theories. 
Historical Institutionalism: Institutional Persistence versus Institutional Diffusion 
During democratization, at the “moment of the transition” from communist rule, 
existing institutions surround political actors. Framers, the executive, legislators, and 
parliamentary staff do not make their institutional choices from an infinite number of 
institutions that might be imagined. Instead, they tend to make their initial choices from a 
set of possibilities constrained by what already exists, either in their own polity or 
another one, and then adapt them to their ends. Two different institutional literatures step 
back from a consideration of these individual actors or political factions as the unit of 
analysis, focusing on state institutions as the unit of analysis instead. While both of these 
theories are less attentive to the motivations of actors participating in institutional choice, 
they share the strength of offering a cross-national perspective. 
A first broad literature on institutions describes institutional diffusion.32 In this set 
of theories, developing states borrow rules, organizational structures, and processes from 
other regimes and jurisdictions. Diffusion of institutional innovations might spread 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  In one possible construct, distributional models designate geographic-district 
constituents and organized interests and social factions as principals and 
executive/committees/ legislators as agents. Informational models designate the 
legislature median as the principal and technocrats and participants in the drafting process 
as agents. Partisan models designate the majority party median as principal and central 
drafters as agents. 
32 Melo, M. A. (2004). Institutional choice and the diffusion of policy paradigms: Brazil 
and the second wave of pension reform. International Political Science Review / Revue 
Internationale De Science Politique, 25, 320-341.  
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legislative drafting processes from contiguous states, or it might proceed from influential 
states and international organizations. The latter include hegemons (especially in these 
cases, Russia, the United States, and the European Union and its member states) and 
international organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and NATO.33 
Whether these entities pressure developing democracies to replicate foreign institutions, 
incentivize them with development aid, or simply influence them with the apparent 
effectiveness, “modernity,” or “scientific” quality of a process believed to promote “the 
rule of law,” developing democracies might adopt the legislative drafting processes of 
other jurisdictions. Diffusion of institutional innovation falls short of fully explaining the 
variation in drafting processes; first because it neglects to specify which neighboring or 
influential state a developing democracy will imitate and because even in cases plausibly 
under the hegemony of one state, drafting processes do not consistently reflect those of 
the hegemon. However, as the analysis will show, diffusion can sometimes complicate 
the evolution of the drafting process. 
Another institutional literature focuses on policy legacies and the persistence of 
institutions; developing states might simply retain the institutions of the previous 
regime.34 Though path dependence might create powerful reasons for a state to retain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Djelic, M., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2006). Transnational governance: Institutional 
dynamics of regulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
34 North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989), Constitutions and commitment: Evolution of 
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England, Journal of 
Economic History, 49, 803-832; Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (1997), Factor 
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existing institutions, doing so can present special hazards for developing states; Seidman 
et al. (32) observe that “inherited drafting rules…ill serve governments seeking to 
employ the law for institutional transformation.”35 As Acemoglu and Robinson point out, 
institutional persistence involves both de jure and de facto components: a formal change 
might have blunted effect if elites “intensify their investments in de facto political 
power.”36 However, persistence alone also cannot explain the origins of legislative 
drafting processes in developing democracies, as these processes do not consistently 
mirror those of previous regimes, even at the moment of transition, nor do they remain 
remotely static over time. Some explanation is needed that acknowledges the agency of 
political actors and accounts for their motivations as these institutional rules are chosen 
and developed. 
The Structure of Factional Conflict 
This dissertation argues that the structure of factional conflict shapes the 
incentives of those who make institutional choices about legislative organization and the 
legislation drafting process – often starting from a set of existing institutional rules, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
endowments, institutions, and differential growth paths among New World economies, in 
S. Haber (Ed.), How Latin America fell behind. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001), The colonial origins of 
comparative development: An empirical investigation, American Economic Review, 91, 
1369-1401; Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002), Reversal of fortunes: 
Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1133-1192. 
35 Seidman, A., Seidman, R., & Abeyesekere, N. (2001). Legislative drafting for 
democratic social change. Boston: Kluwer. 
36 Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
34 
then shapes how each of these choices structures subsequent ones. This approach remains 
focused on the motivations of actors (unlike much of the institutional literature) while 
allowing also for cross-national state-level comparison (unlike much of the legislative 
organization literature).  Of course, the structure of factional conflict is mediated by 
institutional persistence and institutional diffusion, but this study gives priority of 
explanation to the structure of factional conflict.  
Within this dissertation, “the structure of factional conflict” means “the identity 
and relative strength of competing factions as structured by features of the state and 
communication network.” To elaborate, many factions emerge and compete during 
transition from communist rule. This multidimensional competition includes conservative 
(in these cases, Communist Party) factions versus reform/radical factions and the proto-
parties emerging from these factions to compete against each other, and elite factions 
versus non-elite factions of varying levels of organization in civil society.  Although 
many factions might exist before transition, the end of communist rule can both reveal 
factions organized in the communist era out of the regime’s view and also spur the 
evolution of new factions. Factional conflict is structured by the state (specifically by 
district magnitude) and by the connectivity of communication networks that connect 
factions in state and society. The structure of factional conflict shapes the motivations of 
those designing the legislation drafting process in ways that explain the variation in these 
processes.  
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Drawing on previous research, in the next paragraphs I expand on each element of 
this concept and derive specific hypotheses about how the structure of factional conflict 
creates specific incentives to choose a relatively more centralized, consensus-based, or 
fragmented drafting process. 
Political factions: conservative factions versus reform/radical factions, and the 
proto-parties emerging from these factions. One important strand of the historical 
institutional literature shows that the relative strength of factions participating in the 
transition to democracy—factions aligned with reform/radical or conservative forces—
shapes the institutional choices that they make during the framing of the constitution.37 If 
the conservative faction leads or dominates the transition to democracy, framers and 
conservatives seated in the first session have an incentive to replicate legislative drafting 
processes from the previous regime; they can anticipate that their skills, knowledge of the 
process, and social networks will allow them to maintain political power if the drafting 
process remains unchanged (see also the discussion of institutional persistence and policy 
legacies, above). Alternatively, if they maintain a coherent partisan identity during 
transition, a dominant conservative faction will have partisan incentives to choose a 
relatively centralized and hierarchical drafting process that they can capture. If 
conservative and reform/radical factions (and the parties that emerge from them) have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Smith, S. S., & Remington, T. F. (2001). The politics of institutional change: The 
formation of the Russian State Duma, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Pérez-Díaz, 
V. (1993), The return of civil society: The emergence of democratic Spain, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
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relatively equal strength, their need to produce more effective policy than their rivals will 
produce informational incentives to choose a consensual drafting process, anticipating 
that they will enjoy veto rights over text in draft legislation they find intolerable. If 
conservative and reform/radical factions splinter into multifactional conflict, each faction 
will have a distributional incentive to create fragmented or pluralist drafting processes 
that will allow them to deliver particularistic benefits to their supporters. 
Social factions: elite versus non-elite factions in civil society, and their 
organization. Next, the identity and organization of various social factions also shapes 
the incentives during democratic consolidation, structuring the benefit political factions 
gain from including these social factions in the drafting process.38 If social factions are 
heterogeneous or fractionalized but their organization is low, dominant political factions 
gain little from trying to include diffuse competing social factions in the drafting process; 
instead, they have a partisan incentive to choose more centralized drafting processes that 
allow for party capture and control of the agenda for electoral advantage. If social faction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Voluntary group membership and participation in social networks have been shown to 
affect other types of political participation, including voting (see Verba, S., Schlozman, 
K. L., & Brady, H. E. [1995], Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Mutz, D. C. [2002], The consequences of 
cross-cutting networks for political participation, American Journal of Political Science, 
46(4), 838-855).  A few studies find evidence that group membership also increases 
political knowledge (see Stein, R. M., & Bickers, K. N. [1994], Congressional elections 
and the pork barrel, Journal of Politics, 56, 377-399; Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. [1995], 
Citizens, politics, and social communication, New York: Cambridge University Press; 
Dalton, R. J. [2002], Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced 
industrial democracies, New York: Seven Bridges Press.).  Although voters may not be 
generally informed about their representatives’ degree of responsiveness, they may be 
informed about responsiveness on matters relevant to them as members of a group. 
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organization is uneven or moderate (some interests mobilize but mobilization is uneven 
along class, ethnic, religious, or geographic lines), political factions have a distributional 
incentive to gain electoral support by creating pluralist drafting processes through which 
they can distribute particular benefits to “service the organized.”39 If social faction 
organization is high and widespread, political factions have informational incentives to 
choose consensus-based drafting processes that draw on the information of competing 
groups to reduce policy uncertainty and offer policy responsiveness. (As Martin and 
Swank have shown, state structures such as the legislation drafting process motivate 
group organization as well, suggesting that legislative drafting processes and social 
organization co-evolve.40)  
Features of the state. The state structures factional conflict, shaping the incentives 
of political factions to organize drafting processes in various ways. Fenno observes that 
legislators strategically choose forms of responsiveness on the basis of district 
characteristics41; larger or more heterogeneous districts require policy responsiveness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
40 Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2008), The political origins of coordinated capitalism: 
Business organizations, party systems, and state structure in the age of innocence, 
American Political Science Review, 102, 181-198; Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2012), 
The political construction of business interests: Coordination, growth, and equality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
41 Fenno, J. Richard F. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Glenview: 
Scott, Foresman and Company. 
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because service- and allocation-based demands are too diverse to be met.42 This literature 
also suggests that, at least at the high end,43 greater district magnitude can provide 
incentives to choose relatively more consensus-based drafting processes that produce 
more efficient policy results and greater policy responsiveness.44 45 46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Ragsdale notes the “overarching interest in responsiveness as a central element of 
legislative elections” in current research on representation (Ragsdale, L. [1994]. Old 
approaches and new challenges in legislative election research. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 19, 537-582). This type of representation extends beyond elections into the 
daily activities of legislators, and it can mean different things to different legislatures and 
to parties and legislators in different types of electoral districts. For example, Cox (56-61) 
has shown that the elimination of most “rotten boroughs” by Britain’s Reform Act of 
1832 coincided with a significant uptick in speechifying in the Commons by formerly 
silent MPs in the Commons about policy matters; with the expansion of suffrage, there 
were simply too many interests in the district for MPs effectively to go on “buying” their 
seats with particularistic benefits or outright bribes, so MPs began demonstrating policy 
or symbolic responsiveness. (Cox, G. W. [1987]. The efficient secret: The Cabinet and 
the development of political parties in Victorian England. New York: University of 
Cambridge Press). 
43 Hix, S., Hortala-Vallve, R., & Riambau, G. (2013). The effects of district magnitude on 
voting. Unpublished manuscript.	  
44 An open debate remains about whether open- or closed-list rules would incentivize 
greater policy responsiveness. (See, for example, International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems [2009], Proportional representation open list electoral systems in Europe, No. 
1, IFES). While open-list voting has been shown to increase the “candidate-centered” or 
personal vote (as candidates try to distinguish themselves from other members of their 
own party; see Hix, S., & Hagemann, S. (2014), Could changing the electoral rules fix 
European Parliament elections? ResearchGate), it is less clear whether this behavior is 
associated with distributional or policy responsiveness. On the one hand, among the cases 
considered in this study, those that use PR and that measure in the consensus-based 
legislation drafting process range associated with policy-responsive legislation use open-
list PR. But, as discussed above, electoral system more broadly is not predictive: two of 
the consensus-based legislation drafting processes are found in countries with mixed 
electoral systems. In addition, centralized drafting is found in one SMD country in this 
dataset and in one PR (closed-list) system. All five countries with fragmented/pluralist 
drafting processes in this dataset used PR (closed-list); Ukraine used SMD and a mixed 
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Features of the communication network. Features of the communication network 
further structure factional conflict, shaping the incentives of those creating the legislation 
drafting process.47 When the connectivity of communication networks linking factions in 
the capital with citizens is nonexistent or rudimentary, the costs of gaining information 
from citizens are prohibitively high, and political factions have instead an incentive to 
choose a drafting process open to foreign or domestic elites in the capital. Such 
rudimentary connectivity between citizens in the country at large and elite political 
factions in the capital not only create high costs in gaining information from citizens, but 
also lower the benefits since citizens are likely to remain relatively uninformed about 
legislative activity anyway, so legislators have a distributional incentive to choose 
pluralist drafting processes that allow them to “service the organized”48; groups with the 
resources and proximity to participate might even be allowed to draft preferred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
system during parts of this transitional period, switched to PR for 2006 and 2007 
elections, then returned to a mixed electoral system. 
45 André, A., Depauw, S., & Deschouwer, K. (2012). Legislators’ local roots: 
Disentangling the effect of district magnitude. Party Politics, 
doi:10.1177/1354068812458617. 
46 The question of whether bicameralism might affect the choice of legislation drafting 
process also arises. In the sixteen cases considered here, Czech, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovenia have a second elected chamber; all of these but Romania have consensus-based 
legislation drafting, while Romania’s drafting process is fragmented. Belarus (centralized 
drafting) and Russia (fragmented drafting) have partially elected, partially appointed 
second chambers. The other ten cases have unicameral legislatures. See Sénat (2014) 
Bicameralism around the world, position and prospects. Paris: Sénat. 
47 For more on the question, “Who is able to pay attention—or might begin to pay 
attention—to legislative behavior?” see Arnold, D. (1990), The logic of congressional 
action, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
48 Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
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legislation.49 When the connectivity of communication networks is developed sufficiently 
to transmit information to citizens, dominant (conservative) political factions have an 
incentive choose highly centralized drafting processes that allow for partisan capture and 
control of the agenda for electoral advantage; they can transmit their legislative agenda to 
the mass electorate at low cost but would still pay a high cost to receive information from 
society.50 As the connectivity of the communication network increases in scope and 
interactivity (as it is characterized by more mobile phones, personal computers, and hosts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Although I have observed this type of interaction between elite political factions and 
foreign or domestic elites in the capital in countries with nonexistent or rudimentary 
communication networks, none of the cases considered in this study are characterized by 
such low development of communication networks. Under communist rule, these 16 
states had at least developed television and radio networks capable of transmitting the 
regime’s message fairly broadly. As a result, this study cannot offer evidence to test the 
hypothesis that rudimentary/nonexistent communication networks influence a choice of 
fragmented drafting institutions. However, as data are available, this theory predicts that 
fragmented drafting processes would be more likely to be chosen in countries with low 
social faction organization at the extremes of connectivity – extremely low connectivity 
and extremely high connectivity.  
50  Do communication networks equip constituencies to pay attention only at the time of 
an election? Or do they belong to a network or issue public that keeps them consistently 
engaged? An extensive literature on the role of mass media in transmitting information to 
the electorate has considered the role of the media in shaping citizens’ political 
knowledge, sophistication, attitudes, and behavior. According to the learning model, the 
mass media provide new information that viewers include in their analysis of events 
(Graber 1994).  The news equips viewers with information that allows them to take 
central approaches to attitude formation about candidates (Ansolabehere, Behr, and 
Iyengar 1993; Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt 1995; Bennett 1996). Using a cognitive 
accessibility model, other studies have examined how media coverage evokes viewers’ 
own beliefs and feelings about issues (Iyengar 1991, Zaller 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 
1994, Kinder and Saunders 1996). However, information supplied by the media may be 
framed in ways that create bias (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Gamson 1992, 
Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996).  These frames may be provided by elites or by 
the media themselves. Furthermore, coverage may create bias simply through agenda 
setting and priming effects—emphasizing certain issues and events rather than others 
(Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
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per capita), so too does the capacity of political factions to offer particularistic benefits, 
and the capacity of “the heavenly chorus”51 across the country to demand these benefits. 
As such, as connectivity increases, political factions have a distributional incentive to 
choose increasingly fragmented/pluralist legislation drafting processes. However, this 
effect is mediated by interaction with the organization of social factions.  When 
communication networks have high connectivity allowing for multi-directional 
information flows, and when social faction organization is also high and widespread – in 
short, when there is a highly developed communication network and “someone on the 
other end of the line” to speak for the varied interests of non-elite social factions –
political factions have an informational incentive to choose consensus-based drafting 
processes that allow them to gain expert and public input; the cost of doing so is low, and 
the benefits include reduced policy uncertainty and the competitive electoral advantage of 
policy responsiveness. In sum, this theory anticipates that as connectivity increases, 
political factions will follow the incentive to choose more fragmented drafting processes, 
but this effect will be mitigated by its interaction with the effect of social organization, 
which will “pull” the choice of drafting process back toward the middle, consensus-based 
range of organization. 
The structure of factional conflict, then, produces the incentives that shape the 
choice of a legislation drafting process. In light of the preceding hypotheses, we can 
imagine three ideal cases:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy 
in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden. 
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(1) When the structure of factional conflict is characterized by a dominant 
conservative faction (and parties emerging from it) connected to unorganized social 
interests via a transmission-oriented network (such as state radio and television), this 
theory anticipates that partisan incentives will align to produce highly centralized 
legislation drafting.  
(2) When the structure of factional conflict is characterized by strongly 
competitive conservative and reform/radical factions (and emerging parties) connected to 
highly organized social factions via a highly connective two-way network (such as online 
networks and mobile telephones), this theory anticipates that informational incentives 
will align to produce consensus-based drafting, which will be relatively more or less 
centralized as mediated by district magnitude.   
(3) When the structure of factional conflict is characterized by multifactional 
competition (perhaps with splintered conservative or reform/radical factions and the 
proto-parties emerging from them) linked to unevenly organized interests via networks of 
increasing connectivity, this theory anticipates that distributional incentives will align to 
produce a fragmented, pluralist drafting process. 
The case studies that follow in chapters 4 through 7 typify these ideal cases. 
Throughout its transition from Soviet rule, Belarus’s conservative (Communist) faction 
has remained overwhelmingly dominant, using its control of state television broadcasting 
to connect to a society left almost completely without broad organization after severe 
repression under German occupation and Soviet rule. As expected, the conservative 
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faction’s partisan incentives have produced a legislation drafting process so centralized as 
to be nearly a caricature of centralized drafting. In Estonia, conservative and 
reform/radical factions have competed in equilibrium, linked with a highly organized 
society via online communication networks of high connectivity almost since the moment 
of independence. As expected, political factions’ (and emergent parties’) informational 
incentives have produced consensus-based drafting; diffusion from Sweden and the 
OECD both help to explain why Estonian legislation drafting is more centralized than 
other consensus-based processes. Poland’s balanced conservative and reform/radical 
factions, linked with a highly organized society via highly connective communication 
networks, have produced informational incentives as well. Like Estonia, Poland has a 
consensus-based drafting process, as predicted by the theory – but Poland’s diffusion 
from the United States rather than Sweden helps to explain partly why its process is 
slightly less centralized than Estonia’s, locating more technical drafting capacity in the 
parliament and centralizing executive drafting functions less. Finally, since its transition, 
Ukraine has had strong conservative factions and splintered reform/radical factions, 
connected to an unevenly organized society via a mix of highly developed television 
networks and rudimentary online networks; during its post-Soviet history, Ukraine has 
had a majority SMD system and a mixed electoral system, as well as a brief period of PR 
(during the relevant period of transition, Ukraine had 450 single-member electoral 
districts). This structure’s distributional incentives to create a pluralist drafting process 
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have been reinforced by diffusion from the United States. As expected, Ukraine’s 
legislation drafting process is deeply fragmented.   
In between these archetypal cases, we can imagine cases with different structures 
of factional conflict. In some polities, these structures offer mixed incentives, and the 
resulting legislation drafting processes are interesting hybrids falling between the four 
cases examined here on the continuum of centralization to fragmentation. (For an 
approach to comparing these variations in the structure of factional conflict, see Chapter 
3). These cases demonstrate that the structure of factional conflict is the source of the 
motivations that drive the variation in legislation drafting processes. 
Legislative Drafting: Theory of Institutional Effects  
Institutional Effects on Political Behavior: Legislative Bargaining 
Does the variety of legislation drafting processes matter? Do these institutional 
choices exert any influence on legislative outcomes, on the responsiveness of legislation 
to various interests or to citizens? Do they have any effect on the quality of governance 
and the quality of democracy? The literature on institutional effects on political behavior 
–  particularly the literature on legislative bargaining – suggests that they do. I examine 
this issue in the second part of this dissertation. 
An extensive literature on legislative bargaining considers institutional effects on 
political behavior and legislative outcomes. Since Shepsle’s path-breaking formal 
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modeling of “structure-induced equilibrium,”52 empirical research has explored the 
effects of various institutional rules and processes on legislative bargaining.53 Even while 
it has considered the effects of such important but obscure institutional rules as those that 
govern cabinet decision-making,54 however, this literature has paid little attention to 
legislative drafting processes. While drafters, lawyers, and judges have remarked 
extensively on drafting practice and ethics, the literature on development has also 
overlooked the effects of legislative drafting processes (though sometimes engaging the 
question of drafting technique), despite development organizations’ strong focus on 
“legislative strengthening.”55 The drafting process has often been ignored because it is 
seen as purely technical; elected officials are supposed to be debating every detail of 
proposed legislation in idealized democratic fashion56 and simply committing their 
completed policies to drafters for transcription into “legalese.”57 As noted above, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Shepsle, K. A. (1979). Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional 
voting models. American Journal of Political Science, 23, 27-59. 
53  See, for example, studies of portfolio assignment, Tsebelis 1995; term length, McLean 
1987; coalition formation/termination, Lupia and Strøm 1995; cabinet decision-making 
rules, Huber and McCarty 2001; vote-of-confidence procedures, Diermeier and 
Fedderson 1998; dissolution, Strøm and Swindle 2002; amendment rules, Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989, Huber 1992; committee assignment rules, Diermeier 1995, Dion and 
Huber 1996, presidential-legislative interaction, Shugart and Carey 1992. 
54 Huber, J. D., & McCarty, N. (2001). Cabinet decision rules and political uncertainty in 
parliamentary bargaining. American Political Science Review, 95(2), 345-360. 
55 USAID (2000), USAID handbook on legislative strengthening, Washington, D.C.: 
USAID Center for Democracy and Governance; UNDP (2010), Benchmarks and self-
assessment frameworks for democratic legislatures UNDP. 56	  Habermas, J. (1983). The theory of communicative action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.	  
57  Seidman, A., Seidman, R., & Abeyesekere, N. (2001). Legislative drafting for 
democratic social change Kluwer. 
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assumption has mythical properties even in most advanced industrial democracies; in 
many developing democracies it borders on delusion.58  
In this dissertation, I argue that legislation drafting processes in transitional 
polities shape bargaining over the content of legislation, privileging certain information 
and preferences and excluding others. Highly centralized drafting processes tend to 
produce legislation that favors the preferences of the executive, and perhaps more 
insidiously in transitional polities, the preferences of the conservative faction (and parties 
that emerge from it). These processes also predictably produce legislation that favors the 
elites aligned with the executive and the conservative faction, whether these elites are 
foreign or domestic. Consensus-based drafting processes tend to produce legislation that 
is relatively the most thoroughly grounded in empirical analysis and reflective of broad 
interests, legislation that articulates stable, efficient policy and is associated with high 
quality of democracy. And fragmented drafting processes tend to produce legislation that 
is highly responsive to organized, connected factions and unresponsive to other interests, 
often in ways that prove highly inefficient and cost-ineffective. 
Some might question whether the drafting process is anything more than a 
shadow cast by the larger legislative process, a mere reflection of the characteristic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  For example, Tupou describes the drafting process in the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, where the average level of education among senators at the time of democratic 
transition was grade 10 in secondary school. As a result, legislators had limited capacity 
for developing or assessing draft legislation, which was instead drafted by a highly 
trained expatriate lawyer (Tupou, S. [2008] Personal interview, Boston). Sometimes the 
volume of draft legislation proposed overwhelms new legislative processes, and 
legislators simply do not have time or adequate staff to read it (Fuley, T. [2009], 
Policymaking and drafting in transition, Unpublished manuscript).  
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representation and responsiveness of the political system itself and, to the extent that it is 
carried out by ministry staff or parliamentary staff, subject to the whim of the political 
principals – and thus exerting no independent effect on resulting legislation. While it is 
true that ministry and parliamentary staff involved in the drafting process are usually 
legally (and sometimes managerially) constrained to fulfill their duty to serve their 
elected “clients” in the executive or in parliament, and while it true that the legislature 
generally possesses constitutional authority and political capacity to change or override 
the legislation drafting process at will, empirically, drafting processes vary in the ways 
they bestow discretion, in the extent to which they “outsource” or delegate decision 
making from the elected executive and legislature, in the number of constituencies they 
generate for their preservation as the status quo, and in their independence from political 
control. In fact, even when drafting processes are overrun by political processes and 
political principals, becoming little more than projections of the larger political situation 
– as has happened under authoritarian communist-successor regimes in both centralized-
drafting Belarus and pluralist-drafting Ukraine, they tend to succumb in divergent ways 
(as I detail in Chapters 8 and 9). Because legislation drafting processes designate 
principals and agents in a diverse range of configurations, and because they privilege 
information from certain sources over others, this theoretical framework anticipates that 
the type of drafting process exerts an independent effect on legislation, and as a second-
order effect of this fact, on the quality of democracy. 
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The Origins of Legislative Drafting Processes 
 What accounts for the variation in legislative drafting processes in developing 
democracies? In Part 1, I explore this first research question. Chapter 3 introduces 
comparative data on legislative drafting processes in 16 European countries transitioning 
from communist rule since 1989, as well as 3 contiguous and influential polities, drawing 
on historical sources and interviews to offer the first comparative dataset on pre- and 
post-transition legislation drafting processes. Using these data, I conduct a cross-national 
quantitative analysis to test the effects of institutional persistence and the structure of 
factional conflict on the origins of drafting processes during transition to democracy. In 
Chapter 3, I also expand on some important variations within the three ideal types of 
drafting processes. This type of analysis can begin to shed light on the relative effects of 
theories of the macroevolution of drafting institutions – on how legislation drafting 
processes are replicated over time and space, and on the how higher-order structure of 
factional conflict produces the incentives for actors making institutional choices. These 
findings, in turn, suggest a way to predict across cases which motivations (distributive, 
informational, or partisan) we might expect to find operating within a particular 
legislature, explaining the choice of drafting process.  
However, the greater level of generalization available through quantitative 
comparison requires the elision of key features of particular cases – features that explain 
the microevolution of legislation drafting processes. To explore these micro-foundations 
of legislative organization and the underlying causal relationships that structure the 
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design of legislation drafting processes, Chapters 4 through 7 trace the features and 
historical evolution of the drafting process in four cases: highly centralized drafting in 
Belarus, highly coordinated consensus drafting in Estonia, diffuse consensus drafting in 
Poland, and pluralist drafting in Ukraine.  
The Effects of Legislative Drafting Processes 
In Part 2, I turn to the question of how legislative drafting processes affect the 
responsiveness of legislation. In Chapter 8 I consider the case of Belarus, tracing the 
history of a broad class of legislation as it was developed and assessed. I consider the 
effects on the responsiveness of legislation concerning a vulnerable minority. Here again, 
the theory anticipates that centralized legislation drafting will subject vulnerable social 
minorities to the preferences of the dominant conservative faction, and this study finds 
support for this hypothesis.59 60 61 In contrast, Chapter 9 details the effects of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The ongoing research agenda for future investigation could fruitfully explore effects of 
the other major types of legislation drafting process on legislation governing the rights of 
vulnerable minorities in additional polities.	  Consensus legislative drafting processes are 
predicted to produce the greatest security for minority rights, as minority groups have a 
chance to participate in coordinated drafting procedures. Because within pluralist 
legislative drafting processes minorities can propose legislative provisions that serve their 
particular interests, legislation generated through these processes is predicted to have 
provisions that are highly responsive but also highly inefficient. 
     Further research could also usefully investigate the effects of legislation drafting 
institutions on legislation governing foreign direct investment. A large literature on 
dependency theory focuses on foreign investment in developing states (see, for example, 
Cardoso 2001, O’Donnell 1996) and an economics literature focuses on the comparative 
effects of common and civil law traditions on investors’ rights and economic 
development (see, for example, Beck and Levine 2003, Graff 2005). Beck and Levine 
argue that a political mechanism operates through the fact that “legal traditions differ” to 
produce different outcomes for investors and creditors in various states (Beck, T., & 
Levine, R. [2003]. Legal institutions and financial development). Similarly, I posit that 
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consensus-based drafting process in Estonia and the highly fragmented pluralist drafting 
process in (also authoritarian) Ukraine on the responsiveness of legislation concerning 
vulnerable minorities. These chapters demonstrate in otherwise comparable states the 
divergent outcomes in the responsiveness of legislation at the two ends of the 
centralization-fragmentation continuum in drafting processes. Finally, in Chapter 10 I 
consider a second-order effect, the effect of the type of drafting process on the quality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legislative drafting processes work as political mechanisms that privilege certain actors’ 
knowledge and preferences and exclude others. Therefore, this theory anticipates that 
highly centralized and highly decentralized drafting processes will produce legislation 
more responsive to elite and foreign investors, who can capture the drafting process or 
lobby for particular concessions. Empirically, this issue is of particular interest in post-
communist states, as they offer something like a natural experiment since all property 
was state-held before transition. Consensus legislative drafting processes might be 
expected to prove most resistant to elite and foreign cartel dominance because they 
include representatives of non-elite domestic interests.  
60 This theory anticipates that the type of legislation drafting process exerts a second-
order effect on quality of governance, a key concern of development professionals. 
Quality of governance includes transparency and legitimacy. (UNDP [2010], Benchmarks 
and self-assessment frameworks for democratic legislatures, UNDP). Because consensus-
based corporatist processes provide the most information to combat policy uncertainty 
(see above), I hypothesize that these systems will produce the highest quality of 
governance. In centralized processes, the president or partisan cartels in Cabinet have an 
interest in maintaining control of the agenda and drafting process to increase the 
efficiency of implementation and secure their continuance in office, so I hypothesize that 
they will produce lower levels of transparency, resulting in a moderate quality of 
governance. Because pluralist drafting processes are designed to serve particular 
interests, I hypothesize that they will also produce lower levels of transparency (and thus 
lower quality of governance). 
61 Institutional rules affect the scope of participation and establish veto rights for 
vulnerable groups in legislative competition, key aspects of democracy. As described 
above, legislative drafting processes structure “whose ideas” will be heard as the details 
of legislation are crafted. Because consensus-based drafting processes create the highest 
participation and (unlike the other two ideal types) create real veto points, this theory 
suggests that they will contribute to the highest quality of democracy. See Chapter 10 for 
theory and analysis. 
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democracy, demonstrating that consensus-based drafting is associated with higher quality 
of democracy. Previous research has demonstrated that other features of legislative 
organization affect quality of democracy, and this chapter returns to cross-national 
analysis of these institutional effects.62  
Conclusion 
 The study of drafting processes in developing democracies is important for 
several reasons. Most significantly, “whose ideas” will be heard as legislation is drafted 
is a question of representation, the fundamental issue in democratic theory. In Federalist 
10, Madison identified representation as the central feature of the republican form of 
democracy:  “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of 
representation takes place,” is characterized by “the delegation of the government…to a 
small number of citizens elected by the rest.”63  Precisely what form this representation 
should take once the election is over has long been a matter of debate.  Echoing Burke 
and fearing “the mischiefs of faction,” Madison envisioned representation as a filter 
through which the passions of the public might be strained to produce judicious policy in 
the best interests of society. More recent theorists have proposed alternatives to this 
“trustee” model of representation.  One of these sees the elected representative as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Lucas, L. (2004). Context and perception in contemporary congressional elections. 
Unpublished M.A. 
63 Madison, J. (2001). Federalist paper No. 10. In S. Welch, & et al. (Eds.), 
Understanding American government. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Group. 
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delegate “sent to pursue his constituents’ will and not his own.”64 This view emphasizes 
the representative’s responsibility to respond to constituents and their preferences (unless 
he can explain to constituents why his vote runs counter to their preferences):  
“Representation here means acting …in a manner responsive to [the represented]…. 
[T]here need not be a constant activity of responding, but there must be a constant 
condition of responsiveness, or potential readiness to respond.”65  Implicitly or explicitly, 
much of the contemporary literature on representation embraces the delegate model, 
evaluating representation by measuring the degree to which incumbents are responsive to 
their constituents and the legislature is responsive to the electorate.66 While previous 
research has demonstrated collective legislative responsiveness—the national electorate’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Pitkin, H. F. (1967), The concept of representation, Berkeley: University of California 
Press; McCrone, D. J., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1979), The delegate theory of representation, 
American Journal of Political Science, 23, 278-300. 
65 Pitkin, H. F. (1967), The concept of representation, Berkeley: University of California 
Press; Jones, B. D. (1973), Competitiveness, role orientations, and legislative 
responsiveness, Journal of Politics, 35, 924-947. 
66 Ragsdale, L. (1994), Old approaches and new challenges in legislative election 
research, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19, 537-582; Luttbeg, N. R. (1992), Legislative 
careers in six states:  Are some legislatures more likely to be responsive? Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 17, 49-68; Bartels, L. M. (1991), Constituency opinion and 
congressional policy making: The Reagan defense buildup, American Political Science 
Review, 85, 457-474; Hurley, P. A. (1982), Collective representation reappraised, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 7, 119-136; Erikson, R. S. (1978), Constituency opinion 
and congressional behavior:  A reexamination of the Miller-Stokes representation data, 
American Journal of Political Science, 22, 511-535; Erikson, R. S. (1981), Measuring 
constituency opinion:  The 1978 U.S. congressional election survey, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 6, 235-245; Fiorina, M. P. (1974), Representatives, roll calls, and 
constituencies, Lexington: DC Heath; Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1963), 
Constituency influence in Congress, American Political Science Review, 57, 45-56. 
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choice of the legislature on the basis of aggregate preferences67 and the extent to which 
the legislative agenda reflects aggregate constituent priorities68—little empirical work has 
been done on the potential for the drafting process to privilege certain voices in ways that 
make actual legislative enactments relatively more or less responsive to the 
“represented,” especially in developing democracies.69 In addition, previous research on 
the origins and early evolution of drafting processes is virtually nonexistent. This study 
will contribute both theoretically and empirically to the literature on these micro-
foundations of representation. 
 Moreover, legislative drafting processes take on particular significance in light of 
an extensive formal theoretic literature on legislative bargaining. This literature has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Weissberg, R. (1978), Collective vs. dyadic representation in Congress, American 
Political Science Review, 72, 535-547; Hurley, P. A. (1982), Collective representation 
reappraised, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 7, 119-136; Tufte, E. (1975), Outcomes of 
midterm congressional elections, American Political Science Review, 69, 812-826; Tufte, 
E. (1978), Political control of the economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.	  
68 Erikson, R. S., & Wright, J., Gerald C. (2001). Voters, candidates, and issues in 
congressional elections. In L. C. Dodd, & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress 
reconsidered (7th ed., pp. 67-95). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
69  As Clonard (458-9) colorfully noted, “[T]he man who writes a law is not usually a 
Senator or Representative. It is a lawyer employed either by a government department or 
by a politically influential group of citizens….After it leaves the draftsman’s hands, it 
passes through a hierarchy of officials…or of clients…before it ever reaches the 
legislative chambers….This fiction of legislative authorship is one of the principal 
obstacles to better drafting” processes (Clonard, A. F. [1947], New ways to write laws, 
Yale Law Journal, 56, 458-459). Feldblum describes the legislative lawyer as the 
“individual responsible for developing the content of the proposed legislation, or the 
content of amendments that may stop or effectively alter proposed legislation. The 
legislative lawyer must be well versed in both politics and law in order to craft the 
content of legislation effectively” (Feldblum, C. R. [2003]. Five circles of an effective 
coalition, Georgetown Law). 
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arrived at the perhaps depressing conclusion that unconstrained by certain institutional 
rules, an agenda setter can carry any proposal she makes to a majority-rule body70; under 
this scenario, the person(s) who initiate and draft legislative proposals—that is, bills—
will prove likely to see their preferences enshrined in any law that results.71 This study 
extends the theoretical and empirical literature on legislative bargaining by considering 
how the rules of the legislative drafting process assign agenda-setting power to specific 
actors and the extent to which those rules constrain otherwise potentially omnipotent 
agenda setters. 
 Third, this study extends the literature on legislative organization in two ways. It 
brings a comparative empirical analysis to bear on a feature of legislative organization—
the drafting process—that has previously been studied almost exclusively by 
practitioners. More importantly, it sheds light on competing theories of legislative 
organization.  While previous research has tested the power of these theories to explain 
the organization of particular legislatures, it has often overlooked the question of why 
different legislatures organize their drafting processes in various ways. This dissertation 
demonstrates that the structure of factional conflict shapes the incentives that explain the 
variation in legislation drafting processes. 
Finally, this research has important implications for citizens, officials, and 
international development practitioners interested in improving the quality of governance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 McKelvey, R. D. (1976). Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 12, 472-482. 
71 Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, 
and the status quo. Public Choice, 33, 27-43. 
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and democracy, and more directly, the responsiveness of legislation to constituent 
preferences, especially during the transition to democracy and in developing 
democracies. The text of a bill articulates specific interests, knowledge, and preferences –
sometimes the constituents’, sometimes elites’, often merely the drafter’s— with 
sometimes drastic effects on governance outcomes, as became clear when the United 
States Coalition Provisional Authority enacted in Iraq a traffic code drafted for the 
expatriate drafter’s home State of Maryland—and Baghdad’s streets plunged into 
chaos.72 As Seidman et al. write, those who participate in the drafting process are 
“responsible for translating policy’s broad dictates into the law’s form and details. There 
lurks the substance of policy. By designing form and details, drafters unavoidably 
participate in designing the policy’s operative force.”73 74 Ultimately, legislation is a 
product of the voices that participated in its conception and drafting, and when drafting 
processes privilege elite or extranational voices, the “represented” stand to lose in 
sometimes calamitous ways, as shown in a story as outrageous as it is familiar to 
observers of developing democracies and occupied states alike: 
The Iraqi parliament has gone into summer recess without passing the oil law that 
Washington was pressing it to adopt. For the Bush administration this is irritating, 
since passage of the law was billed as a "benchmark" in its battle to get Congress 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Langewiesche, W. (November, 2004). Welcome to the Green Zone. The Atlantic 
Monthly. 
73 Seidman, A., Seidman, R., & Abeyesekere, N. (2001). Legislative drafting for 
democratic social change. Boston: Kluwer. 
74 Bates, T. (2009). Legislating for drafting: The Moldavian experience. Statute Law 
Review, 30(2), 123-139. 
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not to set a timetable for US troop withdrawals….The law that Washington and 
the US oil lobby really want would set the arrangements for foreign companies to 
operate in Iraq's oil sector….Platform, an oil industry watchdog, warns that the 
Iraq oil and gas law could ‘sign away Iraq's future’….[T]he British government's 
role - like that of most western governments - has not been good. Working closely 
with the Americans, British officials in Baghdad saw drafts of the law before the 
Iraqi parliament. Britain supports the IMF line that Iraq's final tranche of 
Saddam-era debts cannot be forgiven until Iraq has a law permitting foreigners a 
role in the oil industry.75 (emphasis added) 
The proposed study has implications for students of advanced industrial democracies as 
well. The same types of calculations that take place in developing democracies might 
shape the evolution of drafting processes in established legislative systems over time. 
And as the story of the oil law for Iraq demonstrates, as the story told in the following 
pages illustrates, the legislatures of developing and established democracies are far more 
enmeshed than citizens in either might care to discover. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Steele, J. (August 3, 2007). Good news from Baghdad at last: The oil law has stalled. 
The Guardian. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGINS OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 
PROCESSES 
Introduction 
 
 As we survey the landscape of legislation drafting practice and processes more 
than twenty years after the transition from communist rule, we see a wide divergence 
across post-communist states, ranging from highly centralized and coherent processes to 
deeply fragmented and pluralist processes. Whereas we might at first glance assume that 
this variation is a result of a state’s regime type, these cases suggest that a deeper cause is 
at work. For example, in Belarus, an authoritarian Communist successor regime directly 
controls almost every aspect of drafting – policy formulation, research, technical drafting, 
and assessment of draft legislation (with no public input), while in neighboring Ukraine, 
an authoritarian Communist successor regime has been forced to navigate an increasingly 
fragmented drafting process to see its agenda (and the particular benefits the ruling 
party’s clients demand) into law. United not only by shared history and Slavic culture and 
language, but also by similar experience under Soviet rule (including even the recent 
memory of the Chernobyl disaster) and by semi-presidential regimes, Belarus and 
Ukraine have both recycled Soviet-era figures and norms in the executive while diverging 
to the extremes in their legislation drafting processes. And this divergence has not been 
without legislative and political effect: Belarusian legislation is coherent, clear, and 
dedicated to the maintenance of ruling-party interests; while Ukrainian legislation often 
still proves, by the standards of Ukrainian jurists themselves, a bewildering tangle of 
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loopholes, conflicts, and unpredictable inefficiencies.76 But while Ukrainians who must 
interact with the corpus of this law might find themselves dismayed by its complexities 
and conflicts, both the process through which law is drafted and the resulting legislation 
itself have created space for contestation, for political debate, for a discourse of resistance 
to authoritarian trends. (See Chapters 9 and 10 for a discussion of these effects of the 
drafting process). 
 Between these extremes lies a number of consensus-based legislation drafting 
processes. Within this group, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Poland stand out for their 
emphases on evidence-driven, consensus-based legislation drafting, marked by extensive 
public input and carried out by highly qualified drafters and experts. With only slightly 
more fragmented or pluralist processes, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia also have deep resources of drafting expertise in their cabinet ministries and in 
their parliaments, mediated by slightly less coherent or formal procedures for public 
participation in drafting.  These cases also fail to conform to easy assumptions. They are 
a mix of unicameral and bicameral legislatures with a dizzying array of electoral systems 
(indeed, Hungary’s mixed system through its transitional years has been regarded as one 
of the most complex in the world,77 differing profoundly from Czech’s open-list PR 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2014). The current state of Ukrainian legislation. In 
T. Fuley, L. Lucas & L. Seitz (Eds.), Developing and drafting legislation (2nd ed., pp. 
11-32). Kyiv: Indiana University/Ohio State John Glenn School of Public Affairs (PDP- 
II). 
77 For a description, see Sapiro, V., & Shively, W. P. (2004). Election notes. Comparative 
study of electoral systems, 1996-2001 [computer file] (4th ICPSR version ed.). Ann 
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. 
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system).  Their party systems diverged wildly (all developing in uneven fashion, some 
even had missing or muddled ideological space at transition due to their varying 
experiences under one-party rule78).  
 If regime type, uni- or bicameralism, electoral system, and party system cannot 
account for the variation in the type of legislation drafting process, then what can explain 
this variation? As Chapter 2 discussed at length, we might next turn to policy legacies or 
the diffusion of institutional innovations to explain this variation. But here too, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, common explanations fail us to some extent. First, post-
communist states shared the experience of one-party rule, and a feature of communist 
rule across these cases was near-total control over all aspects of drafting by the central 
committee of the Communist Party.79 While the drafting experience of several countries 
prior to communist rule varied, the traumas of World War II and more than half a century 
of one-party centralized drafting meant that an entire generation of legislators and senior 
drafters had never known any other system in 1989. The pre-independence Czech, 
Slovak, Croatian, and Slovenian experience demonstrated slightly less centralization than 
was present in the other cases, but these cases prior to their transitions had also been 
nearly severed from their pre-communist drafting legacies. (For an examination of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Evans, G., & Whitefield, S. (1993). Identifying the bases of party competition in 
Eastern Europe. British Journal of Political Science, 23, 521-548.	  
79 Malackova, E., & Sivakova, D. (1998). Parliamentary library and information services 
of the Slovak republic. In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries 
and research services in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 177-193). Munich: IFLA/K.G. 
Saur. 
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effects of these deeper historical institutional legacies, see Chapters 4 through 7). This 
chapter will offer comparative analysis to demonstrate the limitations of this explanation. 
For similar reasons, diffusion of institutional innovation also cannot adequately 
explain the development of varied legislation drafting processes; innovations in drafting 
did not reliably follow particular hegemons or neighboring polities. Because the Soviet 
bloc countries and Soviet republics bordered each other, one likely source of diffusion to 
each of these states at the moment of transition was a contiguous state whose drafting 
process was still similarly centralized. As transitions continued, most states either 
remained fixed in Russia’s orbit (and early post-Soviet Russia exhibited as little interest 
in these states’ drafting processes as these newly independent and diverging states 
exhibited in Russia’s); or they were overrun with technical assistance from multiple 
polities and international and supranational organizations offering frequently conflicting 
advice. Most of the cases analyzed in this chapter received advice on their drafting 
processes and practice from the EU, OECD, and the United States, and several also 
received assistance from the UN, NATO, the World Bank, and other states. Moreover, 
these entities often offered differing recommendations for drafting innovation. Not only 
did different donors offer different partner states different advice, but even the same 
donor could offer different advice, either in different countries, or to different projects 
within the same country.80 As a result of these patterns, there is not a clear path of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 In one case not considered in this chapter, I heard an advisor from one department of a 
donor country describing advice on legislation drafting she had given to the executive 
branch of a partner (recipient) country – advice that was precisely the opposite of that 
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diffusion across which one polity’s drafting innovations are reliably followed by another, 
and in fact, since even similar features of the drafting process exist in today in interesting 
variety, diffusion that did occur appears to have been mediated by some other factor. (For 
more nuanced process tracing of diffusion in a broader historical institutional context, see 
Chapters 4 through 7).  
This chapter analyzes the origins of legislation drafting processes to assess why 
some states developed centralized drafting processes, others developed consensus-based 
drafting, and still others developed fragmented drafting processes. This comparative 
analysis of data from sixteen countries, drawn from interviews, archival research, and 
existing indicators, offers an answer to the puzzle: the evolution of drafting processes was 
influenced more by the structure of factional conflict than by drafting legacies or 
diffusion. From the array of institutional choices available to them – choices perhaps 
embodied in their country’s past experience or in surrounding polities – political actors 
respond to the incentives created by the structure of factional conflict, creating drafting 
processes that serve their interests. 
The structure of factional conflict does not fully explain why framers, legislators, 
and other political actors choose certain drafting process features rather than others. The 
possibilities that occur to them are often created by historical institutional factors such as 
policy legacies or diffusion, processes I trace in Chapters 4 through 7. Yet from a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
given by another department of the same donor country to the legislative branch of the 
same partner country. It is not unusual to encounter similar situations in transitional 
democracies around the world, often to the dismay of professional drafters and national 
experts subjected to this torrent of conflicting “expertise.” 
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common starting point of centralized drafting in 1988-89, and exposed to many of the 
same extranational influences thereafter, these countries moved in profoundly different 
directions as they built their drafting processes. This chapter demonstrates how the 
structure of factional conflict influenced the choice of these legislation drafting processes. 
Cross-National Quantitative Analysis 
Methodology 
 
I assess my hypotheses detailed in Chapter 2 about the origins of legislation 
drafting processes both through the quantitative analysis of interview, archival, and other 
data, and through comparative case studies. After describing the measurement and 
estimation procedures for the quantitative analysis, this chapter reports my findings for 
sixteen nations transitioning from communist rule on my hypothesized determinants of 
choice of drafting process. Chapters 4 through 7 carry this analysis further to investigate 
causal mechanisms through comparative historical case studies.  
 
Measuring Legislation Drafting Processes 
Legislation drafting processes can be conceptualized along a continuum from the 
most centralized processes to the most fragmented processes. Each of the five 
components of the drafting process also falls along this continuum. The components 
(described on pages 21 through 25, above, and more fully considered below) are (1) 
formulation of policy concepts for translation into draft legislation; (2) supporting 
professional research to guide drafting; (3) public input during drafting; (4) technical 
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legal drafting, and (5) non-political, formal technical assessment of draft legislation for 
legality and impact. One can posit three ideal types of processes: 
(1) Centralized – In the most centralized processes, policy is formulated 
exclusively within the executive, perhaps even with some central coordination 
mechanism. For example, the Cabinet may produce a legislative agenda or program 
outlining its plan for drafting and introducing draft legislation on specific topics; the 
Cabinet will retain veto rights over policy proposals suggested by the line ministries 
under the legislative program (sometimes even adopting a one-in/one-out policy that 
requires the elimination of a proposal for every new proposal added to the program); and 
the Cabinet may collectively approve policy formulations to be sent to legal drafters. 
Research capacity to support the drafting process exists within the executive ministries; 
the parliament lacks its own independent research capacity and other actors do not have 
the opportunity to contribute research to legislation drafting initiatives. Public input to the 
drafting process is essentially non-existent; the public participates (in non-authoritarian 
polities) only through voting for responsible-party representation. Technical legal 
drafting capacity exists only within the executive, which might even coordinate technical 
drafting centrally. For example, the Ministry of Justice may have a technical drafting 
unit, or there might be a central Cabinet drafting office independent of the line ministries. 
The executive possesses expert capacity to assess legislation for legality (and perhaps 
impact); the legislature lacks professional assessment capacity, and the constitutional 
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court does not have constitutional authority to perform reviews of draft legislation before 
it is enacted and comes into force.  
(2) Consensus-based - In the most consensus-based processes, legislative 
proposals are clearly formulated within the executive and within the legislature. Research 
capacity to support the drafting process exists within the executive ministries and also 
within the parliamentary staff; the parliamentary staff might be organized into 
departments offering different forms of expertise, and the parliament has a library that 
answers to it rather than to the executive. Public input to the drafting process is 
formalized in drafting commissions or consultative working groups. Technical legal 
drafting capacity exists within the executive and also within the parliamentary staff; the 
parliament often has its own office of parliamentary counsel, legal department or drafters 
attached to the parliamentary commissions (committees). The executive and the 
legislature both possess expert capacity (staff experts or formal relationships with 
universities and state research institutes) to assess legislation for legality (and perhaps 
impact); but the constitutional court does not have constitutional authority to review draft 
legislation before it is enacted and comes into force (perhaps with the exception that the 
executive or legislature may refer draft legislation to the court for opinion).  
(3) Fragmented/pluralist - In the most fragmented processes, policy is formulated 
within the executive (sometimes at several administrative levels or even in both entities 
of a dual executive) and within the legislature, perhaps even competitively (Ukrainian 
legislation, for example, has sometimes been complicated by conflicts of law introduced 
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by unresolved competition between the president, the prime minister, and the Rada at 
large). In these cases, interested parties additionally formulate policy outside the 
executive and legislature, although they must secure the cooperation of a party with the 
right of legislative initiative to introduce legislation they draft on the basis of this policy 
formulation. Research capacity to support the drafting process exists within the executive 
ministries and the parliamentary staff, but it is also provided by outside groups 
representing public, private, and extranational interests. Public input to the drafting 
process is ad hoc, conducted through notice-and-comment, committee hearings, lobbying, 
and meetings of interested parties with politicians and their staff. Often this “heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent”81; official responses to notice-and-
comment might be less than transparent, hearings might include only the best-funded and 
most-organized interests, and lobbying access proves most open to those on whose 
support politicians depend. Technical legal drafting capacity exists within the executive 
(sometimes at several administrative levels) and within the legislature (sometimes in a 
central office but also in committee, party, faction, and MP offices), and outside entities 
also draft legislation. The executive and the legislature possess expert capacity to assess 
legislation for legality (and perhaps impact); and (notionally, though in none of these 
cases) the constitutional court has constitutional authority to perform reviews of draft 
legislation before it is enacted and comes into force.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy 
in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden. 
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Within each of these types, the legislation drafting processes of particular 
countries vary. For example, within the category of consensus-based drafting processes, 
some are more centralized than others, perhaps because the Ministry of Justice plays a 
coordinating role across the entire drafting process. From highly centralized drafting prior 
to transition in all sixteen cases,82 to a wide divergence post-transition, Table 3.1 offers a 
measurement of the centralization versus fragmentation of drafting processes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The scoring of predecessor processes is based on formal rules and impressionistic 
evidence from contemporary observers (see, for example, Bates, T. [2009]. Legislating 
for drafting: The Moldavian experience. Statute Law Review, 30(2), 123-139). More 
nuanced coding will be possible with greater access to communist-era records on intra-
Party drafting processes.	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Country pre-Transition post-Transition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total 
 
Centralized drafting process, post-transition 
Belarus 5.0 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 
Croatia** 5.0 2 2 1 1 1 7.0 
 
Consensus-based drafting process, post-transition 
Albania 5.0 3 3 1 1 1 9.0 
Czech* 5.0 2 2 1 2 2 9.0 
Estonia 5.0 2 2 2 1 2 9.0 
Hungary 5.0 2 2 3 2 3 12.0 
Latvia 5.0 2 2 3 2 2 11.0 
Lithuania 5.0 3 2 3 2 1 11.0 
Poland 5.0 2 2 2 2 2 10.0 
Slovak* 5.0 2 2 3 2 2 11.0 
Slovenia** 5.0 2 2 3 3 2 12.0 
 
Fragmented/pluralist drafting process, post-transition 
Bulgaria 5.0 3 3 2 3 3 14.0 
Moldova 5.0 2 3 3 3 3 14.0 
Romania 5.0 3 3 3 2 3 14.0 
Russia 5.0 3 3 3 2 2 13.0 
Ukraine 5.0 3 3 3 3 2 14.0 
Note. The table shows my additive index of (1) formulation of policy concepts for 
translation into draft legislation; (2) supporting professional research to guide 
drafting; (3) public input during drafting; (4) technical legal drafting, and (5) 
non-political, formal technical assessment of draft legislation for legality and 
impact.83 Increasing scores represent increasing decentralization. 
Pre-transition measured 1988-89; post-transition measured 1994-1998 
* Czechoslovakia, post-transition: 13.0 
** Yugoslavia, post-transition: 7.0 
Table 3.1 The Organization of Legislation Drafting Processes in 16 Post-Communist States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The first, second, and fourth components are scored 1.0 to 3.0, as follows: executive 
capacity, 1.0; executive and legislative capacity, 2.0; executive, legislative, and other-
entities capacity, 3.0. The third component is scored 1.0 to 3.0, as follows: political 
representation only, 1.0; drafting commission or survey, 2.0; notice-comment, hearing, 
lobbying, 3.0. The fifth component is scored 1.0 to 3.0, as follows: executive capacity, 
1.0; executive and legislative capacity, 2.0; executive, legislative, and judicial (ex ante) 
capacity, 3.0.  
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Measuring Determinants of the Legislation Drafting Process 
For the structure of factional conflict, I construct a measure of faction that 
combines an ordinal measure of elite political factions competing for power at the 
moment of transition (conservative-dominated, 1.0; competition between conservatives 
and radicals/reformers, 2.0; multi-factional; 3.0) with an existing measure of CSO 
sustainability, used as a proxy for social faction organization.84 85Additional tests using 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization scores,86 separately and additively, as 
proxies for social faction revealed no relationship in these data between fractionalization 
and choice of legislation drafting process; these tests suggest that the conceptualization of 
social faction described in Chapter 2, which requires not just the existence of social 
heterogeneity or cleavages but also the organization of social factions, is the stronger 
approach. Relying on Carey and Hix (2011), for district magnitude, I use a measure of 
mean district magnitude in the first election at transition.87 88 89 For features of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 USAID. (2013). CSOSI data. 2012 CSO sustainability index for Central and Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia (16th ed.) USAID. 85	  This index is measured on a 1.0 to 7.0 scale, with 1.0 indicating the highest level of 
organization. To maintain consistency with the direction of my measure of political 
faction, I have inverted this scale.  
86 Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). 
Fractionalization (data). Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155-194. 
87 Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional 
electoral systems (data). American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 383-397. 
88 For Albania, I use data from Beck, T., et al. (2001). New tools and new tests in 
comparative political economy: The database of political institutions (dataset). 
89 Following Carey and Hix (2011), who show that voters in low-magnitude multi-
member districts and voters in single-member districts are similarly able to engage in 
strategic coordination in support of viable candidates, but that voters engage in markedly 
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communication network, I use an index of connectivity measuring the development of 
transmission connectivity (radio, television) and interactive connectivity (hosts per 
capita, PCs, mobile); an increasing score on a 0.0 to 10.0 scale represents increasing 
connectivity.90 91 
For the effects of drafting legacy, I score the drafting organization of the 
predecessor state of each state in the dataset, using the same criteria described in the 
scoring of legislation drafting process organization above. For this variable, I use the 
average of the five component scores, for an ordinal measure of 1.0 to 3.0. Additional 
tests including regime type, electoral system type, federal-unitary, and bicameralism 
(though done successively due to the low N and consequently constrained degrees of 
freedom), did not reveal a statistically significant effect; the results are available in 
Appendix A. 
Estimation 
 In this model, organization of the legislation drafting process is the dependent 
variable. Following the theoretical argument described in Chapter 2, I specify an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
different (sincere voting) behavior in high-magnitude multi-member districts, I expect a 
curvilinear relationship between district magnitude and legislation drafting process 
organization (above a district magnitude of 7, as district magnitude grows larger, the size 
of its influence increases). To capture this, I add an exponential term to these data. (See 
Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. [2011]. The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional 
electoral systems (data). American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 383-397). 
90 UNCTAD. (2003). Information and communication technology development indices 
(data). New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
91 The original data are scaled 0.0 to 1.0; I have converted the scale to a 0.0 to 10.0 to 
simplify the reader’s interpretation of the results. As described in Chapter 2, this feature 
of the structure of factional conflict interacts with the level of social organization; I also 
include this interaction term. 
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empirical model of the degree of decentralization in the organization of the drafting 
process: 
Di  = b0 + b1 Fi + b2Mi2 + b3 Ci + b4 (Ci * Si) + b5 Li + ei 
where, 
D = degree of decentralization in the organization of the drafting process 
F = competing political and social factions 
M = mean district magnitude 
C = connectivity of the communication network 
S = competing social factions 
L = drafting legacy of the predecessor state’s drafting process 
 
 I estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS). Although this approach is 
less than ideal due to the small sample size and the fact that the dependent variable is 
bounded at zero (and in these case data is functionally bounded at 5), it represents a first 
step toward testing the effect of the structure of factional conflict on the organization of 
the drafting process. To the extent possible with a small sample, the robustness of the 
results has been tested in a range of alternative specifications. In addition, coding the 
organization of the drafting process as a categorical variable (centralized, consensus-
based, fragmented/pluralist) and successively dropping each category from the model 
allowed me to estimate a series of logit models that to some extent assuage fears about 
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the zero-bound of the dependent variable in the OLS analysis. Continuing data collection 
and coding of additional cases going forward will lend analytical strength to future tests. 
Findings 
 The structure of factional conflict. As anticipated by the theory described in 
Chapter 2, the results, shown in Table 3.3, suggest that the choice of legislation drafting 
process is influenced by the structure of factional conflict. The identity and strength of 
competing political and social factions has a large and highly statistically significant 
effect on the degree of decentralization in the drafting process; as the number and 
strength of factions competing during transition increase, the drafting process is 
characterized by a higher degree of decentralization. In countries whose elite political 
competition at transition is dominated by the conservative faction, and whose social 
factions are not highly organized, the legislation drafting process chosen is likely to be 
more centralized, while in countries with multifactional political competition at transition 
and highly organized social factions, the drafting process is likely to be more 
fragmented/pluralist.   
Dependent Variable: Drafting Process 
Independent Variables 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Factions  1.198*** 0.168 
Mean district magnitude  0.0003* 0.000 
Connectivity of communication network  5.072** 1.377 
Connectivity & social factions -1.280** 0.316 
Drafting legacy of predecessor state -0.465 0.622 
Constant  1.728 1.685 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 3.2 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Legislation Drafting Process Organization 
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 Mean district magnitude does not have an effect on the centralization of the 
drafting process in single-member and small-magnitude multi-member districts, but it has 
a slightly increasing positive effect as district magnitude grows large. The results suggest 
but do not definitively demonstrate that the choice of centralized and fragmented/pluralist 
drafting processes is largely driven by other factors, but as expected, among larger-
magnitude districts, increasing size provides a slight incentive to choose less centralized 
consensus-based drafting. This finding follows Carey and Hix92 in finding that large-
magnitude districts structure behavior in ways that differ from single- or small-magnitude 
multi-member districts.   
 As anticipated, features of the communication network have a statistically 
significant effect on the organization of the drafting process as well. Among these cases, 
none was completely without a communication network and a capacity at least to 
transmit information to the country at large. As connectivity increases, the degree of 
decentralization in the organization of the drafting process increases substantially. 
However, there is also a strong interaction effect between the connectivity of the 
communication network and the organization of social factions: as the effect of 
increasing connectivity interacts with the effect of increasing social organization, 
decentralization in the drafting process decreases. This suggests, as anticipated by the 
theory, that a tendency toward fragmentation in the drafting process as connectivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional 
electoral systems (data). American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 383-397. 
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increases is mitigated by the increasing organization of social factions, which serves to 
“pull” the drafting process back toward the consensus-based range.  
 Legislation drafting legacies. The results of the analysis do not show a 
statistically significant relationship between the legislation drafting process of the 
predecessor state and the choice of legislation drafting process during transition. This is 
an effect of the extremely low variation in the legacy variable, given the high degree of 
centralization in the drafting processes of states under Communist Party rule, and the 
high variation in post-transition drafting processes. As data on additional states are 
available, it will be possible to analyze this issue further. However, these results lend 
preliminary support to the theory that the structure of factional conflict explains a greater 
share of the variation in drafting processes. Chapters 4 through 7 analyze the deeper 
drafting legacies of four of these cases (Belarus, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine), assessing 
pre-communist legacies and finding that this historical institutional factor does to some 
extent shape the range of options that occur to political factions as they choose legislative 
drafting processes during transition. The complex process of diffusion is also traced in 
these chapters. 
Quantitative Findings and Historical National Experience: Some Outliers 
 The most centralized cases differ along several dimensions, but they share a 
similar structure of factional conflict at transition. As detailed in Chapter 4, Belarus 
transitioned under its dominant Communist Party (re-branded with a new name but 
retaining the same old faces and policies) and quickly stocked its new presidency with a 
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Soviet-era communist hardliner even more authoritarian than the prime minister who had 
hoped to fill the office he helped to create under the new constitution, while independent 
Croatia was born in civil war and the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia; Croatia’s 
dominant conservative faction was exceptional among these sixteen cases in that it was 
nationalist rather than Communist (a function of Yugoslavia’s deeply divided federal 
politics under Communist rule). Both Belarus and Croatia had a low degree of 
organization among social factions and low connectivity, though both had television and 
radio infrastructure that could transmit information.  The historical institutional legacies 
of drafting in Belarus and Croatia differed widely. Although both states had legacies of 
centralized drafting under Communist rule, the older legacy of Belarusian drafting had its 
origins in pre-Soviet Russia, while Croatia’s lay in Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
drafting. And while independent post-conflict Croatia received extensive UN intervention 
and technical assistance from the US, Belarus remained more closed to foreign technical 
assistance. These cases lend support to the hypothesis that the structure of factional 
conflict – dominated by the conservative faction at transition, characterized by low 
organization of social factions and low connectivity – influences the choice of a 
centralized drafting process.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 detail the origins of the legislation drafting process in Estonia 
and Poland, two consensus-based drafting processes. Like every case among countries in 
this dataset that chose consensus-based drafting processes, Estonia and Poland had strong 
competition between the radical/reform factions and the conservative factions at 
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transition, accompanied by moderate to high organization among social factions. Perhaps 
the most isolated country of this group during the communist era, Albania remains 
exceptional during transition as well, because its conservative and radical factions 
alternated in dominance, effectively taking turns at unifactional authoritarian rule during 
the early transition, and its social organization was the lowest of this group. Albania is 
also the only one of these cases that to date has not become a member of the EU (the 
others in this group all became EU member states in 2004); since the long road to EU 
membership includes significant work to bring legislation into compliance with EU 
norms, this process could have served as a source of diffusion among the other states in 
this group early in their transitions. Albania is therefore something of a bridge between 
the first centralized set and the second consensus-based set of cases, as its polarized 
factions alternate in dominance (rather than competing in equilibrium) and its social 
faction organization and connectivity are low. This structure of factional conflict appears 
to push its choice of legislation drafting process to the more centralized end of the array 
of consensus-based drafting processes. At the other end of this array, bordering on 
fragmentation in its drafting process, Slovenia also presents an interesting case, as it 
diverged widely from fellow Yugoslavia breakaway republic Croatia, where drafting 
organization remained centralized at transition. Slovenia had stronger competition 
between its political factions at transition, and significantly higher organization of its 
social factions and greater connectivity. Like Croatia, Slovenia received technical 
assistance from the United States, especially in the development of its parliament’s 
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research capacity. However, Slovenia also received extensive technical assistance from 
the EU to bring its legislation into compliance with European norms earlier than Croatia 
did (Slovenia became an EU member in 2004, Croatia in 2013), and Slovenia received 
deep capacity building assistance in legislation drafting from OECD.93 These factors 
seem likely to have contributed to the wide divergence of Slovenian drafting, a 
consensus-based process, from the centralized Yugoslavian-era process that survived in 
Croatia during the early years of transition.   
 The countries that developed the most fragmented/pluralist drafting institutions in 
transition also differ from each other historically and in the sources of diffusion to which 
they were open during transition (for example, only two, Bulgaria and Romania, 
progressed quickly enough toward European norms in legislation to become member 
states, both in 2007), but they share a structure of factional conflict marked by splintered, 
multifactional political competition. For example, the Communist Party in Russia 
fractured not only at the top, with a hardline faction attempting a coup against Mikhail 
Gorbachev, but also between its Soviet leadership and the leadership of the Russian SSR, 
embodied in Boris Yeltsin, by whom Gorbachev found himself both politically saved and 
sidelined; and these factions competed further with a range of radical/reform factions. 
While these cases have low to moderate social organization, they exhibit moderate to 
high connectivity at transition. As the introduction to this chapter suggests, the case of 
Ukraine, analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 7, offers another interesting example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 OECD. (1997). Law drafting and regulatory management in Central and Eastern 
Europe. SIGMA Papers, 18, 105-128. 
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divergence from a neighbor that shares many apparent similarities. While Belarus retains 
the most centralized drafting process of any analyzed in this study, Ukraine’s drafting 
process lies at the extreme of fragmentation. Unlike Belarus, whose conservative faction 
has remained dominant throughout transition, Ukraine has followed Russia’s pattern of 
factional splintering across its dual executive and parliament; and its social faction 
organization, while hardly as strong as Estonia or Poland’s, has been much stronger than 
that of Belarus.   
Obscure though the drafting process and the legislation it produces might be, 
these differences matter. Though both Belarus and Ukraine have suffered authoritarian 
rule at various periods since transition, their legislation and the means by which it is 
created have evolved from a common starting point along different paths. While in both 
countries, both the drafting process and resulting legislation often favor elite and insider 
interests, the coherence of the Belarusian process and legislation closes off debate and 
gives these outcomes a patina of legal order that the Ukrainian process and legislation 
cannot. As the succeeding chapters show, the very inefficiencies and inconsistences that 
irk Ukrainian legal scholars and practitioners create space for contestation and make 
manifest the inequities the regime introduces. It is in these spaces, among others, that the 
Orange Revolution of 2004, the TaxMaidan of 2010, and the recent EuroMaidan protests 
have opened the political discourse further in ensuring years. Meanwhile, consensus-
based processes, as I argue in Chapter 10, are associated with the highest quality of 
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democracy through the responsiveness of legislation to evidence-based input and broad 
social interests. 
Conclusion 
 Standing on the verge of transition in 1988, these sixteen countries shared highly 
centralized legislation drafting processes. Although under Gorbachev’s influence, the 
political systems showed some openness to reform and restructuring, and long-
submerged political and social factions stirred in some of the Soviet republics and 
Eastern bloc states, the suddenness with which the region “changed utterly” unleashed 
political competition and institutional experimentation on a grand scale. In some 
countries, political leaders and scholars looked to the past for ideas about the forms 
legislation drafting processes might take, and in some countries, they looked to the 
experience of other polities. However, in this small sample of cases, neither the legacies 
of legislation drafting before or during communist rule, nor the idiosyncratic paths of 
diffusion reliably predict the choice of how the legislation drafting process would be 
organized during transition. 
 The quantitative analysis lends preliminary support to the central hypothesis that 
the structure of factional conflict during the transition from communist rule produces the 
incentives that explain the variation in legislation drafting processes. As the number of 
political factions vying credibly for political power and the organizational strength of 
social factions increase, the choice of legislation drafting process moves from relatively 
more centralized organization to relatively more fragmented/pluralist organization. 
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Increasing connectivity in the communication network amplifies this effect of increasing 
drafting fragmentation in countries with low to moderate social faction organization, but 
the interaction between connectivity and the organization of social factions pulls the 
drafting process back to the consensus-based center range in countries with moderate to 
high social faction organization and high connectivity. And as district magnitude grows 
large, increasing district magnitude can tip the organization of the legislation drafting 
process from centralization to consensus. 
 While a small-sample quantitative analysis can provide some evidence for this 
hypothesis, the following chapters offer a deeper investigation of the dynamic influence 
of the structure of factional conflict on the evolution of the legislation drafting process in 
historical case studies of Belarus, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine. Relying on process 
tracing and archival and interview research, the following chapters reveal the causal 
mechanisms that link the structure of factional conflict to the type of organization in the 
legislation drafting process, as the broader historical institutional factors of drafting 
legacies and diffusion of institutional innovation shape the options available to political 
actors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CENTRALIZED DRAFTING IN BELARUS 
Introduction 
More than twenty years after the transition from Soviet rule, Belarus has one of 
the most centralized legislation drafting processes, not just in Eastern and Central Europe, 
but also in the world. All components of the drafting process – formulating policy 
proposals for translation into draft legislation, conducting supporting research, carrying 
out technical legal drafting, and assessing draft legislation – are carried out by a single 
entity, the National Center of Legislation and Legal Research of the Republic of Belarus, 
that answers directly to the Administration and to President Lukashenko himself. Public 
input to this process is virtually nonexistent, and the legislature does not generate draft 
legislation despite having right of legislative initiative.   
At first glance, the causes of this extreme drafting centralization might seem 
obvious. Anyone who has followed Belarusian politics since the mid-1990s might 
justifiably hypothesize that this is just a case of an authoritarian executive consolidating 
his power over legislative and administrative functions; scholars who have followed the 
debate concerning the authoritarian possibilities of semi- (or perhaps super-) presidential 
systems might locate the origins of centralized drafting in this institutional feature of the 
Belarusian state.94 But as Chapter 2 describes briefly and as this chapter and Chapter 7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 For more, see Linz, J. J. (1994), Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make 
a difference? In J. J. Linz, & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy: 
Comparative perspectives (pp. 3-87), Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; 
Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992), Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design 
and electoral dynamics, New York: Cambridge University Press; Mainwaring, S., & 
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detail, regime type cannot fully explain the centralization of the drafting process: 
authoritarian regimes in neighboring semi-presidential Ukraine have failed to implement 
a drafting process centralized under their direct control, and having failed at this, have 
subsequently failed to consolidate the corpus of Ukrainian law into a coherent code that 
furthers the regime’s objectives.  In fact, semi-presidential arrangements occur across the 
spectrum of drafting processes (in centralized-drafting Belarus and Croatia; in consensus-
based-drafting Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; and in fragmented/pluralist-
drafting Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine).95 
The centralization of the Belarusian legislation drafting process might also be 
attributed to institutional persistence and the policy legacies of tsarist and Soviet rule. 
While legislation drafting in the tsarist and especially the Soviet eras was certainly 
centralized, and some features of these legacies do persist in contemporary Belarus, 
persistence also fails to explain both the ongoing evolution of the drafting process in 
post-Soviet Belarus and its divergence from other countries – countries whose drafting 
processes were similarly centralized under Soviet rule and who shared Belarus’s longer 
history of Russian rule. To explain the centralization of Belarusian drafting, we might 
next turn to diffusion of institutional innovation, seeking the origins of the contemporary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Shugart, M. S. (1997), Juan Linz, presidentialism, and democracy: A critical appraisal, 
Comparative Politics, 29(4), 449-471. 
95 Of these, Belarus, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine have demonstrated the strongest 
presidential dominance. However, the Polish and Lithuanian presidents have considerable 
constitutional powers, and Polish presidents have frequently asserted these powers, 
especially in foreign policy. The Bulgarian, Slovakian, and Slovenian presidents have 
largely functioned as heads of state (see Raunio, T. [2012]. The politics of semi-
presidentialism. Unpublished manuscript). 
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drafting process in the practice of Belarus’s neighbors and patrons. But here also, we run 
into difficulties: Belarusian drafting has centralized further since transition, while the 
once similarly centralized drafting processes in neighboring hegemon Russia and in 
Ukraine have fragmented, and while drafting in neighboring Poland, Latvia, and 
Lithuania has become increasingly consensus-based. 
I suggest that the structure of factional conflict is essential to understanding the 
evolving centralization of the Belarusian drafting process since transition. The 
overwhelming dominance of the conservative (Communist) bloc at transition, coupled 
with the relatively low organization of social factions and structured by the low 
connectivity of the Belarusian communication network (indeed, its near incapacity to do 
more than carry the regime’s transmissions over state radio and television) – this 
structure of factional conflict produced overwhelming partisan incentives for 
centralization. The dominant conservative faction, hampered in its ability to hear from 
under-organized and disconnected social factions but well-equipped to transmit its 
message, and unimpeded by serious competition with the reform faction, acted as a cartel 
and began to consolidate the state institutions. The conservative faction and the proto-
parties that emerged from it during the transition followed partisan incentives almost 
unswervingly; creating a drafting process that is among the most centralized in the world. 
The Belarusian story demonstrates the influence of the structure of factional conflict on 
the evolution of the legislation drafting process, and an analysis of this story lends 
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support to the core argument that this structure is crucial to explaining the country’s 
contemporary centralization in legislation drafting. 
Theories of the Origins of Centralized Drafting in Belarus 
Institutional Persistence and Policy Legacies 
Constitutional framers, legislators, the executive and its staff in Belarus have not 
made their institutional choices from an infinite number of institutional possibilities. The 
past is prologue, and the choice of legislation drafting process is a story that has unfolded 
in light of that past. By the 1920s, several of the Belarusian ministries had accumulated 
small reference libraries for use in developing draft legislation. On September 10, 1933, 
all of the offices of the Government were consolidated into the Government House, 
taking with them their reference collections. Upon this consolidation, these reference 
materials were collected together to form the Presidential Library of the Republic of 
Belarus. Between 1933 and 1941, the Library’s system was organized, and the Library 
grew quickly into one of the largest in the country.96 This theme of centralization 
continues through the development of the Belarusian legislation drafting process over 
time. It is reinforced by the increasing centralization of political institutions in Belarus, 
and it reinforces the centralized (and frequently authoritarian) political institutions by 
limiting the opportunities for participation and contestation and reducing the discourses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Judo, S., (1998), Deputy director of the Presidential Library of the Republic of Belarus, 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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available to political dissidents concerning the legality and order of Belarusian 
governance.   
 The Presidential Library was one manifestation of the long Belarusian quest for a 
national political identity and state institutions, and the Library’s fate followed that of the 
national project and of the legislation drafting process. Long a region of Poland, 
Byelorussia was almost completely absorbed into Russia (except for a small region 
granted to Prussia) during the partitions of Poland of the late eighteenth century and 
underwent an increasingly wide-ranging policy of Russification under the tsarist 
government. Between the emancipation of the serfs in the late nineteenth century and the 
outbreak of World War I, Belarusians began to construct a national identity, which 
flourished especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, when Russia’s defeat and the 
subsequent dislocations of the peasants led to revolts and forced more official tolerance 
for Belarusian language and culture. The violence and hunger that Belarusian people 
suffered under German and Russian hostilities in World War I were extreme. However, 
in December 1917, a Belarusian Rada comprising various socialist, Menshevik, Christian 
Democratic, nationalist, and religious parties assembled in Minsk to set up a democratic 
government for Byelorussia, an undertaking interrupted forcibly by Bolsheviks. Although 
the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk put Byelorussia under German control, the Rada’s 
Executive Committee rejected this arrangement and proclaimed independence. At the 
collapse of the German government later in 1918, the new state had no sponsor to protect 
it, and it fell to Belarusian Bolsheviks (who had the sponsorship of Moscow’s Bolshevik 
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government. The Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was established in January 1919 
(and just a year later, its Presidential Library), partitioned under the Treaty of Riga 
between Russia and Poland in 1921, and (except for the region absorbed into Poland 
under the treaty) incorporated into the Soviet Union upon its formation in 1922, just in 
time to experience Lenin’s first New Economic Plan. Collectivization in 1928 and 
political genocide under Stalin in the 1930s led to over two million deaths, a toll even 
greater than Belarusian deaths under German occupation in World War II.97  
 It is during this period of terror that the development of modern Belarusian 
drafting institutions continues. Between 1941 and 1945, the Presidential Library of the 
Republic of Belarus was destroyed and most of its volumes lost; many were carried off to 
Berlin.98 Between 1946 and 1950, the Library was rebuilt and resumed its lending 
function to the Supreme Soviet; it had little influence on legislation drafting (a central 
party function) and only provided books and documents at official request. 
Theories of institutional persistence and policy legacies anticipate that during 
transition, Belarus would retain existing drafting institutions.99 The past is indeed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Magocsi, P. R. (2002). Historical atlas of East Central Europe. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press. 
98 Judo, S., (1998), Deputy director of the Presidential Library of the Republic of Belarus. 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	  
99 North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989), Constitutions and commitment: Evolution of 
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England, Journal of 
Economic History, 49, 803-832; Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (1997), Factor 
endowments, institutions, and differential growth paths among New World economies, in 
S. Haber (Ed.), How Latin America fell behind, Stanford: Stanford University Press; 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001), The colonial origins of 
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prologue, and to some extent it frames the choices available to political actors in the 
present, shaping their perceptions of possibilities and sometimes even delimiting the 
range of the politically possible. And institutional persistence and the legacies of the 
tsarist, interwar, and Soviet periods do help to explain the context in which post-Soviet 
Belarus chose and shaped its legislation drafting process. As Acemoglu and Robinson 
point out, institutional persistence involves both de jure and de facto components: a 
formal regime change or transition might have blunted effect if elites “intensify their 
investments in de facto political power.”100 This has been the experience of Belarus in 
transition. Belarusian SSR Prime Minister Vyachaslaw Kyebich remained in power 
during the transition, the BSSR’s Supreme Soviet having just been reelected on March 4, 
1990; he retained his position through the declaration of independence in 1991 and the 
framing of the new Constitution in 1994 until his failed bid for the newly created office 
of President.  
Elected in 1994 under the new Constitution, President Aleksandr Lukashenko (a 
former administrator of Soviet state and collective farms and deputy in the BSSR’s 
Supreme Soviet) was, far from being a source of discontinuity, a doubling-down on 
existing institutional patterns and de facto political power; he exploited ambiguities in the 
1994 Constitution to amend the Constitution by referendum, concentrate power in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparative development: An empirical investigation, American Economic Review, 91, 
1369-1401; Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002), Reversal of fortunes: 
Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1133-1192. 
100  Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Persistence of power, elites, and 
institutions. Unpublished manuscript. 
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executive branch, extend his term, and reinstitute an authoritarian Soviet-style regime 
that generally continues to oppose pluralist principles. As in the tsarist and Soviet eras, a 
number of opposition figures have disappeared under his administration.  In June 2003, 
Lukashenko stated, “An authoritarian ruling style is characteristic of me, and I have 
always admitted it. Why? We could spend hours talking about this. You need to control 
the country…”101 The President pushed through the legislature a series of bills that 
granted local officials broad discretion regarding religious practice, public assemblies, 
and association between citizens.102  Officials have used this discretion arbitrarily, 
making administrative decisions that resemble the decisions of the Soviet-era 
bureaucracy in asserting state authority, often to the extent of suppressing minority rights. 
The persistence not just of Soviet political institutions in post-Soviet Belarus, but also of 
Soviet-era political leadership has contributed to (and been reinforced by) the persistence 
of many features of the Soviet legislation drafting process. 
During this transition, consequently, the legislation drafting process reflected 
some institutional persistence in two dimensions. First, the Supreme Soviet of the 
Republic of Belarus, a body that had not faced elections since the dissolution of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 BBC Monitoring, June 2003. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
3881341.stm. 
102 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002). Available: http://www.keston.org. See the Law of the Republic 
of Belarus on Gatherings, Meetings, Street Processions, Demonstrations, and Picketing, 
No. 114-Z of 30 December 1997, No. 233-Z of 7 August 2003, and No. 253-Z of 29 
November 2003. Available at the National Center of Legal Information of the Republic 
of Belarus (NCLI), http://ftp.ncpi.gov.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf.  
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USSR and still had its ninety-percent communist majority, created the Belarusian 
Institute of State Building and Legislation in 1992 to carry out legislative research, 
technical drafting, and analysis of draft legislation previously carried out by the apparatus 
of the central committee of the Communist Party (suspended only in name after 
independence) in the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR; the new Institute was staffed by many 
Soviet-era functionaries retained by continuing communist Prime Minister Kyebich, who 
had only nominally rehabilitated himself as an ex-Communist Party member upon 
independence. Second, this arrangement proving still too decentralized and offering too 
much drafting autonomy for the legislature to suit the newly elected President 
Lukashenko’s tastes in 1994, the process was further consolidated under the Office of the 
President in 1997 – an outcome nearly indistinguishable from the days of central 
committee control of all aspects of the drafting process. The Presidential Library of the 
Republic of Belarus also continued, as it had since its creation in 1933, to answer to the 
executive, not to the legislature it ostensibly existed to serve in the research function of 
legislation drafting. “The Presidential Library is seen as the Information and Analysis 
Center for the Parliament, the Presidential Administration and the other governmental 
bodies of the Republic of Belarus,” reports the library’s former deputy director. “Since its 
creation the Library has been oriented to fulfilling Parliamentary library functions and 
serving the Supreme Soviet. The Library is accountable to the Presidential 
Administration, however, and not the Supreme Soviet.”103 	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However, persistence alone cannot explain the origins of legislative drafting 
processes in Belarus, as the contemporary process does not precisely mirror that of the 
USSR. This is partly because, despite Belarus’s unenthusiastic departure from Soviet rule 
(as late as March 1991, eighty-three percent of Belarusians polled in a referendum 
wanted Belarus to remain part of the USSR), the post-Soviet regime has continued to 
shape the drafting process to its own ends, as my own theoretical argument anticipates 
and explains. 
Diffusion of Institutional Innovation 
Theories of institutional diffusion suggest that at transition, in need of a 
legislation drafting process of its own, Belarus would borrow rules, organizational 
structures, and processes from other jurisdictions. 104 In Belarus, institutional diffusion 
and institutional persistence are unusually co-linear, as the country hardly even evinced 
an interest in leaving the USSR during its dissolution, and only declared independence 
halfheartedly on August 25, 1991, a slowly unfolding reaction to Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence, and to Moscow’s continuing lack of response to Belarusian horror at the 
mismanagement of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and the 1988 discovery of mass graves of 
Stalin’s victims in Belarus. Russia (Soviet and post-Soviet) constitutes the predecessor 
state to independent Belarus, the largest state bordering Belarus, a fellow member of the 	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CIS, and the overwhelming hegemon in the region – one that has long considered Belarus 
its “little brother” subject to Russian oversight.  
These theories predict, first, that institutional diffusion might spread legislative 
drafting processes from contiguous states (most likely from Russia, Poland, Ukraine, and 
Lithuania, given their deeply shared history and linguistic connections with Belarus, but 
also Latvia), or that diffusion might proceed from influential states and international 
polities (Russia and the CIS).105 Whether these polities had pressured Belarus to replicate 
their institutions, incentivized the state with development aid, or simply influenced 
Belarus with the apparent effectiveness, “modernity,” or “scientific” quality of a 
particular process, Belarus might have been expected to adopt features of the legislative 
drafting processes of these neighboring jurisdictions.  
Diffusion falls short of fully explaining the Belarusian drafting processes, 
however. First, it only vaguely predicts which neighboring or influential state Belarus 
would imitate– and its drafting process has almost no features in common with the 
processes of transitional or contemporary Poland or Ukraine (see Chapters 6 and 7 for 
analysis of these cases), much less with that of Latvia or Lithuania, except that all five 
cases have research libraries available to serve those who draft legislation (the Belarusian 
library maintained professional linkages with the Lithuanian parliamentary library 
through the late 1990s, but unlike the other four, answered to the executive and did not 
produce new commissioned reports relating to current proposed legislation, but only 	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compiled existing resources), Second, even under the clear hegemony of one neighboring 
state, the Belarusian drafting process does not consistently reflect that of early post-
Soviet or contemporary Russia.  
The Structure of Factional Conflict 
My argument centers on how the structure of factional conflict shapes the 
incentives of those who make institutional choices about legislative organization and 
process – often from a set of existing institutional rules, and on how each of these choices 
influences subsequent ones. This approach remains sensitive to the motivations of actors 
while allowing also for cross-national state-level comparison. Below, I discuss each 
component of the structure of factional conflict in Belarus at transition. 
Political factions. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, if the conservative bloc leads 
or dominates the transition to democracy, the conservative faction might be expected to 
replicate legislative drafting processes from the previous regime; presumably they can 
anticipate that their skills, knowledge of the process, and social networks will allow them 
to maintain political power if the drafting process remains unchanged (see also the 
discussion of institutional persistence, above).106 In addition, however, they might choose 
a relatively centralized and hierarchical drafting process that they can capture. During the 
transition from Soviet rule, the conservative bloc – in Belarusian context, the Communist 
Party of Belarus – retained almost total control (the Supreme Soviet seated in March 	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1990 comprised only ten percent opposition deputies and did not face new elections until 
almost four years after independence), and once they had consolidated the existing 
political institutions and created a strong centralized executive in the new presidency, 
filled by the Communist holdover Lukashenko, the legislation drafting process was 
further centralized by executive order.  
To trace this development: just three days after Belarus declared independence, 
the whole Cabinet, including Prime Minister Vyachaslaw Kyebich, “suspended” its 
membership in the CPB. To the small but determined liberal and nationalist blocs, this 
signaled a chance at democratic reform. Three weeks later, the legislature replaced its 
conservative chairman Mikalay Dzemyantsye with deputy chairman Stanislaw 
Shushkyevich. On September 19, the opposition won another victory when the country 
was officially renamed the Republic of Belarus and traditional Belarusian symbols were 
restored. The December signing of the Minsk Agreement with Russia and Ukraine was 
something of a draw for conservatives and reformers, as it officially dissolved the Soviet 
Union but also created the CIS, with the three signatories as founding members and 
Minsk as the CIS headquarters.   
It was the beginning of the end for the success of the tiny liberal and nationalist 
blocs, however. In 1992, the opposition agitated for a referendum to dissolve the Soviet 
and call new elections, and working against the apathy of the electorate, managed to 
collect 442,000 signatures, of which the Central Referendum Commission had validated 
384,000 by May – 34,000 more than required under the law. But the conservative bloc 
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was reinvigorated by the electoral success of Communist successors in neighboring 
Lithuania and conservative achievements in stymieing Boris Yeltsin’s agenda in Russia.  
Citing (undocumented) irregularities in the signatures, the legislature voted 202-35 
against holding a referendum, with thirty-five abstentions.  The liberals and nationalists 
accused the conservatives of violating the Constitution to retain their seats and their 
executive power. As a consolation prize, the opposition was offered early legislative 
elections in 1994, a year sooner than had been planned. This concession ended up 
producing almost no value for the liberal cause.  
Kyebich, who remained a Communist Party leader in all but name, personally 
controlled the ministries in a government staffed with erstwhile Communist Party 
members, who were, not surprisingly, leery of reforming economic or political 
institutions, as this was seen both as a threat to their own power and as a potential source 
of political and economic instability. Legislation drafting continued as it had under the 
Communist Party, serving the policy priorities of the executive – indeed, of the very same 
people who had controlled it in the Soviet era. Kyebich’s power was further concentrated 
when the liberal-leaning legislative chairman Shushkyevich was voted out in favor of 
Myechyslaw Hryb, a Kyebich ally, ensuring that Kyebich himself also survived a 
confidence vote instigated by the opposition. The Supreme Soviet was similarly opposed 
to liberalization, and in 1994, it ratified a Constitution that consolidated the government 
under a new president’s office.  Running on a platform of monetary union with Russia, 
Kyebich was widely expected to win the presidential election, scheduled three months 
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later, but in a run-off election in July, he lost resoundingly to Aleksandr Lukashenko, 
who had run on an even stronger pro-Russian (reunification) platform and a program of 
anticorruption. The liberal and nationalist blocs agreed not to speak out against his 
policies for three months, and Kyebich’s government resigned en masse, allowing 
Lukashenko a free hand in setting policy, organizing the executive, and naming new 
ministers.  Lukashenko recruited a mix of new talent and Kyebich critics who had served 
in the Kyebich government, and when the Soviet confirmed his Cabinet, he signaled his 
solidarity with the conservative majority by agreeing to delay parliamentary elections to 
their original 1995 schedule.  
Liberal reform was officially dead, and the new executive would exercise 
virtually complete discretion in shaping Belarusian institutions to Lukashenko’s will, 
including the legislation drafting process. Lukashenko fired anyone who stood in his way 
– the ministers of defense and forestry, the military chief of staff, and the head of the 
border guard were among the first to go – and the remaining pro-reform figures resigned. 
Lukashenko censored a report on corruption in his government, read in the legislature by 
Syarhey Antonchyk in late 1994, and he answered ensuing liberal attempts to raise any 
criticism with threats to dissolve the Soviet – a course of questionable legality under the 
new Constitution, which was amended in 1996, creating the bicameral National 
Assembly of Belarus to succeed the Supreme Soviet. As a result, there was hardly any 
protest when he issued the Edict of the President of the Republic of Belarus of 28 July 
1997, № 407, transforming the Belarusian Institute of State Building and Legislation, 
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which had conducted legislation research, technical drafting, and analysis and had 
answered to the legislature via the Cabinet since its formation in 1992, into the National 
Center of Legislative Activity under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of 
Belarus. The change took effect on November 1.107 It was not the end of the 
centralization of the Belarusian drafting process, but a harbinger of things to come. 
Features of the communication network. This theoretical perspective also 
anticipates that the features of the communication network shape the costs to legislators 
and parties as they organize the drafting process. Who is able to pay attention—or might 
begin to pay attention—to legislative behavior?108  From this perspective, one can 
anticipate that when communication networks connecting the legislators in the capital 
with citizens are fairly rudimentary, the costs of gaining information from citizens will be 
prohibitively high, and legislators might use a drafting process that centers on foreign or 
domestic elites in the capital. Indeed, during the Belarusian transition, almost no 
interactive communication infrastructure connected the president or deputies in the 
Supreme Soviet with constituents; even telephone infrastructure remained low.109 In fact, 
the Presidential Library itself had no network connecting it even to the legislature as late 	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as 1998, although fax was available and email access was improving.110  As predicted, 
drafting reflected elite and Russian priorities rather than any divergent interests of 
constituents; under Lukashenko’s control, drafting even for international treaties was 
organized to make the text porous to Russian interests, which Lukashenko regarded as 
closely entangled with his own. Shortly after his election, he signed a treaty with Russia, 
the draft text of which included a number of Belarusian concessions, most significantly 
allowing Russia to station troops in Belarus, but the treaty language did not include a 
vital Belarusian economic need – a reduced price for Russian gas. 
More specifically, when communication networks are developed largely to 
transmit information to citizens, legislators and parties might be expected to choose 
highly centralized processes that allow for partisan capture and control of the agenda for 
electoral advantage since they can transmit their legislative agenda to the mass electorate 
at low cost. This was also the case in transitional Belarus, whose state television and 
radio were extremely efficient in transmitting a message to the population: the president’s 
message. In April 1995, Lukashenko declared his intention to hold a referendum with or 
without the Supreme Soviet’s approval. The remaining opposition deputies began a 
hunger strike, hoping to draw public attention to the constitutional cause. Not 
coincidentally, just after the strike began both the legislature and the national television 
and radio stations were evacuated due to an alleged bomb threat. The deputies gave up 	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their hunger strike, as there was no way for word of their protest to reach their 
constituents with all media shuttered at executive order. The elections held later that year 
also demonstrated executive control of media structured only to transmit (or not) the 
executive message; so little information was available to voters due to restrictions on 
television and radio broadcasting that voters were unsure of how to participate. Low voter 
turnout in both rounds of the election filled only 120 of the 174 seats required to seat the 
legislature.  Per theoretical expectation, in this context, Lukashenko (supported by his 
partisan allies in the executive bureaucracy and in the legislature) molded the legislation 
drafting process to his will, producing legislation calculated to keep the electorate 
quiescent.  
Social factions. Social organization also shapes the calculations of legislators and 
parties during transition. The organization of various factions in society structures the 
benefit legislators or parties gain from including them in the drafting process.111 In the 
Belarusian case, since social faction organization was extremely low at transition,112 the 
executive and the formerly Communist majority in the legislature could expect to gain 
little from trying to include citizen interests in the drafting process; instead, the theory 
anticipates that they would choose more centralized drafting processes that would allow 
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for party capture and control of the agenda for electoral advantage. In fact, this was 
precisely what happened. As Martin and Swank have shown, state structures motivate 
group organization as well, suggesting that legislative drafting processes and social 
organization co-evolve,113 and as expected, this strongly centralized executive and 
partisan control of legislation drafting did little to motivate civil society participation in 
legislation development or in the political process more generally. Voter turnout 
remained low; comment on or opposition to laws, presidential edicts, and legal normative 
acts remained imperceptible. 
Features of the state. Features of state structure can further shape how legislators 
and parties interact with social organization and organize drafting processes. This theory 
suggests that at the high end, greater district magnitude114 can motivate legislators to 
choose less centralized, more consensus-based drafting processes. Before transition, in 
the 1990 election of the unicameral Supreme Soviet, voters in single-member districts 
overwhelmingly returned a conservative majority, and because new parliamentary 
elections were not held until 1995, the conservative faction started with other incentives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2008), The political origins of coordinated capitalism: 
Business organizations, party systems, and state structure in the age of innocence, 
American Political Science Review, 102, 181-198; Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2012), 
The political construction of business interests: Coordination, growth, and equality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
114 Cox, G. W. (1987), The efficient secret: The Cabinet and the development of political 
parties in Victorian England, New York: University of Cambridge Press; Lijphart, A. 
(1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six 
countries, New Haven: Yale University Press; Wink, K. A., Livingston, C. D., & Garand, 
J. C. (1996), Dispositions, constituencies, and cross-pressures: Modeling roll-call voting 
on the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House, Political Research 
Quarterly, 49, 749-770. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
99 
to centralize its legislation drafting process: ensuring that the legal framework of the 
country reinforced the pro-Russian, communist-successor majority’s economic interests 
and hold on power. The 1996 constitutional amendments chartered a bicameral National 
Assembly with geographic single-member electoral districts for the upper house. By this 
time Lukashenko’s project of centralizing every aspect of policymaking, legislation 
drafting, and implementation under his direct authority was already well underway. 
However, the choice of single-member districts under the 1996 amendments continued to 
exclude a potential motive for legislators to introduce a greater consensus basis to the 
drafting process. The Lukashenko bloc won a majority in the elections to the newly 
constituted National Assembly. 
Expectations. Given the alignment of every incentive, then, following my 
theoretical argument, one would expect the executive and the legislature to do exactly 
what the Belarusian conservative faction did: centralize the legislation drafting process. 
The structure of factional conflict in the early transitional years created partisan 
incentives for this centralization, and in the further development of the legislation 
drafting process, as I trace below, the dominant conservative faction continued to follow 
these incentives. Partisan models generally explain legislative organization as the result 
of the majority party’s attempts to maintain the party’s electoral appeal and control of the 
agenda.115  As such, my argument anticipates that the dominant conservative faction 	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would create drafting processes that give it control of policy formulation and legislative 
agenda setting, research, technical drafting, and analysis of draft legislation—and that do 
not include participatory input to the drafting process. The conservative faction would be 
likely to avoid choosing drafting processes that require the consent of competing interests 
or that allow organized interests to submit their own preferred draft bills. The 
development of the drafting process in Belarus since 1997 follows these expectations: the 
Belarusian drafting process did evolve further into one of the most centralized legislation 
drafting processes in the world, with policy concept formulation, research, technical 
drafting, and analysis all performed in an ever-narrowing ring of executive institutions, 
and participation in legislation development including an ever smaller group of elite 
stakeholders.  
Effects on the legislation drafting process. Following the partisan incentives 
created by the structure of factional conflict, the Communist Party of Belarus and its 
successors in the Lukashenko bloc essentially have functioned as a party cartel in which 
legislators cooperate to achieve their collective goals. In a less authoritarian regime, the 
president and his proto-partisan majority in the legislature might have been interested 
merely in organizing centralized drafting in ways that increased their appeal or reduced 
inefficiencies in their efforts to secure re-election. In Belarus, many dimensions of 
political activity, including the organization of legislation drafting, have often aimed at an 
even more direct factional control of electoral outcomes, policy, administration, and 
economic resources by limiting access to competing information, stifling nascent sources 
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of social and political organization, and ensuring that the text of legislation precisely 
describes and legalizes the existing self-interested behaviors of the conservative political 
elite.116 117 I turn now to tracing these effects. 
The Presidential Library, unlike its counterparts throughout Europe and 
specifically in contiguous post-Soviet states, deepened its subservient role, providing 
resources to the legislature but answering to the executive. By 1998 it had 1.5 million 
items in its collections and was adding 20,000 items annually, but rather than providing 
original research reports to the legislature, it confined itself to indexing parliamentary 
papers; providing bibliographic information to the officers and deputies of the legislature, 
Constitutional Court, and ministers; processing 500,000 loans and 33,000 reference 
requests annually; and photocopying material requested by the ministries. During the 	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early years of transition (1991-1997), the deputies’ most frequent requests had been for 
CIS documents and the papers of foreign parliaments, and for information on the New 
Economic Policy of the Leninist era.  The chairman of the Supreme Soviet had been 
similarly interested in economics, requesting volumes concerning problems of a market 
economy and property law.118 Under Lukashenko’s direct oversight, the Presidential 
Library, like the legislature itself, was focused on the threats of economic transition, even 
as it was sidelined in the legislation drafting process. 
After reorganizing the drafting process to bring it under the Office of the 
President in 1997, Lukashenko set about further centralizing changes. Issuing the Edict of 
the President of the Republic of Belarus of 13 December 2007 No 630 “On certain 
measures for improving the law-making activity and scientific researches in the field of 
law,” he reorganized his National Center for Legislative Activity, combining it with the 
public Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. 
Renaming this consolidated entity the National Center of Legislation and Legal Research 
of the Republic of Belarus, he commissioned it to improve the effectiveness of 
lawmaking activity and to advance “the legal science in providing for the socio-economic 
and socio-political development of the republic.”119 The Administration of the President 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Judo, S. (1998), Deputy director of the Presidential Library of the Republic of Belarus. 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	  
119 Национальный центр законодательства и правовых исследований Республики 
Беларусь. (2008). (http://center.gov.by/eng/lawstatus.html ed.), Национальный центр 
законодательства и правовых исследований Республики Беларусь. (2008). 
http://center.gov.by/blr/index.html. 
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manages the Center, and the Lukashenko appoints and dismisses the Center’s director at 
his own discretion.  
To the extent that the five major functions of legislation drafting are carried out at 
all, they are carried out by the Center. The Center formulates concepts for legislation and 
draws up a legislative agenda and a plan for developing all legislation on the agenda. It 
both conducts research on legislation under development, including research on 
comparative law and experience and regulatory impact (and has authority to form 
working groups with academic institutions or to compel any other person or body to 
submit documents it deems necessary in this work), and lays out guidelines for research 
in support of legislation performed by any other body. To the extent that it decides to 
employ a notice-and-comment period (the only form of participatory input to drafting that 
occurs in Belarus), it does so at its discretion, and it sets the criteria by which any inputs 
are evaluated and then integrated into draft legislation. The Center not only conducts 
technical drafting (of law, legal normative acts, and even international treaties), but also 
makes rules to govern drafting by any other state bodies that might submit working drafts 
to the Center for consideration. It carries out the formal legal analysis of legislation it 
drafts, and also of any amendments the National Assembly proposes to make; and it 
monitors and evaluates implementation of legislation at the national and local level.  
The Center also includes in its portfolio a number of duties not usually associated 
with the drafting function. These include directing post-graduate study in law and taking 
a lead in setting the curriculum and certification requirements for graduate students of 
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law; overseeing professional development of professionals in the field of law; training all 
officials at the national, oblast, and local levels in rulemaking procedures and technique; 
conducting law reform and codification; interpreting legislation governing subsidiary 
rulemaking; and coordinating with international bodies in its fields of competence. 
 A mere list of the Center’s formal competences, however, fails to convey the 
degree to which all legislation drafting authority is vested in the Center. When the 
President proposes a policy to the Center, the Center creates the policy concept document 
and not only plans the development of the law, but also of its subsidiary rules. During 
technical drafting, it conducts the research that supports legislation development and 
issues guidelines for any other bodies that provide supporting research. It governs rights 
of legislative initiative and possesses legislative initiative to submit its own draft 
legislation to the National Assembly on behalf of the President. It performs analysis on 
its own drafts, but also has authority to analyze and reject amendments put forth by the 
National Assembly.  Once the National Assembly has voted in favor of a law, the Center 
submits it to the president for signature.  It publishes laws in the National Register and 
performs legal codification upon presidential signature.  And once the law has entered 
into force, the Center performs monitoring and evaluation of executive agency and local 
implementation. In short, there is almost no conceivable aspect of legislation 
development – of legislation drafting – that is not directly controlled by the Center, and 
the Center itself answers directly to the Lukashenko. Even when draft legislation makes 
its brief foray into the legislature, it meets a body comprising over ninety percent 
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Lukashenko bloc MPs.  These arrangements qualify the Belarusian drafting process as 
one of the most centralized in the world.  
Conclusion 
The extremely centralized Belarusian legislation drafting process has developed 
in the context of the state’s past, of its drafting legacy and the persistence of executive-
centered Russian and Soviet institutions. But neither the legacies of the past nor diffusion 
of institutional innovation from other polities can explain the evolution of the Belarusian 
drafting process since transition from Soviet rule. During and since transition from Soviet 
rule, the structure of factional conflict has created incentives, as theory anticipates, for 
conservatives to centralize the process further, putting under direct executive control and 
even consolidating in a single institute all five functions of legislation drafting: (1) 
formulating policy concepts for translation into draft legislation; (2) conducting 
supporting professional research to guide drafting (3) arranging public input (very limited 
notice and comment only, with no transparency about this input or its effect on draft 
legislation) during drafting; (4) technical legal drafting, and (5) non-political, formal 
technical assessment of draft legislation for legality and impact.  This institutional choice 
serves the partisan interests of the president and the Lukashenko bloc, whose political 
cartel can maintain their economic stake and political power against an increasingly hard-
pressed opposition and population.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: COORDINATED CONSENSUS DRAFTING IN ESTONIA 
Introduction 
Contemporary Estonian legislation drafting is increasingly coordinated, evidence-
driven, and consensus based. The Cabinet and the Riigikogu have staff resources to 
support policy formulation for translation into draft legislation, research, and professional 
assessment of draft legislation. Technical legal drafting is coordinated through the 
Ministry of Justice. And public input during drafting is not just accepted, but proactively 
sought, especially from experts and representatives of potentially affected social groups, 
through participation in drafting commissions and through surveys. 
It might seem that these features of the legislation drafting process are mere 
imports from EU best practices, the hallmarks of a functional parliamentary system and 
“good governance” imported during Estonia’s journey to EU membership. While the 
quest for EU membership does exert pressure on aspiring member states to bring their 
legislation into alignment with EU standards, and to achieve benchmarks of democratic 
good governance,120 the EU member states evaluated in this study fall across the range of 
legislation drafting processes. Croatia’s legislation drafting process during transition was 
significantly more centralized than those of consensus-based-drafting Czech, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak, or Slovenia (and in this consensus-based-
drafting group, the degree of coordination varies somewhat, as the measures in Chapter 2 
and the Polish case study detailed in Chapter 6 demonstrate). EU members Bulgaria and 	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Romania have been during transition at the fragmented/pluralist end of the legislation-
drafting spectrum. In short, neither European cultural and democratic norms nor diffusion 
of institutional innovation from the EU predict the choice of legislation drafting process. 
Estonian drafting has diverged widely from neighboring Russia, and it is (as the measures 
in Chapter 2 show) more coordinated than that of neighboring Latvia. 
The consensus basis of the Estonian legislation drafting process might also be 
attributed to institutional persistence and the policy legacies of German, Swedish, tsarist, 
and Soviet rule. Though the Swedish legislation drafting process remains consensus-
based and German technical drafting influenced early Estonian legislation, and though 
some features of these legacies do persist in contemporary Estonia, persistence also fails 
to explain both the ongoing evolution of the drafting process in post-Soviet Estonia and 
its divergence from German, Swedish, Russian, and Soviet drafting – and from less 
coordinated Latvia, which shares Estonia’s history of Swedish and Russian rule and 
whose drafting process was similarly centralized under Soviet rule.  
I suggest that the structure of factional conflict is essential to understanding the 
evolving coordinated consensus basis of the Estonian drafting process since transition. 
The equilibrium between conservative and reform/radical factions at transition, coupled 
with the high organization of social factions and structured by high district magnitude 
and the high connectivity of the Estonian communication network (indeed, its impressive 
online capacity even very early in the transition years) – this structure of factional 
conflict produced overwhelming informational incentives for the choice of a consensus-
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based legislation drafting process that was grounded in fact and widespread input, able to 
deliver policy certainty in the uncertain waters of economic transition. Given the 
roughness of these waters, the competing political factions and the proto-parties emerging 
from them needed an advantage of policy certainty (for themselves as they navigated 
liberalization and privatization and the aftershocks of these changes) and policy 
responsiveness (for their constituents) in order to secure votes. With engaged and highly 
organized social factions and high district magnitude, this was their best electoral chance, 
and the high connectivity of Estonia’s communication network lowered the cost of 
getting information that would make policy more certain and responsive. The Estonian 
story demonstrates the influence of the structure of factional conflict on the evolution of 
the legislation drafting process, and an analysis of this case lends support to the core 
argument that this structure is crucial to explaining the country’s contemporary 
consensus-based legislation drafting. 
Theories of the Origins of Consensus Drafting in Estonia 
Institutional Persistence and Policy Legacies 
Political actors in post-Soviet Estonia have not made their institutional choices 
from an unlimited number of institutional possibilities. To some extent, the past frames 
the possibilities that occur to contemporary decision makers, and perhaps even the range 
of the politically possible. The origins of modern legislation drafting in Estonia can be 
traced to December 21, 1918, when the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Estonia, newly independent from Bolshevik Russia and still fighting a war to secure its 
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independence, ordered the foundation of the State Library and commissioned it to create 
a collection to support lawmaking. Members of the Maapäev (the Estonian provincial 
assembly provisionally serving as Parliament until the drafting and ratification of a new 
Constitution) and government bodies began to use the collection, which was housed 
along with the Maapäev in Toompea Castle on the heights of Tallinn.121 Under the new 
Constitution of 1920, the Riigikogu’s (Parliament’s) system proved unstable, since a 
threshold was not established that could prevent the proliferation of parties, the parties 
were roughly balanced between Left and Right, and parliamentary dismissal of a 
government did not trigger elections. Legislation, in fact all major Government 
initiatives, required the Riigikogu’s approval, setting up a stark choice between 
consensus and chaos (with chaos often prevailing: 23 governments fell in the first 15 
years of independence). In this environment, the need for information to justify decisions 
and create common ground in a politically fragmented state was clear; as early as 1935, 
Estonian and Baltic publications were included in mandatory deposit at the State Library, 
and along with the Riigikogu, the country’s intelligentsia had begun to depend on the 
library’s resources, which focused on social science acquisitions.122  
 The State Library was one manifestation of the long evolution of Estonian 
national political identity and state institutions, and as in Belarus, the Library’s fortunes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Loddes, E., (1998), Director, Reference and Information Center, National Library of 
Estonia. In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research 
services in Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: 
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rose and fell (and rose again) with those of the larger national project and of the 
legislation drafting process. Ruled by German nobility since the thirteenth-century 
Crusades, Estonia (together with modern Latvia was Livonia) endured Russian invasion 
under Ivan IV (the Terrible) in 1558. The Swedes and Poles pushed back the Russian 
offensive but then spent the next decades fighting each other for Livonia, devastating the 
local Estonian population. In control of the territory by 1629, Sweden divided Estonia 
into northern Estland and southern Livland (encompassing part of modern Latvia). A 
decade of war between Sweden and Russia’s Peter I (the Great) at the dawn of the 
eighteenth century returned Estland and Livland to Russian control. Under German, 
Swedish, and Russian rule alike, the German nobility preserved its privileges; native 
Estonian peasants were forced into serfdom and their land, crops, and labor were 
expropriated to an increasingly draconian extent. The first reforms did not begin until 
1804, culminating in emancipation in 1819. A growing sense of Estonian cultural identity 
during the urbanization and industrialization of the mid-nineteenth century met with a 
repressive policy of Russification; revolutionary sentiment and action to unify Estonian 
territory and end Russification at the turn of the twentieth century incurred further 
retaliation from the tsar – but the moderate Estonian Progressive People’s Party 
eventually won the right to participate in the Russian Duma. 
 The tsar fell from power in February 1917, and the Estonian Progressive Peoples 
Party leader Jaan Tõnisson led a successful lobbying effort with the provisional Russian 
Government to unify Estonian territory into a single province and allow the election of a 
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Maapäev. As would continue to be the case in the interwar years, the parties in this 
provincial assembly ranged across the ideological spectrum, from several of the Left 
(Bolsheviks, Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries) to those aligned with nationalist 
right, Tõnisson’s party occupying the center. Confronting the rapid shift from Russian 
Bolshevik takeover in November 1917 to German occupation in February 1918, the 
standing body of the Maapäev declared Estonian independence. In the ensuing years of 
party fragmentation and instability under the 1920 Constitution, the Government faced 
down an attempted coup by the Estonian Communist Party in 1924 (aided by Moscow); 
and ten years later under the amended Constitution, it evaded takeover by a protofascist 
party by acquiescing in a preemptive coup by the newly elected center-right President 
(and former Prime Minister) Konstantin Päts of the National Front.  The perturbations of 
the early years of the Republic of Estonia had ended in an uneasy and more centralized –
and centrist – equilibrium.   
Just six years later, Stalin’s USSR forced Päts to agree to a treaty of “mutual 
defense,” claimed Estonia had violated it and occupied the country, installed a pro-Soviet 
Government, deported the Estonian Government to Siberia, forced a new election for 
which only the Estonian Communist Party was allowed to offer a slate of candidates, and 
accepted the newly seated Communist legislature’s declaration that Estonia was a Soviet 
Socialist republic and its request to join the USSR. Soviet rule commenced with the 
deportation of 10,000 Estonians (most women, children, and elderly people) to Siberia in 
a single night and was quickly followed by German occupation (and near extermination 
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of Estonia’s Jewish population) from 1941 to 1944. As the USSR fought its way back 
into Estonia, 70,000 Estonians went into exile, many in Sweden, the United States, and 
Britain; the diaspora kept the Estonian cause before the international community, which 
continued to recognize Estonia’s sovereignty; this recognition sustained the national 
identity of dissident factions in Soviet Estonia. Under Soviet occupation and 
Russification, the State Library was renamed; its links to foreign libraries were severed, 
its Estonian-language collections placed under restricted access or destroyed, and 
Russian-language publications placed on mandatory deposit. The library was ordered to 
produce bibliographies of “recommended reading” endorsed by the Communist Party.123 
The Communist central committee drafted legislation; the library’s resources were no 
longer needed to provide information that could support Government action in a 
democratic parliament characterized by fractious party competition. It might have seemed 
that early Estonian traditions of law and legislation drafting, of evidence-based consensus 
building and negotiation and centripetal tendencies amid chaos had been extinguished. As 
it turned out, the memory of these traditions persisted through fifty years of occupation, 
the ineradicably concrete historical institutions of a state whose sovereignty had become 
mostly abstraction. The development of the contemporary Estonian legislation drafting 
has continued from these beginnings. 
The present descends from the past, and some features of the process as it already 
existed have carried on, reflecting historical precedent. This theoretical perspective 	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anticipates that during transition, Estonia would retain the institutions of the previous 
regime.124 Wary after centuries of occupation that inarguably failed to serve the interests 
of most ethnic Estonians, sovereign Estonia has historically been sensitive to the truth 
that “inherited drafting rules…ill serve governments seeking to employ the law for 
institutional transformation.”125 As this theoretical perspective anticipates and as 
analyzed below, Estonians explicitly rejected Soviet legislation drafting practice – in 
process and in substance, seeking to eradicate Soviet law from the books as quickly as 
possible. As a result, the drafting institutions that have persisted in post-Soviet Estonia 
have largely been those of Estonian devising during the interwar and Soviet eras. On 
November 26, 1928, the Government of the Republic of Estonia had approved an act 
titled “Seaduste kokkuseadmise juhtnöörid” (Instructions for Compiling Legislative 
Acts), which governed the structure of Estonian legislation: legislative acts were to be 
drafted in sections, which would be combined into chapters, and the chapters combined 
into parts as necessary. The Instructions also described how legislative acts were to be 
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repealed. In the months immediately following Estonia’s departure from the USSR, the 
Board of the Riigikogu drew on these Instructions as they devised new rules to govern 
legislative drafting.  
Features of the Estonian legislation drafting process at the end of the Soviet era 
also carried into the contemporary era. With the adoption of the law "On the Self-
Employed” on November, 19, 1986, the USSR began an experiment in “self-supporting 
socialism” that allowed “self-employment in handicraft trades, consumer services and 
other activities based solely on the personal work of individuals and their families." The 
law "On Cooperation in the USSR” No 8998-11 of May 26, 1988 created additional 
opportunities for non-state enterprise in cooperative associations. Estonian intellectuals 
and reformers sensed an opening. The first major political demonstration had occurred in 
August 1987; by September 1988 Estonia’s popular “Singing Revolution” would be well 
underway. Recognizing that any effort to regain their independence would be futile if the 
legal framework was not ready to support a smooth transition from Communist rule, 
reformers (led by four liberal intellectuals) developed the concept of Self-Sustained 
Estonia (Estonian: Isemajandav Eesti, or IME) in 1988, which sought to lay out how 
Estonia’s state and society might be structured apart from central Soviet administration. It 
outlined a legal system separate from that of the USSR, revealing a need for ESSR 
legislation that could support the transition to a market economy. By November 1988, the 
ESSR’s Supreme Council (no longer subject to political Russification in the Gorbachev 
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era of glasnost) had asserted its sovereignty and declared that USSR law would apply 
only when approved by the ESSR Supreme Council.  
The development of new republican draft legislation was forbidden in the Soviet 
system, however.126 Even if they were to defy this limitation, the reformers were 
constrained by the need to draft legislation within the Soviet legal mode, so instead of 
drafting an entirely new Civil Code, they decided only to draft amendments to the ESSR 
Civil Code in the form of individual acts. The Supreme Council followed through on this 
intention with the Enterprise Act passed on November 17, 1989, which recognized 
freedom of enterprise and established a legal basis for enterprises using private property 
rather than state property;127 and the Statutes of Public Limited Company of November 
22, 1989 allowing for public limited companies rather than just the cooperatives allowed 
under the earlier USSR law.128 Since the state still owned the major means of production, 
these nascent public limited companies faced an enormous competitive challenge. 
Sensing this challenge, but also tasting success, the reformers began deploying legislation 
drafting even more explicitly as a form of radical politics: they drafted the Farm Act 
(passed by the Supreme Council of the ESSR on December 6, 1989), the first in the 
USSR to allow private persons – farmers – to employ labor other than themselves and 
their immediate family members. The Farm Act also authorized perpetual use of land, 
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allowing private farms to operate in competition with collective farms.129 In March 1990, 
a representative body of Estonian citizens, the Congress of Estonia, voted to restore the 
Republic of Estonia in legal continuity; a referendum later that month showed nearly 78 
percent of Estonians agreed. In a stronger assertion of Estonian autonomy, just prior to 
regaining independence later that summer, the reformers drafted the Principles of 
Ownership Reform Act, which passed on June 13, 1991 and entered into force on June 
20, 1991. This act specified which property expropriated during the Soviet era would be 
returned or eligible for compensation, and it established that state property not directly 
needed for administration would be privatized.130 
Throughout this period, Germanic legislation drafting persisted. Soviet law 
possessed many unique features (notably the absence of property law and the limited 
scope of contract law), but it had striking similarities to continental law, combining the 
structure of the Germanic pandect system with a more Romanist conception and content 
of law. Estonia’s long tradition of Germanic law made the Germanic features of Soviet 
law even more pronounced. As a result, when reformers began drafting legislation in 
advance of independence, they had to avoid conflicts of law with the Soviet code and 
maintain the Germanic mode of drafting. This necessity would end up framing the 
choices open to framers, the Riigikogu, the Government and the staff during the 
transition from Soviet rule. In fact, the Supreme Court of newly independent Estonia 
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would rule in 1992 that the legal system had to align with principles of law applicable in 
1940.  
However, institutional persistence alone cannot explain the origins of 
contemporary legislative drafting processes in Estonia, as these processes do not 
consistently mirror those of previous regimes, nor have they remained static over time. 
Instead, as my theoretical argument anticipates, the evolution of the contemporary 
drafting process in Estonia has been a much more interesting story of political agents 
acting against the backdrop of existing institutions in response to incentives created by 
the structure of factional conflict. 
 Diffusion of Institutional Innovation 
In need of new political institutions, including a legislation drafting process, at 
transition, we might expect Estonia to borrow rules, organizational structures, and 
processes from other jurisdictions.131 In Estonia, institutional diffusion and institutional 
persistence are entwined, as many of the institutions that persist in post-Soviet Estonia 
originally spread from other jurisdictions by conquest in Estonia’s early history. Russia 
(tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet) constitutes the de facto predecessor state to 
contemporary Estonia, the largest state bordering Estonia, and the overwhelming 
hegemon in the region – one that has for centuries considered Estonia its “window to the 
West.”  But Estonia’s system of law also evolved with Germany’s under German rule and 	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trade, and its legal institutions were established under Swedish and Polish-Lithuanian 
rule.  
Theories of institutional diffusion predict, first, that diffusion might spread 
legislative drafting processes from contiguous states (Russia and Latvia), or second, that 
diffusion might proceed from influential states (especially Russia, Sweden, Germany, 
Poland, and Finland) and international or supranational polities (EU).132 As discussed 
above, whether these polities pressured Estonia to replicate foreign institutions, 
incentivized the state with development aid, or simply influenced Estonia with the 
apparent effectiveness, “modernity,” or “scientific” quality of a particular process, 
Estonia might have been expected to adopt features of the legislative drafting processes 
of these neighboring jurisdictions. And this has been the case historically as well as in the 
post-Soviet era. The process of institutional diffusion in legislative drafting began in 
medieval Estonia, which received German law governing land, trade, and other matters of 
importance to the German nobility and merchant class. Because this nobility remained in 
place under Swedish and Russian rule, German law became so engrained in Estonia that 
even in the tsarist era, Professor Georg-Friedrich Bunge of the University of Tartu 
developed and drafted the Baltic Private Law of 1865 according to the German pandect 
system, in five parts.133  The fact that a professor was developing and drafting legislation 
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was itself an artifact of another case of institutional diffusion, in this case from Sweden, 
whose legislation drafting was customarily done by a drafting commission appointed to 
conduct research on a broad policy formulation and then conduct the technical drafting of 
the text of legislation; these commissions might be staffed by a single university 
professor with a secretary, or a commission might include three or four experts.134  
Diffusion continued after independence. The Government of the Republic of 
Estonia began drafting an Estonian Civil Code in the early 1920s, finishing the work in 
1940. It was not passed before Soviet occupation. This law (like the earlier law) was 
drafted according to the German system and drew on the example of the tsarist-era Baltic 
Private Law Code, the German Civil Code (BGB), the Swiss Civil Code, and the 
Austrian Civil Code. As in 1865, a professor, Jüri Uluots, led the development and 
technical drafting of the new code; he noted that the Swiss Civil Code was particularly 
influential as the text of the draft code was prepared.135 However, little of tsarist 
governance itself made an impression in Estonia, and Soviet Russia was similarly 
unsuccessful in grafting its institutions into Estonian drafting, in part because Moscow in 
both eras dictated most decisions and did little to integrate its own process with Estonian 
customary law or existing Swedish, Germanic, or Estonian institutions or to include 	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ethnic Estonian leaders. Indeed, Russification in both tsarist and Soviet Estonia was 
periodically so severe that ethnic Estonians were subjected to repression (in the 1880s 
and during the 1905 Revolution), deported (in 1941 and 1949), and purged from 
participation in governance (in 1950 the Estonian Communist Party itself was purged and 
Estonian Communists were replaced with Russians). Institutional diffusion, too has 
continued in the post-Soviet era, with Estonia adopting features of its legislation drafting 
process from Germany, from Sweden, from Poland and Lithuania, from the Netherlands, 
Quebec, Louisiana and the greater USA, from Belgium, Switzerland, and Finland, and 
perhaps most importantly from the EU. But this has not been a simple story of 
transplanted institutions or institutional contagion. Instead, as my own argument 
anticipates, the consensus-based drafting process in contemporary Estonia has developed 
as political actors have followed the incentives shaped by the structure of factional 
conflict, strategically selecting some drafting innovations from a range of other polities 
while rejecting others.  
The Structure of Factional Conflict 
My argument centers on how the structure of factional conflict shapes the 
incentives of those who make institutional choices about legislative organization and 
explains the variation in legislation drafting processes. This approach considers the 
motivations of actors choosing the drafting process while allowing also for cross-national 
state-level comparison. These choices are made against the backdrop of the past, in the 
context of existing institutions and surrounding polities. At the moment of independence, 
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Estonians had a Soviet corpus juris, deeply influenced by the Germanic mode of 
continental legislation drafting and recently amended to ease the transition from a 
centrally planned socialist economy. They had a tradition of evidence-based research and 
technical drafting conducted by professors and experts in drafting commissions, as in 
Sweden, and a strongly engaged civil and political society that remembered its history of 
lively party competition and had maintained ties to Western Europe and North America – 
but they also had a long history of central authoritarian rule, not only under the tsar and 
the USSR, but even for a fourth of their interwar independence years. The choices they 
made were framed by these facts, but as I detail below, their incentives are ultimately a 
product of the structure of factional conflict. 
Political factions. As noted previously, one important strand of this historical 
institutional literature shows that the relative strength of various blocs participating in the 
transition to democracy—factions aligned with radical or conservative forces—shapes 
the institutional choices that they make during the framing of the constitution.136 If 
conservative and radical factions have relatively equal strength, this theory anticipates 
that they would choose a consensual drafting process, anticipating that they will enjoy 
veto rights over text in draft legislation they find intolerable. During the transition in 
Estonia, a strong majority (nearly 78 percent) of the public favored Estonian 
independence and sovereignty; the country retained a strong sense of national identity 	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and ethnic Estonians overwhelmingly continued to regard annexation into the USSR as 
an occupation. The August 20, 1991 declaration of independence included a call to 
convene a constitutional assembly, of whose participants thirty were members of the 
ESSR Supreme Council (given its push for independence, it could hardly be seen as a 
reactionary body, but as the existing authority in power it could be characterized as the 
more conservative faction) and 30 were members of the Congress of Estonia (the more 
radically nationalist representative body of Estonian citizens built in the lead-up to 
independence). The Supreme Council had already decided that legal continuity would 
require naturalization of people who had immigrated to Estonia during its occupation 
(ethnic Russians) and set two-year residency and Estonian language requirements for 
citizenship. The more nationalist Congress of Estonia was adamant that these immigrants 
would not vote in the constitutional referendum or in subsequent elections unless they 
were naturalized. As a result, the ethnic Russian population – significantly more likely 
than ethnic Estonians to favor continuity of the Soviet system – participated at a low rate 
in the referendum. (Close to 30 percent of Russian residents of Estonia had also 
supported independence, so even among this population the Communist Party could not 
count on support, although the Russian population had managed to elect 27 pro-Soviet 
deputies of 101 seats to the last ESSR Supreme Council). The Constitution passed with a 
91 percent majority on June 28, 1992, just 10 months after independence. A second 
question on the referendum, whether to allow applicants for citizenship who had not yet 
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been naturalized to vote in the September 1992 Riigikogu elections, denied these 5,000 
people this right.  
As a result, there was little constituency for conserving features of the Soviet 
system during the constitutional drafting and referendum processes, and little 
constituency for the Communist Party itself; the party was not even registered during the 
first post-independence election in 1992, and consequently it won no seats. Of the 
multitude of registered parties that competed (32 in total), 23 ended up with 
representation in the Riigikogu – most as members of six blocs. The parties were 
distributed for the most part from the (now more typically ideological) center-Right to the 
center-Left; the center-Right Pro Patria bloc won 29 of the 101 seats and formed a 
government with the Estonia National Independence Party (a nationalist party) and the 
centrist Moderates bloc.  
As the theory anticipates, the ideological balance of these parties and blocs 
provided a strong incentive for consensus, and reaching any sort of consensus among so 
many parties seemed to call for information. By December 1992, the Riigikogu had 
created a Chancellery and organized several departments, a number of which assisted 
with research to support drafting and with technical assessment of draft legislation: the 
Legal Department, the Documentation Department, the Information Systems and 
Technology Department, and the Foreign Relations Department. In 1993, a Reference 
and Information Analysis Center was established in the National Library of Estonia to 
coordinate the production of information from all departments of the library and provide 
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information to the ministries and the various bodies of the Riigikogu. “The development 
of Estonia as an independent state [was] greatly dependent upon such cooperation,” says 
a past director of the National Library’s Reference and Information Analysis Center. 
“Information as a resource should be used in the most effective way both in legislation 
and in the development of society as a whole.”137 “Government Regulation No. 199 of 
July 1, 1993 “On the organization of concordance and legal expertise of legal acts 
proposed to the government” was a next step toward consensus: all ministries whose 
portfolios touched on draft legislation proposed by another ministry had a right to 
comment on the legislation and the competent ministry had an obligation to respond 
during the concordance process. Under the newly seated Riigikogu’s first rules of 
procedure, the Board of the Riigikogu (President and two Vice Presidents of the 
Riigikogu) acting under the provision delegating authority, approved new regulatory 
rules governing legislative drafting on November 22, 1993. The rules set requirements for 
both the form and substance of draft legislative acts, laying out principles for the 
structure of legislative acts and establishing that there should be instructions to guide the 
wording. These rules also set out requirements for references in draft acts and contained 
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provisions delegating authority. The Estonian drafting process was already taking shape: 
an evidence-based search for consensus.138 
Social factions. The organization of social factions shapes the calculations of MPs 
and parties during democratic consolidation. The organization of various interests in 
society structures the benefit MPs or parties gain from including them in the drafting 
process.139 If group organization is high, legislators would be expected to gain the most 
support by choosing consensus-based drafting processes that draw on the information of 
groups to reduce policy uncertainty. Estonian civil society remained more resilient and 
organized throughout the Soviet era than that in most of the SSRs, partly due to the 
prominence of the diaspora and the government in exile and the West’s recognition of 
Estonian sovereignty; partly due to the value of Estonia’s technical expertise to the post-
Stalinist USSR that insulated its professional class from the more repressive policies 
deployed to the south; and partly because Estonia’s small population could organize 
around personal bonds without constituting an existential threat to the Soviet regime. The 
revolution itself that re-established Estonian independence had begun in the founding of 	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the Estonian Popular Front and in a series of public song festivals, starting with 10,000 
and growing to 300,000 (in a country of just over a million residents), that earned the 
name “Singing Revolution,” a revolution galvanized by the protests’ success in forcing 
the replacement of the Russian general secretary of the Estonian Communist Party with 
an ethnic Estonian in 1988. This had been preceded by student protests at Tartu in 1987 
against the Soviet plan for phosphate mines likely to be environmentally destructive; with 
the newspaper publication of the IME plan by four leading reformers (see above); and 
with a plenary session of Estonia’s creative and intellectual associations that culminated 
in the founding of the Estonian Popular Front, led on a popular television show by Edgar 
Savisaar – one of the four authors of the IME plan. When Estonian and Baltic deputies in 
Moscow succeeded in getting an official commission to assert that Stalin and Hitler had 
indeed signed a nonaggression pact delivering the Baltic states to Soviet rule, to draw 
attention to the fiftieth anniversary of the pact, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
linked arms and formed a 600-kilometer human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius. Radical 
pro-independence groups, the Estonian Citizens Committees, began registering citizens 
of the interwar Republic of Estonia and their descendants, as proposed by the Estonian 
National Independence Party, the Heritage Preservation Society, and the Christian Union; 
eventually 700,000 of just over a million residents of Estonia had been registered as 
Estonian citizens. Student groups continued to mobilize; associations defunct since the 
Soviet invasion were reconstituted. In a sense, post-Soviet Estonia did not have a strongly 
organized civil society so much as it was the creation of Estonian civil society. It is also 
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important to note that, although organized interests proliferated, before independence 
these groups were already tending to coalesce, first around the Estonian Popular Front, 
the Congress of Estonia, the Chamber of Commerce, and other national associations. 
Estonian society was broadly and deeply engaged, but groups coordinated with increasing 
centralization as Soviet antagonism to organization at the state level dissolved under 
glasnost policy. As a result, as the theory predicts, Members of the first Riigikogu (many 
themselves active participants in the independence movement) had a strong incentive to 
design consensus-based institutions that would draw on the information and support these 
organized interests could offer. 
However, the earliest impulses toward consensus-based legislative drafting 
related not (as one might reasonably expect) to the first part of the drafting process –
formulating policy concepts, nor to the third part of the process – arranging for public 
input during drafting. Instead, during the earliest days of the transition to democratic rule, 
the tendency toward negotiation and consensus centered on the second feature of the 
legislative drafting process (conducting research to guide drafting) and the fifth feature 
(formal technical assessment of draft legislation). While Estonians engaged deeply and 
with a high degree of political organization in the electoral process, and elected a 
parliament whose fairly balanced ideological distribution required consensus-driven 
coalition government, the first several Governments notably failed to provide drafters 
with clear, detailed policy concepts decided in Cabinet or at the ministerial level, and 
legislation initiated in the Riigikogu similarly lacked clear policy formulation for 
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drafters.140 The first Riigikogu Procedure Act alluded to the need for stakeholder input on 
draft legislation, but what this meant also remained unclear. What was clear in these rules 
of procedure was Clause 53’s delegation to the Board of the Riigikogu of responsibility 
to make technical rules governing drafting quality. The procedure act also set out rules 
for submitting draft laws and other normative acts to the Board; the Board was to return a 
draft to its initiator if the procedures and technical rules were not followed.141 As it turned 
out, the participation of social groups in legislative drafting would evolve from the more 
technocratic features of the drafting process. As Martin and Swank have shown, state 
structures motivate group organization as well, suggesting that legislative drafting 
processes and social organization co-evolve;142 in Estonia, just as highly and centrally 
organized social groups would spur the creation of consensus-based drafting dependent 
on rich information, an emphasis on evidence-based drafting would incentivize further 
group organization, as groups gradually began to be included in the drafting process.  
Features of the state. State structures further shape how political and social 
factions interact in ways that shape the incentives of those choosing the legislation 
drafting process. In Estonia, the Supreme Court having ruled in 1992 that the legal 
system would maintain continuity with 1940 law, the courts began interpreting still-	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applicable Soviet law and rudimentary national law on this basis – and, given the unusual 
timing (the readiness of the judicial branch to begin its work as the first parliament was 
just beginning to establish a legislation drafting process; the absence of large parts of the 
corpus juris necessary to govern a market economy), this feature of state structure ended 
up having an interesting (and singular) effect on early legislation drafting after 
independence. Many of the first laws drafted in post-Soviet Estonia (perhaps most 
importantly the Law of Obligations Act) were based on court judgments already taken, 
many of their provisions deriving directly from judicial rulings – rather than these rulings 
deriving from the code.143 
Fenno also observes that legislators strategically choose forms of responsiveness 
on the basis of district characteristics such as district size.144 The literature suggests that, 
at least at the high end, greater district magnitude145 can motivate legislators to choose 
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consensus-based drafting processes that produce more coherent or predictable policy 
responsiveness. The Riigikogu is a unicameral legislature elected through proportional 
representation; with district magnitude above eight, each multi-member district contains 
just less than ten percent of the population on average. A five percent threshold reduces 
the fragmentation that occurred under the interwar electoral system. (In fact, as Estonia’s 
party system has matured and voters have aligned with greater stability with parties, only 
six parties have maintained the capacity to clear the threshold and to win seats in the 
contemporary Riigikogu; the fairly even distribution of the parties from center-Right to 
center-Left has continued). As a result, Estonian legislative politics has become 
increasingly stable over time, and the dwindling number of parties in the Riigikogu and 
in Cabinet over has allowed each successive session and Government to rationalize 
drafting further. In the development of the Estonian legislative drafting process, the trend 
toward consensus – toward more established concordance processes, greater participation 
of national associations of stakeholders, more organized research services, greater 
coordination between the Chancellery and the ministries, stronger central oversight of 
technical drafting – has often manifested as a trend toward coherence and coordination.  
By the (second post-Soviet) 1995 election, Estonian parties were sorting a little 
more clearly onto the ideological spectrum, and the center-Right parties (led by Mart 
Laar) that had formed the first governments had fallen out of favor for their introduction 
of liberalizing “shock therapy” during the economic transition. A center-Left majority 
formed a coalition Government, but scandal led to the exit of a major coalition member 
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and the formation of a new (and unwieldy) coalition Government – a center-Right party 
with the Left-leaning rural parties that remained. It was becoming clear, both in the 
Riigikogu and in the Cabinet, that more coherent information was needed to overcome 
the powerful challenges of transition in ways that didn’t infuriate or alienate the 
electorate or make continuing in office impossible.146 This clarity was underscored by the 
OECD’s publication of rules of good lawmaking practice, decided by the Council of the 
OECD in 1995 after its investigation into ways to improve the quality and efficiency of 
law  -- a case of institutional diffusion meeting with and being shaped by the agency of 
legislators themselves.147 To meet this need, the Riigikogu established the Department of 
Economic and Social Information (DESI) in the Chancellery of the Riigikogu with a staff 
of eight. “The establishment of the Department of Economic and Social 
Information…was an important step in Estonia’s ongoing transformation to 
parliamentary democracy,” says the founding director of DESI. “The Department was 
established primarily to provide the parliament with economic and social data, research, 
and analysis [to] permit it to make informed decisions and to operate more independently. 
It is designed to serve as bridge between social science information on the one hand, and 
parliament’s day-to-day political and legislative activity on the other.”148 Because the 
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Riigikogu’s need to manage the economic transition had been an important motivation 
for DESI’s organization, the department set about analyzing laws on pensions, labor, 
advertising, income tax models, customs duties, and deposit insurance within its first two 
years.149 The Chancellery of the Riigikogu’s Legal Department, in a state that had 
possessed very limited drafting capacity prior to independence, now had nine experts on 
staff responsible for providing legal advice on technical drafting and legal analysis of 
draft legislation submitted to the Riigikogu. The Government of the Republic Act of 1995 
gave the Ministry of Justice responsibility for ensuring the quality of draft legislation 
produced in the ministries. The infrastructure of a consensus-based, research-driven 
legislation drafting process was taking shape, and the process, while not yet as 
centralized as it would become, was increasingly coordinated. 
Features of the communication network. Finally, although social organization can 
shape the benefits available to legislators and parties as they organize the drafting 
process, communication networks structure their costs. Who is able to pay attention—or 
might begin to pay attention—to legislative behavior?150 When communication networks 
are highly connective for multi-directional information flows, this theory anticipates that 
legislators and parties would choose consensus-based drafting processes that allow them 
to gain information and reduce policy uncertainty, since the cost of doing so is low. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
services in Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: 
K.G. Saur.	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150 Arnold, D. (1990). The logic of congressional action. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
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Estonian Popular Front had been founded on a popular television show in the late Soviet 
era; even broadcasting networks had been co-opted to communicate pro-independence 
information. Perhaps more importantly, the State Library had full internet access from 
1991, and the Library’s Reference and Information Analysis Center had begun 
networking the Library with its parliamentary and ministerial constituents. By 1994, the 
Chancellery of the Riigikogu had email. By 1996, as DESI was being established, the 
staff of every department of the Chancellery, the Riigikogu committees, and the parties in 
parliament had computers; the staff had online access to transcriptions of parliamentary 
motions and sessions and a database of Estonian law. By 1998, the Riigikogu’s website 
would be fully searchable. Contemporary Estonia has one of the highest rates of internet 
use in the world (80 percent of Estonians had home internet access in 2013151), and free 
wireless networks are widely distributed. In this context, the cost of gaining information 
from the public is quite low. (Estonia has used online voting since 2005.152) As described 
below, Estonians had increasing opportunities to see the entire work of the Riigikogu and 
the Government online, to interact with research services in the State Library and the 
Chancellery of the Riigikogu, and to provide information to ministries and committees as 
legislation drafting occurred.  Perhaps more importantly, Estonia’s highly developed 
communication networks allowed for the creation of linkages between highly organized 
social factions, national associations, university researchers, and drafting commissions in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Statistics Estonia. (2013). Eight out of ten households have an internet connection at 
home, from http://www.stat.ee/65162. 
152 Riigikogu. (2013). Election of the Riigikogu, from https://www.valimised.ee/mac. 
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the ministries, and for reports of their work to be made available to the public, increasing 
the legitimacy and consensus that surrounded draft legislation.  
Expectations. Given the alignment of these factors to produce informational 
incentives, then, following my theoretical argument, one would expect the executive and 
the legislature to do just what Estonian politicians did next: create a more coordinated, 
evidence-driven, consensus-based legislation drafting process. The structure of factional 
conflict in the early transitional years created incentives for choosing processes that could 
deliver policy certainty and the electoral rewards of policy responsiveness, and in the 
further development of the legislation drafting process, as I trace below, political factions 
continued to follow these informational incentives. In informational models, the 
legislature wants to know that legislation will effectively embody its policy preferences 
(or more technically, those of the median legislator). To achieve this, legislatures reward 
policy specialization while minimizing distributional losses.153 As noted above, this 
model fits with the expectations of the emerging literature on “legisprudence,” which 
argues that legislatures should rationalize lawmaking processes through evidence-based 
policymaking and drafting.154 As such, my argument anticipates that legislators motivated 
by informational interests would create drafting processes that transparently compile 
credibly unbiased research on which to base drafts, assign technical drafting activities to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See Krehbiel, K. (1991), Information and legislative organization, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press; Kiewet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1989), The spending 
power: Congress, the president, and appropriations, unpublished manuscript. 
154 Wintgens, L. (Ed.). (2002). Legisprudence: A new theoretical approach to legislation. 
Oxford, OR: Hart Publishing. 
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neutral or balanced drafters, and require the input of competing interests in order to signal 
the bill’s likelihood of effectiveness upon enactment. They would be likely to avoid 
choosing drafting processes that designate a single official body (subject to partisan 
capture) to draft bills following an established legislative program or that allow organized 
interests to submit their own preferred draft bills. (Forgette observes that the logics for 
these choices can change over time.)  The development of the drafting process in Estonia 
follows these expectations: the Estonian drafting process today is an increasingly 
coordinated, expertise-rich system in which both the Cabinet and the Riigikogu have 
resources for policy concept formulation, research, and analysis; technical legal drafting 
is coordinated through the Ministry of Justice; and public input is incorporated by 
increasingly systematic, widespread, and consensus-based means. 
Effects on the legislation drafting process. The development of the contemporary 
Estonian legislation drafting process was driven by informational incentives produced by 
the structure of factional conflict, mediated by drafting legacies and the diffusion of 
institutional innovations from supranational and international organizations. Having 
founded DESI to conduct research that would contribute to more stable legislation to 
guide and support the economic transition, the Riigikogu began commissioning practical 
and theoretical studies of legislative drafting.  On the Chancellery of the Riigikogu’s own 
initiative, DESI carried out ambitious projects of social and economic analysis, beginning 
with a survey of the explanatory notes in draft legislation. Continuing the Estonian (and 
originally Swedish) institution of parliamentary reliance on academic research to support 
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legislative drafting, DESI teamed with the Tartu Society of Legal Psychologists and 
Sociologists to investigate uses of sociological information in law making. This work was 
reinforced by social and market research conducted by the Estonian survey company 
SaarPoll. The Ministry of Justice, the Institute of Law of the University of Tartu, and the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Tartu conducted additional supporting research.155 
 But it was not just the Members, parties, and blocs of the Riigikogu that 
experienced an increasing need for information. The newly elected Government, hoping 
to avoid the fate of its predecessor while managing the ongoing economic transition, also 
began to formalize its sources of information and its participation in technical drafting 
and analysis of legislation. By 1996, the Government was drafting and initiating over 
sixty percent of all legislation introduced in the Riigikogu; this share would grow as the 
political system matured, the legal environment grew more specialized, and the Riigikogu 
increasingly left this task to the Cabinet.156 On June 11, 1996, the Government adopted 
an Order of the Government of the Republic, Regulation No. 160, laying out the drafting 
process within the Government. Although the process was evolving toward greater 
coordination, the Government’s Order specified a process that was still a work in 
progress, with overlapping authorities in legislative drafting. As previously specified in 
the Government of the Republic Act of 1995, the Order assigned to the Ministry of 
Justice responsibility for the concordance procedure, for the quality of draft legislation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Narits, R. (2004). Good law making practice and legislative drafting: Conforming to it 
in the Republic of Estonia.	  
156 OECD. (1997). Law drafting and regulatory management in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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initiated by the Government, and for the conformity of such draft legislation with the 
Constitution and principles of the Estonian system of law. However, Article 41 of the 
Order of Government assigned to the State Chancellery the task of checking drafts of 
legal acts proposed to the Cabinet and, as necessary, revising these draft legal acts to 
conform with the technical and linguistic drafting rules. Article 42 specified that, in the 
event that a draft legal act contained minor technical, linguistic, or legal errors, the State 
Chancellery was to attach an amended draft to the proposal. While these procedures so 
far suggest something like a division of labor – the Ministry of Justice would supervise 
legal conformity and check draft Government legislation to be initiated in the Riigikogu, 
while the State Chancellery would supervise technical conformity and check draft legal 
acts proposed as Government regulations – the actual procedures were more entwined 
still. The State Chancellery was to supervise all materials proposed to the Government, as 
well as checking draft legal acts proposed as Government regulations (the Government of 
the Republic Act of 1995 had also assigned to the State Chancellery the responsibility for 
verifying that legal acts of the Government proposed as regulations conformed with the 
Constitution and the laws). The Ministry of Justice was to approve all draft Government 
legislation to be initiated in the Riigikogu under Article 25 of the Order of Government. 
In practice, the Ministry of Justice mostly supervised concordance procedures and 
verified all respects (legal and technical) of draft Government legislation to be initiated in 
the Riigikogu, while the State Chancellery supervised draft legal acts proposed as 
Government regulations.  
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 Although this procedure represented a significant step toward coordination and 
consensus in legislative drafting, its overlapping lines of responsibility earned the 
criticism of the OECD in a 1997 report following up on its 1995 publication of rules of 
good lawmaking practice: 
This system is rather uncomfortable because it mixes two different theoretical 
models in the construction of an administration. In the future, there should be only 
a single supervisory institution controlling drafts of legal acts of Riigikogu and 
the government. It should be decided whether to gives [sic] this function to the 
State Chance[lle]ry and eliminate the function of the Ministry of Justice of co-
ordinating law drafting or to attribute the supervisory function totally to the 
Ministry of Justice.157 
The seriousness with which the State Chancellery, the Ministry of Justice, and some 
Members received this criticism and acted on it throughout the following years indicates 
the extent to which Estonia’s growing coordination of drafting arose in the interplay 
between continuing diffusion and the agency of legislative actors.  
An economic slump returned Mart Laar to power in 1999, this time as Prime 
Minister of another ideologically unwieldy coalition Government headed by Laar’s 
conservative Pro Patria Union/Fatherland Union Party and joined by the Right-liberal 
Estonian Reform Party and two Left parties, the Moderates and the Estonian People 
Party, that would merge (now the Social Democratic Party). Volkens et al. scored these 	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  OECD. (1997). Law drafting and regulatory management in Central and Eastern 
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parties’ manifestos in a range (on a +/- 100 scale) from +22.2 on the Right to -10.2 on the 
Left in 1999, with the Reform Party in between the others at +8.6.158 Further procedural 
rationalization was necessary in the legislative drafting process to produce consensus 
legislation within an ideologically mixed (and volatile) Cabinet managing a still-fraught 
economic transition and moving Estonia toward EU membership, and the Cabinet 
required more robust research to support its draft legislation it planned to initiate in 
Parliament.159  
The Government’s Regulation 279, adopted in September 1999 and entering into 
force on January 1, 2000, established regulatory rules intended to improve the 
consistency and quality of draft legislative acts. The rules laid out technical drafting 
requirements, procedures for amending and repealing legislation, and most significantly, 
(on the basis of the extensive research undertaken previously) the required content of 
explanatory memoranda accompanying draft legislation. After undergoing some changes 
on November 20, 2001, the regulation remained without further amendment through 
2004. In addition to governing the quality of draft legislation to be proposed to the 
Riigikogu, the regulation specified requirements for future Government (Ministry) 
subsidiary regulation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Volkens, A., Klingermann, H., Merkel, W., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, S., et al. 
(2010). In Bara J., Budge I. and Tröger V.(Eds.), Manifesto research project on political 
representation [database]. Berlin: German Research Foundation. 
159 Kasemets, A., (1998), Director, Department of Economic and Social Information, 
Riigikogu. In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research 
services in Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: 
K.G. Saur.	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These developments were mirrored in the Riigikogu itself, which adopted new 
drafting rules on June 3, 2001. The rules reflected the ongoing work of the Journal of the 
Estonian Parliament, which had undertaken an extensive study of drafting, following the 
earlier work of DESI, the Ministry of Justice, and the University of Tartu. The Journal 
had offered five recommendations, focusing on the second element of the drafting 
process (conducting supporting professional research to guide drafting). First, the 
editorial board concluded, an inventory should be produced of previous research and 
surveys ordered by the Riigikogu and Government, and the procedures for ordering, 
evaluating, systematizing, and preserving such research should be studied further and 
improved. Next, the editors, recommended, there should be a Government program for 
improving “knowledge-based legislative drafting,” a programme that should be 
formalized by the Riigikogu itself if politically feasible. Third, given the demands of a 
modern information-driven society and economy, the Riigikogu would need procedures 
for reviewing critically any surveys and reports submitted to it, ensuring compliance with 
requirements for these reports, seeking revisions as necessary, and seeing that legislative 
drafting conformed to the evidence presented and the drafting rules set forth by the Board 
of the Riigikogu in order to produce “informed representation of the public.” Next, the 
Ministry of Education and Research (whose portfolio included directing publicly-funded 
research) should work with the Research and Development Council to produce an 
overview of all research ordered under the state budget; this overview should be 
submitted to the Riigikogu committee with responsibility for oversight of research and 
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education so the Riigikogu could identify research priorities for knowledge-based 
legislative drafting. Finally, the editorial board advised, the Government should include a 
prioritized list of research needs and a supporting budget in its annual legislative drafting 
plan, to be coordinated through the Ministry of Justice. Although some polities might 
employ a decentralized approach to commissioning research to support legislative 
drafting, the Journal concluded, “Considering Estonia’s limited human, time, and 
monetary resources; modest experience in interdisciplinary studies; etc., it would seem to 
be more expedient to organise national surveys and evaluate the level of research 
centrally in the coming years.”160  
Through the efforts of the Chancellery, the Riigikogu came to a similar 
conclusion about the necessity of further centralization in the fifth element of the drafting 
process (non-political, formal technical assessment of draft legislation for legality and 
impact). In 2002, following its participation in a European Centre for Parliamentary 
Research and Documentation conference,161 the Chancellery of the Riigikogu organized a 
seminar for the legislature, “How to Make Good Law?”  The seminar focused on 
communicating to the Riigikogu how regulatory impact analysis was organized and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Kasemets, A. (2002). Ordering of applied research and analyses in government 
agencies in 1999–2001: Toward more knowledge-based politics, legislation, and public 
administration. [Rakendusuuringute ja analüüside tellimine valitsusasutustes 1999–2001: 
teel teadmistepõhisema poliitika, õigusloome ja ava­liku halduse poole] Riigikogu 
Toimetised, 6, 107-108.	  
161 Kasemets, A. (2003), Parlamentide info- jakoostöövõrgud. [Information and 
Cooperation Networks of Parliaments] Riigikogu Toime­tised, 7, 181-188; Kundla, H., & 
Madise, L. (2001), Technical rules for draft legislation submitted for legislative 
proceeding of the Riigikogu, ECPRD Seminar on Legal and Regulatory Impact 
Assessment of Legislation, Tallinn, Estonia. 
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conducted in the EU and OECD countries to produce knowledge-based policy and 
legislation. Discussion of these issues continued in the Riigikogu throughout 2002, given 
urgency by Estonia’s move toward EU membership and the need for Estonian legislation 
to meet EU standards. In this sense, Chancellery staff were exercising agency in 
advocating for institutional diffusion in an effort to increase their own professional 
reputations among European peers, and MPs were exercising agency in embracing 
European practices of regulatory impact analysis in order to maintain the economic 
growth that cooperation with the EU appeared to offer. 
Within the legislature, the next stage of development, not surprisingly perhaps, 
was reached just after the next election and the formation of a new Government. The 
March, 2003 election, while following the pattern of re-litigating debate over the 
economic transition of the past decade once again, coincided with Estonia’s move toward 
full EU membership (per the treaty finalized just after the election and scheduled to be 
submitted for referendum later that year). The party system remained volatile. The social-
liberal Estonian Centre Party (usually Left-leaning, but whose manifesto has been scored 
that year at +0.8 on a +/-100 scale, or just slightly Right of center162), expected to 
perform well, had won 28 of 101 seats with a message of economic populism and 
progressive taxation to replace the flat tax, but failed to articulate a clear position on EU 
membership that would allow it to form a coalition if necessary. As the party had been in 	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government prior to the election, it had been involved in guiding Estonia toward EU 
membership, but remained unlikely to gain votes with a Euroskeptical public by 
emphasizing this fact. The Centre Party’s slight vote advantage had only translated into a 
tie in seats with Res Publica, a party formed just a year before from some of the older 
Right parties and branded on combating crime and corruption (the Centre Party’s leader 
Edgar Savisaar had resigned as Interior Minister in 1995 amid scandal). The Centre Party 
proving unable to form a Government and refusing to enter coalition with its deeply 
conservative rival (with a manifesto score of +24.5 in 2003163), Res Publica formed a 
coalition with the center-Right Reform Party and the center-Left People’s Union, all of 
which skewed right that year. Parties in government in Estonia, given their responsibility 
for managing EU relations, tended to shed Euroskepticism upon taking office, and the 
new Government followed this trend.164  As the EU-Estonia accession treaty was 
finalized in April 2003 and the referendum on EU accession was scheduled for later that 
year, the new Minister of Justice was preparing a Handbook of Regulatory Practice to 
guide legislative drafting in the ministries in compliance with Estonian law and European 
standards (published in early 2004).  
The tenth Riigikogu responded energetically to the need for a more rigorous and 
efficient legislative drafting process that could produce legislation harmonized with EU 
law, a need made apparent by impending EU accession. (The September referendum 	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164 Mikkel, E. (2003), Europe and the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2 March 2003. 
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supported Estonia’s accession to the EU). Following up on the Chancellery’s seminar for 
the previous Riigikogu on “How to Make Good Laws?” using European regulatory 
impact analysis best practices, the Constitutional Committee and the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the Riigikogu began organizing a parliamentary hearing on the subject; the 
investigation was enlarged in January 2004 in anticipation of the treaty’s entering-into-
force on May 1. In preparation for the hearing, the committees requested input from the 
Prime Minister and all of the Cabinet Ministers, the Legal Chancellor, the Auditor 
General, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, the rectors of four public universities, and the 
directors of five research centers. Specifically, the ministries were to provide a case of 
recent legislation each had drafted, and to answer six questions.165 The hearing revealed 
that the Ministries of Social Affairs, Economic Affairs and Communications, Finance, 
Agriculture, and Education and Research had units that ordered supporting professional 
research to guide legislative drafting and conducted technical assessment of draft 
legislation. Less than a decade before, the OECD had reported that Estonia had no such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 The questions, as noted here, touched on four of the five elements of legislative 
drafting: “1. [non-political, formal technical assessment of draft legislation for legality 
and impact] Were any institutional or international guidelines used for the analysis of the 
social and economic, budgetary, demographic, environmental, and other impact of the 
legislative act? 2. [technical legal drafting] What were the composition and qualification 
of the working group preparing the legislative act? 3. [conducting supporting professional 
research to guide drafting] What kind of databases, preliminary surveys, expert 
assessment, and other tools were used? 4. [non-political, formal technical assessment of 
draft legislation for legality and impact] What regulatory impact analysis methods were 
applied? 5. [arranging public input] What kind of agencies, research centres, and citizens’ 
associations were notified and involved? 6. How will the ex post regulatory impact 
analysis be carried out, and what is the method for providing feedback?” For more, see 
Narits, R. (2004), Good law making practice and legislative drafting: Conforming to it in 
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units. Through the hearings, a consensus evolved that this process required further 
consolidation and coordination. 
Significantly, several facts about the state of Estonian legislation drafting 
emerged through the committees’ efforts. While the hearings revealed little about the first 
element of the legislative drafting process (formulating policy concepts for translation 
into draft legislation), which was becoming more centered in the Cabinet as the political 
system matured and more policy formulation was delegated to the Cabinet, the other 
elements were becoming increasingly coordinated in the ministries.  In regard to the 
second element of legislative drafting, conducting supporting professional research to 
guide drafting, the committees considered the work of two scholars appointed by the 
previous Riigikogu (on the recommendation of the Journal) and learned that 
approximately one third of the surveys and reports the ministries commissioned from 
1999-2001 was intended to support legislative drafting. Public input in the drafting 
process, the third element of drafting, was becoming more common. Most of the working 
groups drafting legislation for the ministries had involved stakeholders, frequently 
through professional peak associations, which offered a cost-effective way to learn about 
the interests of those affected. The committees determined that public input to the 
drafting process was proving most effective when the stakeholder group had a high level 
of information about the potential effects of the legislation and sufficient capacity to 
conduct an assessment of the draft. Clause 53 of the regulatory rules of the Riigikogu had 
specified requirements for informing and involving stakeholders, and the committee’s 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
146 
review of explanatory memoranda attached to major draft legislative acts determined that 
these requirements for public input were being followed twenty-three percent of the time. 
Working groups responsible for technical drafting (the fourth element) regularly included 
both a lawyer and an expert, and the universities were beginning to turn out professionals 
trained in regulatory impact analysis who might join these groups in the future. Finally, in 
regard to formal technical assessment of draft legislation, the ministries were regularly 
following the Order of Government on “regulatory rules of draft legislative acts” and 
regulatory impact analysis rubrics from the OECD, the EU, and NATO. While best 
practices of regulatory impact assessment were still coming into use, the newly elected 
Government had identified in its coalition agreement a priority of forming an integrated 
approach to regulatory impact analysis of draft legislation.166 
The Ministry of Justice, whose portfolio included responsibility for the 
concordance procedure and the quality of draft legislation, recommended that instructions 
on regulatory impact analysis should be appended to the Government’s 1999 “regulatory 
rules of draft legislative acts.” The difficulties of meeting its responsibilities with limited 
resources also motivated the Ministry of Justice, along with the Ministries of Education 
and Research and of Social Affairs, to recommend the creation of a center to coordinate 
regulatory impact assessment by establishing a coherent practice, advising ministries and 
working groups drafting legislation, and supervising this element of the legislative 
drafting process. The Ministry of Education and Research proposed that this center could 	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map the institutions that should be involved in analyzing each distinct type of legislation. 
Some legal scholars inferred from these hearings that Estonia should even try to 
centralize or coordinate research through a single entity to support both drafting and 
technical assessment of draft legislation to make these functions more efficient and 
coherent.167  
These decisions within the Riigikogu and the ministries took place within the 
larger landscape of EU accession and institutional diffusion. Following a 2000 OECD 
analysis of legislation drafting practice and reforms in its member States168 and the 
Mandelkern Group Report169 to the Lisbon European Council Summit, the European 
Commission began insisting that newer member States adopt laws to govern legislation 
drafting, as implementation of the acquis communitaire required transposition of EU 
directives through high-quality national measures.170 Although some EU legislation was 
prescribed and required adoption without amendment, most was to be harmonized, and in 
pursuit of harmonization, Estonia was obligated to implement regulatory impact analysis 
and drafting procedures that would ensure the quality of law. Under Andrus Ansip’s 
Reform Party-led coalition Government, which came to power in the 2007 election (the 
world’s first national election to be conducted online), the Ministry of Justice addressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Narits, R. (2004). Good law making practice and legislative drafting: Conforming to it 
in the Republic of Estonia. Juridica International, 9. 
168 OECD. (2000). Reducing the risk of policy failure: Challenges for regulatory 
compliance. Paris. 
169 Mandelkern Group. (2001). Mandelkern group on better regulation, final report. 
170 Xanthaki, H. (2010). Drafting manuals and quality in legislation: Positive contribution 
towards certainty in the law or impediment to the necessity for dynamism of 
rules? Legisprudence, 121.	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these obligations by developing an approach to regulatory impact analysis at the national 
level from 2007–2009.171 The Government, however, was not merely seeking to comply 
with EU obligations, but also to ensure that information-based, high-quality legislation 
would achieve its policy aims.172 
Following the 2011 election, the Reform Party’s Taavi Rõivas formed a new 
coalition Government, which continued the Reform Party’s preceding program of 
rationalizing the drafting process (particularly the second and fourth elements, research 
and analysis).  The Riigikogu adopted the Government’s “Development Plan for Legal 
Policy until 2018” on February 23, 2011.173 Currently under implementation, the Plan 
addresses all five elements of the legislative drafting process, bringing each under more 
formal institutional coordination and laying out requirements for each.  
First, in regard to formulating policy concepts for translation into draft legislation, 
the Plan establishes an expectation for clear political control and statement of policy to be 
articulated in draft legislation:  
6.1. The Government of the Republic shall establish a procedure which provides 
that a substantive policy document describing an intention to elaborate a draft act 
shall be drawn up prior to drafting a draft act (analogous to the green paper in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Talmar-Pere, A., Narits, R., & Kasemets, A. (2011). Applying the concept of better 
regulation to internal security policy. Juridica International, 28, 35-43. 
172 Justiitsministeerium [Ministry of Justice]. (2008). Õigusaktide mõjude analüüsi 
süsteemi üldkirjeldus. õiguspoliitika osakond [General Description of impact assessment 
system.] Legislative Policy Department. 
173 Riigikogu. (2011). Õiguspoliitika arengusuunad aastani 2018. [Development Plan for 
Legal Policy until 2018] Riigikogu Toimetised, 1. 
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European Union decision-making process), which shall include a comparative 
analysis of laying down legal provisions and other possible solutions together 
with a primary analysis of the impacts of the preferred regulation.  
The plan goes on to specify criteria for these policy documents: a description of the 
problem and its significance and urgency; a description of the preferred outcome; a menu 
of alternative solutions, along with comparative analysis to demonstrate the reason for the 
choice of the recommended solution; an overview of solutions employed in comparable 
states; a description of the provisions to be included in the proposed legislation, including 
the term of the legislation’s force; an analysis of risk and regulatory impact; and a plan 
for developing and drafting the legislation, including a list of persons responsible. 
Furthermore, draft legislation with substantial impact may not be elaborated until the 
competent ministries approve an “intent to prepare a draft act”; if the competent 
ministries disagree, the Cabinet must meet and decide whether to approve it.174  
In this section, the Plan demonstrates several important facts about the 
development of the first element of the Estonian legislative drafting process. As the legal 
landscape has grown more complicated, and the Riigikogu’s responsibilities have grown, 
and the party system has become more coherent, the Riigikogu, like developing 
parliaments before it,175 has increasingly delegated the formulation of policy and the 
development of legislation to the Cabinet and its Ministries, despite the formal rights of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Ibid. 
175 Cox, G. W. (1987). The efficient secret: The Cabinet and the development of political 
parties in Victorian England. New York: University of Cambridge Press. 
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initiative granted to individual Members, parties and blocs, and committees of the 
Riigikogu.176 This has had a secondary effect of centralizing other elements of the 
drafting process in the Cabinet and its Ministries, with Riigikogu Chancellery 
departments like DESI increasingly cast in a supporting role. Also, the historical 
institutional factors surrounding the development of the contemporary drafting process 
continue to present incentives for an informational emphasis in legislative organization 
(as detailed in the previous section of this chapter), and actors in this context have 
devised a increasingly coordinated drafting process that focuses on building consensus 
through analysis (both of the ex ante facts and of the draft legislation’s potential to alter 
those facts). Finally, while the deeply academic working-group model of drafting, first 
adopted from Sweden, has persisted, it has evolved in the interplay between continuing 
institutional diffusion (“analogous to the green paper in the European decision making 
process”) and electoral and legislative politics.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Solvak, M. (2013). Private members' bills and the personal vote: Neither selling nor 
shaving. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19(1), 42-59.	  
The Estonian electoral system is a three-mandate system in which (1) candidates who 
earn the most votes (“personal mandate”) in open-list voting in multi-member districts (2) 
are seated first when parties are assigned district seats (“district mandate”) and (3) seats 
are awarded nationally to achieve proportional representation (“compensation mandate”). 
This system provides personal-vote-seeking candidates seated through personal mandate 
with an incentive to raise their personal profiles by introducing private Member bills, but 
the share of these relative to all proposed legislation is increasingly low. Furthermore, 
from 1999 to 2007, on average only thirty-seven percent of these draft laws were 
successful, and this percentage has continued to fall. Although Estonian parties have high 
vote discipline in roll call votes, the party system itself and Government tenures have 
been fairly unstable, and this situation creates an incentive to seek information for 
predictable policy and legislation development through coordinated institutions, most 
importantly the Cabinet. 
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In regard to the second element of the legislative drafting process (conducting 
professional research to guide drafting), the Plan requires extensive research and impact 
analysis before technical drafting begins. 
7. A law shall suit in the Estonian legal system and ensure international 
competitiveness of Estonia. To that end, alternatives of legal realisation of 
politically desirable solutions shall be considered.177 
Before technical drafting begins, the developer must describe in its full context the legal 
solution selected and produce a “draft act concept.” This concept paper must include 
regulatory impact analysis for the proposed draft; an explanation of the legal framework 
surrounding the proposed draft “and suggestions established by international 
organisations”; a comparison to legal solutions implemented in comparable states; an 
assessment of the international competitiveness of the proposed draft “on the basis of 
methods used by international organisations” or “generally recognised methods”; and an 
assessment of the proposed draft’s compatibility with Estonian law. In order to 
rationalize this research element of the drafting process, the Chancellery of the Riigikogu 
and the Government of the Republic are to harmonize the rules governing legislative 
drafting and ensure compliance during the legislative drafting process.178 
As in regard to the first element of the drafting process, this section of the plan 
specifies both substantive and institutional requirements to ensure a coordinated, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Riigikogu. (2011). Õiguspoliitika arengusuunad aastani 2018. [Development Plan for 
Legal Policy until 2018] Riigikogu Toimetised, 1. 
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consensus-based process. It also demonstrates the influence of diffusion, especially from 
OECD and EU, in governing rigorous research and impact analysis protocols in the 
legislative drafting process. Finally, it again demonstrates the informational pressures 
shaping the drafting process in Estonia “in order to ensure the quality of the content of 
the draft act.”179  
The Plan also makes a significant leap in the third element of the drafting process, 
arranging technical input, governed previously by Clause 53 of the regulatory rules of the 
Riigikogu.  
10. Discussing the main solutions of the draft with persons affected by the 
regulation is necessary for both identifying all impacts of the draft Act and 
adhering to the principles of democracy.180 
To improve this element of the drafting process, the Plan requires the policy concept, the 
draft act concept, and the draft itself to undergo stakeholder discussion. Toward this end, 
the Plan requires the Government to formalize a common procedure by 2018 for all 
Government authorities to submit each of the three for public discussion, and then to 
report the discussion to the Riigikogu. In addition, all affected by legislation are to be 
made aware of the legislation “through channels familiar to them.”  Each draft concept 
must specify how the addressees of the law will be made aware of it. In addition, the 
various sources of information about legislation are to be rationalized into “a single legal 
information system,” all legislation is to be made available in English as well as Estonian, 	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and indicators and regular surveys of legal awareness are to be implemented and reported 
to the Riigikogu committees.181 The themes of information being used to create high-
quality, efficient, predictable legislation; of consensus building and public input; and of 
institutional coordination and centralization are reflected here as well. 
 In regard to the fourth element, technical legal drafting, the Plan says bluntly, 
“Law shall be clear.” 
Estonian Draft Acts shall be developed in a language as simple as possible, 
clearly and precisely, primarily in consideration of the persons who are expected 
to be the main target group for the legislation as to both implementing the Act and 
being the addressee.182  
Provisions and sentences are to be short, terminology harmonized throughout the corpus 
juris, and drafts edited by the Ministry that drafted them to ensure compliance with the 
rules provided by the Ministry of Justice. 
 Finally, in regard to formal technical assessment of draft legislation for legality 
and impact, the Plan calls for efficiency and alignment between intended and likely 
impacts: 
8.1. [T]he extent to which the created regulation contributes to the achievement of 
the expected policy objective shall be assessed before developing a 
legislation….183 	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The assessment is to include special consideration of impacts on business. If the impacts 
are determined to be complex, the analysis will include the relative merits of a temporary 
period for the legislation to be in force. A plan for ex post assessment of the law upon its 
implementation is to be proposed, including the timeline and institution responsible for 
the monitoring and evaluation, and each draft law is to include provisions specifying 
when the Government will present an evaluation report to the Riigikogu after enactment. 
Law and instructions governing regulatory impact analysis are to be brought into 
alignment with international standards, and the regulatory impact analysis is to be 
submitted to the Government and to the Riigikogu along with the draft legislation, once it 
has ministry approval and has been discussed with relevant parties. 
 Finally, by 2018 the Estonian legislative drafting process will be fully 
coordinated. To achieve this, the Plan envisions a number of institutional reforms that 
will centralize full responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the legislative drafting 
process in the Government, specifically the Ministry of Justice: 
As the Government of the Republic holds a central role in the development of 
legislation…regardless of whether…initiated by the Government of the Republic 
or by any other institution with a right of initiative, the Government of the 
Republic shall also stand for the quality of legislation….184 
To achieve this aim, the Minister of Justice is to implement the Plan, verify the 
conformity of all draft legislation and regulatory impact assessment reports with the 	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norms governing legislative drafting (even for non-Government draft legislation), and 
begin to lay out instructions and rules for all ministries to govern compliant drafting. The 
ministries are each to have a unit responsible for drafting legislation, and Ministry of 
Justice officials responsible for overseeing drafting or assigned to other ministries’ 
drafting units are to receive training to ensure coherence and compliance. The plan 
concludes, 
 22. With a view to involving academic circles in…the legislative drafting 
process, a suitable form of cooperation between the Government of the Republic, 
the Riigikogu and research institutions shall be developed….185 
In short, the institutions, rules, and personnel of Estonia’s legislative drafting process 
across the legislative and executive domains are being coordinated into a consensus-
based system, under the central coordinating oversight of the Ministry of Justice and 
focused on providing information-based, quality legislation with predictable outcomes. 
This process offers continuity with the past in its use of working groups that include 
academic experts, and it reveals continuing institutional diffusion, most importantly from 
supranational and international bodies. 
Conclusion 
The origins of the highly coordinated consensus-based legislation drafting process 
in Estonia are framed by the past, in the persistence of German drafting style and the 
Swedish institution of the drafting commission, often staffed by academics as well as 	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lawyers and stakeholder-experts. During and since transition from Soviet rule, framers, 
legislators, and the executive have responded to informational incentives created by the 
structure of factional conflict in ways that, as theory anticipates, have contributed to 
increasing coordination and consensus-seeking in the process, putting under the aegis of 
the Ministry of Justice all five functions of legislation drafting: (1) formulating policy 
concepts for translation into draft legislation; (2) conducting supporting professional 
research to guide drafting (3) arranging public input during drafting; (4) technical legal 
drafting, and (5) non-political, formal technical assessment of draft legislation for legality 
and impact. While working groups organized through ministry units continue to 
participate in drafting, and while the parliamentary services support Members and 
committees in assessing and amending draft legislation, all draft legislation ultimately 
must be coordinated through the Ministry of Justice, with a strong emphasis on public 
input and technocratic analysis. This institutional choice serves the informational 
interests of the Riigikogu, whose volatile party system and ideological balance in the 
midst of a profound economic transition have demanded stable, efficient policy. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DIFFUSE CONSENSUS DRAFTING IN POLAND 
Introduction 
Nearly a quarter-century after the transition from Communist rule, Poland has a 
consensus-based legislation drafting process, and the human and technical resources 
available to its parliament for gathering evidence as legislation is developed are among 
the most sophisticated in the world. Although Polish legislation drafting is somewhat 
more open to a range of both technocratic and political influences than Estonian drafting 
is, and the process a little less centrally coordinated in the executive and less calculated in 
the ways public input to drafting is taken, the parliament and the ministries have immense 
capacity to ground draft legislation in research and, to a significant and increasing extent, 
to assess its probable impacts. 
As with the Estonian case, one might at first assume that these features of the 
legislation drafting process are EU best practices diffused to Poland, the inevitable and 
even definitional characteristics of a functional parliamentary system and “good 
governance” introduced along Poland’s path to EU membership. While the pursuit of EU 
membership does exert pressure on aspiring member states to bring their legislation into 
alignment with EU standards, and to achieve standards of democratic good 
governance,186 as discussed in Chapter 5, the EU member states evaluated in this study 
fall across the range of legislation drafting processes.187 This suggests, then, that neither 	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187 Croatia’s legislation drafting process during transition was significantly more 
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European cultural and democratic norms nor diffusion of institutional innovation from 
the EU can predict the choice of legislation drafting process. Since transition, Polish 
drafting has also diverged widely from neighboring Belarus, whose legislation drafting 
process is among the most centralized in the world and growing increasingly so (see 
Chapter 4), and from neighboring Ukraine and Russia, whose legislation drafting 
processes are deeply fragmented (see Chapters 2 and 5). Instead, in comparison with the 
drafting processes of contiguous countries, Poland’s drafting process more closely 
resembles Lithuania and Slovakia’s consensus-based processes (although these two 
processes have been less coordinated than Poland’s in transition), and Germany and 
Czech’s consensus-based processes (processes that have been slightly more coordinated 
than Poland’s).188 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak, or Slovenia (and in this consensus-based-drafting group, the 
degree of coordination varies somewhat, as the measures in Chapter 2 and the Estonian 
case study detailed in Chapter 5 demonstrate). EU members Bulgaria and Romania have 
been during transition at the fragmented/pluralist end of the legislation-drafting spectrum. 
Indeed, it seems probable that the development of adequate legislation drafting capacity 
of any form is more likely to be a determinant of EU membership than EU membership is 
to be a determinant of the type of drafting process, although EU norms and legislation 
drafting processes co-evolve among member and candidate states. 
188 Mention of the German case might raise for some readers the question of whether 
federalism is related to the choice of the drafting process; research has shown a link 
between federalism and distributional politics in the American case (see, for example, 
Eulau, H., & Karps, P. D. [1977], The puzzle of representation: Specifying components 
of responsiveness, Legislative Studies Quarterly; and Fenno, J., Richard F. [1978], Home 
style: House members in their districts, Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company). 
However, in regard to legislation drafting itself, rather than to the larger political system, 
federalism is not predictive of fragmented/pluralist drafting, at least in the cases analyzed 
in this study (only Russia is federal). In the larger set of European cases, federal states 
include consensus-based-drafting Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, and 
fragmented/pluralist-drafting Bosnia-Hercegovina and Russia. As data are available on a 
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The consensus basis of the Polish legislation drafting process might also be 
attributed at first glance to institutional persistence and the policy legacies of the pre-
communist Polish state. Though the contemporary legislation drafting process retains its 
information-rich qualities from earlier eras, and though some features of pre-war 
Poland’s legacies do persist in Poland today, persistence also fails to explain several 
puzzles. For example, why has the Polish drafting process diverged so widely during 
transition from Belarus’s centralized process, from Lithuania’s less coordinated 
consensus-based process, and from Ukraine’s fragmented/pluralist process? Poland ruled 
large parts of all three historically, and as a result, the four countries share political 
history and institutions, as well as culture; all four countries’ drafting processes were also 
similarly centralized under Communist rule. And why does contemporary Polish drafting 
more closely resemble German and Austrian drafting, and not Russian drafting, when 
Poland spent more than a century partitioned among all three? 
I suggest that the structure of factional conflict is essential to understanding the 
evolving diffuse-consensus basis of the Polish drafting process since transition. The 
equilibrium between conservative and reform/radical factions at transition, coupled with 
the extremely high organization of social factions and structured by high district 
magnitude and the fairly high connectivity of the Polish communication network – this 
structure of factional conflict produced strong informational incentives for the choice of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
larger set of countries or country-years, further research might investigate whether 
federalism has a positive effect on the choice of a consensus-based and fragmented 
drafting processes over centralized processes. 
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consensus-based legislation drafting process that was grounded in evidence, able to 
deliver policy certainty in the uncertain waters of economic transition and rapidly 
changing regional politics. Given these profound challenges, competing political factions 
and the proto-parties emerging from them needed an advantage of policy certainty (for 
themselves as they navigated economic liberalization and the aftershocks of this change) 
and policy responsiveness (for their constituents) in order to secure votes. With fervently 
engaged and highly organized social factions and high district magnitude, this was 
politicians’ best electoral chance of distinguishing themselves, especially as the two main 
political factions gave rise to a high number of proto-parties in the first fully free 
parliamentary election of 1991. The connectivity of Poland’s communication network 
and its technical infrastructure in the parliament lowered the cost of getting information 
that would make policy more certain and responsive. Polish experience demonstrates the 
influence of the structure of factional conflict on the evolution of the legislation drafting 
process, and an analysis of this record lends support to the core argument that this 
structure is crucial to explaining the country’s contemporary consensus-based legislation 
drafting. 
Theories of the Origins of Consensus Drafting in Poland 
Institutional Persistence and Policy Legacies 
Constitutional framers, the parliament, the executive and its staff in Poland have 
not made their institutional choices from an endless array of institutional possibilities. 
The past frames the present, and the post-transition choice of legislation drafting process 
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is a decision that has been made within that frame. In 1919, following over a century of 
partition of Polish lands, the first parliament seated in newly sovereign Poland voted in 
favor of a proposal of the Polish Peasants’ Party that “the Sejm library be established and 
provided first with the most necessary works, and then gradually expanded.”189 The new 
Library began to consolidate collections of the governing bodies of Polish territories of 
the partition period – from the administration in Prussian Poznań Province, from the 
autonomous Polish government of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, and from the Polish Group 
of the Russian State Duma. Over the next twenty years, the Legislative Sejm Library 
offered increasingly sophisticated services. “It provided, among other things, information 
services and supported the actual work on bills, acting to some extent as a predecessor to 
several of today’s units within the Chancellery of the Sejm, such as the Bureau of 
Research and the Legislative Bureau,” explains Barbara Karamać of the Sejm Library.190 
(Led by its indefatigable early director Dr. Henryk Kołodziejski, the Library would 
eventually publish an expert journal of Polish legislation in French, exchange information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Kulisiewicz, W. (2009). The Sejm Library 1919-2009. World Library and Information 
Congress: 75th IFLA General Conference and Council, Milan, Italy. 75. Kulisiewicz (2) 
notes that the “petition expressed a conscious need and concern of the law-makers for the 
establishment of a research and documentation base necessary to support legislative work 
that was to give shape to the reviving state.” This concern with grounding legislation in 
evidence has indeed persisted in the contemporary Polish legislation drafting process, 
although the choice to continue in this direction rather than to go in another after the near 
extinction of the legislature and its institutions during the German occupation and 
subsequent communist era remains an interesting question, which I argue is illuminated 
by the structure of factional conflict in post-communist Poland.	  190	  Karamać, B. (1998), Deputy Librarian of the Sejm Library. In W. Robinson, & R. 
Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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with other parliaments, deploy a new catalog system, and staff a Legal Section and a 
Socioeconomic Section providing support work on draft legislation.191) In a country 
whose intellectual history included Nicolaus Copernicus and the emergence of globally 
acclaimed research institutions, the Sejm Library stood out as one of the best libraries 
almost immediately.192 Reorganized to report to the Speakers of both the Sejm and the 
Senate (the second chamber set up in 1922), and foreshadowing Poland’s enduring 
bicameral unity around the need to ground legislation in evidence, the Library was 
renamed in 1931: the Library and Archives of the Sejm and Senate. Its reading room now 
remained open until proceedings ended on the days of plenary sessions, a tradition that 
persists in the modern Sejm.193 These twin themes, the search for stabilizing integration 
and a strong focus on parliamentary research and technical legal capacity to support 
legislation drafting, continue to appear throughout the development of the Polish 
legislation drafting process. These characteristics are reinforced by the participatory 
quality of larger political and social institutions in Poland, and they reinforce the 
negotiation-centered qualities of these political institutions by bringing experts and 
stakeholders into the dialog as law is developed and drafted.   
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  Kulisiewicz, W. (2009). The Sejm Library 1919-2009. World Library and Information 
Congress: 75th IFLA General Conference and Council, Milan, Italy. 75.	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  Szymanowska, Z. (1980). Działalność biblioteki sejmowej w latach 1919-1939. 
Rocznik Biblioteki Narodowej, 16, 241-250.	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  Kulisiewicz, W. (2009). The Sejm Library 1919-2009. World Library and Information 
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 The Library and Archives was one expression of the long Polish effort to re-assert 
national sovereignty and to establish state institutions that could support the production of 
Polish knowledge and the stability of Polish policy, and the Library’s fortunes reflected 
those of the larger national project and of the legislation drafting process. Poland’s 
history stretches back to the mid-tenth century, when the local prince converted to 
Catholic faith, thereby gaining recognition from the German (later Holy Roman) Empire 
as a principality, but he shrewdly submitted to baptism in Rome rather than in the 
German Church; Polish national identity has from its origins maintained its deep roots in 
Roman Catholicism, which sustained a resilient civil society throughout the country’s 
history (including its communist era). As the founding dynasty fragmented Poland’s 
territory by dividing the land among the princes of each successive generation, the 
kingdom was vulnerable to invasion by neighboring Bohemia and by the Mongols. 
Outsourcing its attempted conquest of modern-day Lithuania to the Teutonic Knights, the 
Polish monarchy also soon discovered that its mercenaries were creating their own 
territorial claims on “Polish” lands. But through skillful diplomacy, the last king of the 
founding dynasty re-established Poland as a European nation, its Catholicism orienting it 
toward Germany and Western Europe rather than toward the Orthodox East in ways that 
arguably persist in its drafting institutions (among others) to this day.194 Through dynastic 
union with Lithuania, which ruled land reaching into modern Belarus and Ukraine, 
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Poland-Lithuania became a major European power that defeated the Teutonic Knights 
and conquered much of Bohemia and Hungary.  
Poland’s parliamentary tradition dates to 1493, the year of the first national 
assembly of the Polish-Lithuanian king, house of deputies, and senate; the parliament 
represented the nobility and acted as a significant check on the king’s authority (by the 
end of the sixteenth century, in fact, the Polish parliament elected the king). A loss to the 
Ottoman Empire in Hungary signaled the end of Polish-Lithuanian imperial power, but 
the early parliamentary period saw a flowering of Polish culture. The Sejm gained sole 
lawmaking authority; laws could only be passed by the unanimous consent of the nobles 
in the parliament. Significantly, in 1552 the Sejm passed legislation effectively separating 
Church and state, protecting religious minorities (of whom there were many in Poland-
Lithuania) by ending the practice of enforcing decisions of the ecclesiastical courts.195 
Though Polish sovereignty faltered throughout the subsequent centuries, Polish national 
identity remained strong, and the ideals of mutually consenting minorities (or even 
individuals) in the Sejm respecting the rights of minorities in society continued. In fact, 
the modern Sejm Library preserves the extant legislation of this period (and catalogues it 
on its website), an enduring legacy of the early Polish state.  
Hoping to hold back an ascendant Russia that sought control of land that is now 
Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine (territories inhabited by subjects who did not share the 
ruling class’s Polish and Catholic identities), when the last king of the Polish-Lithuanian 	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dynasty died, the nobles created a commonwealth. The parliament expanded to include 
nobles of lower rank, and together the nobles exerted yet greater control over the king, 
often electing a foreign noble they could more easily keep in line domestically. But non-
Polish kings tended to have non-Polish foreign policy interests, including initiating 
conflicts with Sweden and Russia. These policies, combined with the crushing of a 
Ukrainian rebellion against Polish-Lithuanian rule, provoked war with Russia, which 
gained most of the eastern (Ukrainian) land in the treaty at the war’s end, and precluded a 
defense against Sweden, which took most of Lithuania. The consensus principle of 
unanimous consent that had preserved the minority and individual rights of nobles in the 
early parliamentary period made the state increasingly ungovernable and fragmented as 
individual nobles nullified any collective or central action. In 1764, beset by Russian, 
Austrian, and Prussian attempts to subdue fragile Poland-Lithuania, the newly appointed 
king persuaded the nobles to suspend their individual veto prerogative temporarily. 
Before he could strengthen his position, administration, and military power sufficiently to 
resist foreign invasion, however, Poland’s neighbors agreed among themselves to the first 
of three partitions of Poland. 
Under the first partition, Poland adopted the first written constitution in Europe, a 
document that followed the American example in separating powers and permanently did 
away with unanimous consent. Protesting the lost of their ancient privileges, a 
conservative faction of nobles joined with Russia and Prussia to put an end to the 
constitutional project. In the second partition that followed, Poland lost an even greater 
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band of its territory, finally disappearing in the third partition that followed a Polish 
insurgency against Russia and Prussia. It would not be the last time a conservative faction 
attempted to scuttle a constitution in Poland to retain its privileges, nor the last that 
Poland’s statehood depended on achieving a balance between its tradition of enshrining 
minority rights and requiring consent on the one hand, and the need for a coherent 
executive center on the other. 
Polish nationalism survived through partition, not so much through rebellion and 
alliance with Napoleonic France (both of these approaches failed at the hands of 
increasingly aggressive Russian and Prussian imperialism), but through what nationalists 
called “organic work,”196 the effort to ground the Polish national idea in civil society by 
associating it with Roman Catholicism and the Polish language, both of which were 
repressed by various Russian and German policies. Meanwhile, the notion of a Polish 
state lived on in Hapsburg Poland (Galicia), which was allowed a regional Sejm (with its 
own book collection for legislative research) and where Roman Catholic faith was shared 
with the ruling power. The idea of Poland re-emerged in the civil society of Russian 
Poland as industrialism brought former peasants to the cities, where their working 
conditions and participation in trade unions exposed them to socialist leaders advocating 
independence and democratic equality.  
Geographic ill fortune having situated Poland between Russia and Germany, 
Poles suffered enormous losses in World War I, but Polish nationalist leaders had 	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shrewdly extracted promises of renewed Polish statehood from Russia, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary, all of which hoped to gain Polish support and retain or gain Polish 
territory. With the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, potential tsarist resistance to 
Wilsonian US support for Polish sovereignty upon defeat of Germany and Austria-
Hungary was eliminated, and independent Poland returned to the map of Europe with the 
Treaty of Versailles, its border with Germany set to become a flashpoint in the next 
World War. War with Soviet Russia continued at the still-unresolved eastern border, 
Poland hoping to incorporate the western Ukrainian and Belarusian lands it had 
historically controlled. With the Treaty of Riga, these territories were divided between 
Russia and Poland. As in earlier times, independent Poland’s constitution created a 
dominant but politically unstable legislature that was unable to overcome the challenges 
of uniting a formerly partitioned country inhabited by a diverse population and beset by 
aggressive foreign rivals. Like the old Polish kings before him, the leader of Poland’s 
national movement was unable to govern; he resigned his elected post as head of state 
and led a successful coup instead, inaugurating a period of popular but unconstitutional 
authoritarian rule. Attempting to avoid further conflict with Russia or Germany, the 
Polish government pursued a treaty with its remaining Central European neighbors and 
diplomatic overtures to France to induce France to ensure Polish sovereignty and borders 
according to its treaty obligation. Both failing, Poland attempted diplomacy with Russia 
and Germany, also soon to fail: Germany’s invasion in 1939 touched off World War II. 
During the war, Poland was more than decimated, losing fifteen percent of its population 
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(over six million people) to combat, deprivation, deportation, and atrocities (including 
Nazi genocide and Russian massacre of thousands of Polish officers) committed on its 
soil.  
 It is during this period of terror that the development of modern Polish drafting 
institutions continues. Between 1939 and 1945, the Library and Archives of the Sejm and 
Senate was destroyed; over 70,000 of its 78,000 volumes disappeared never to return, 
many burnt by the S.S., some recycled at the Warsaw paper mill, the rest carried off to 
Berlin.197 As the Red Army “liberated” Poland from Nazi Occupation, the USSR 
recognized the communist Lublin Committee as the provisional government, rather than 
recognizing the government-in-exile in London, and the communist faction consequently 
dominated post-war Polish institutions, formally instituting its rule with a 1952 
constitution that abolished the Senate. The Library, now serving a unicameral, 
communist-dominated Sejm and once again known as the Sejm Library, was rebuilt and 
resumed its function of supervising the Sejm’s collections. The staff attempted to pursue 
the acquisition policy Kołodziejski had set, and in the first years of the communist era, 
the quality of the earlier Library’s work was still acknowledged. This would change as 
the communists established their regime under the control of the Polish United Workers' 
Party198 and the Sejm took the perfunctory role of rubber-stamping the party’s legislation, 
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while the Library grappled with the obstacles created by the censor’s office.199 Although 
the communist-era Sejm Library staff had relatively little influence on legislation drafting 
(a function of the party’s central committee), and although the expert staff were 
sometimes assigned to “communist production actions” like harvesting potatoes,200 Polish 
traditions were not so completely set aside as those of the Soviet republics, and the Sejm 
Library not only served as a lending library for the Sejm but also conducted some 
research for the deputies. In the period of liberalization and crisis of the 1970s, the staff 
tried to create a database of Polish legislation and legal commentary to aid in drafting 
consistent legislation, but funds did not materialize, and in any case, information 
technology and politics were simultaneously nearing a transformation. 
Theories of institutional persistence and policy legacies anticipate that during 
transition, Poland would retain existing drafting institutions.201 The past is indeed 
prologue, and to some extent it frames the choices available to political actors in the 
present, shaping their perceptions of what is possible and sometimes even marking the 	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201 For more, see North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989), Constitutions and commitment: 
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limits of the politically possible. And institutional persistence and the legacies of the pre-
communist Polish and communist periods do help to explain the context in which post-
communist Poland chose and shaped its legislation drafting process. As Acemoglu and 
Robinson point out, institutional persistence involves both de jure and de facto 
components. This has been the experience of Poland through history and in transition: 
while the constitutional order and larger political institutions changed, some of the same 
faces remained, not just in the chambers of the Sejm and Senate, but in the leadership of 
the parliamentary staff offices that served them, and these senior staff have maintained 
some continuity in the legislation drafting process.202 The contemporary Library staff, for 
example, self-consciously situates the Sejm Library in its longer history, pointing to its 
ninety-year history of providing legislative services to support the development and 
analysis of legislation, and explicitly cites Kołodziejski’s influence on many of their 
current activities.203 “During the period 1991-1994, the Sejm Library undertook a much 
broader scope of activities which can be seen as a continuation of pre-war traditions,” 
reports Karamać. “This was accomplished by incorporating several units of the 
Chancellory of the Sejm into the Sejm Library – including the Sejm Museum, Sejm 	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Archives, a team in charge of preparation of press information, and the Microfilms 
Unit.”204 In transition, the evolution of the legislation drafting process in Poland has 
mirrored this dynamic of the Sejm Library: reaching back to older legacies of 
information-driven, consensus-based, reasonably integrated and organized institutions 
that can ground Polish legislation in fact and include a diversity of rights and opinions 
without fracturing into incoherence. Perhaps more than any other of the cases analyzed in 
this study, Poland’s current legislation drafting process reflects not just the themes but 
also some of the organizational and procedural details of the pre-war era.205 
However, persistence alone cannot explain the origins of legislative drafting 
processes in Poland, as the contemporary process does not look much like that of early 
modern, interwar, or communist-era Poland. This is partly because, despite the enduring 
strength of some Polish drafting traditions, such as the focus on research to support 
drafting (embodied in the Sejm Library), Polish parliamentary governance and legislation 
drafting effectively disappeared for fifty years, interrupting the path of drafting 
development; and post-communist political factions have re-constituted, and continued to 
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shape, the drafting process to their own ends, as my own theoretical argument anticipates 
and explains. 
Diffusion of Institutional Innovation 
Theories of institutional diffusion suggest that at transition, in need of a modern 
democratic legislation drafting process, Poland would borrow rules, organizational 
structures, and processes from other jurisdictions. 206 These theories suggest, first, that 
institutional diffusion might spread legislative drafting processes from contiguous states 
(possibly from Belarus and Ukraine, given their linguistic and ancient political ties to 
Poland; but also from Austria, Czech, Germany, Lithuania, and Slovakia, all of which 
have a deeply shared history with Poland and in fact have ruled parts of Poland at various 
points); or that diffusion might proceed from influential states and international or 
supranational polities (particularly the US and EU).207 Whether these polities had 
pressured Poland to replicate foreign institutions, incentivized the Government with 
development aid, or merely influenced Polish observers with the apparent effectiveness, 
“modernity,” or “scientific” quality of a particular process, Poland might have been 
expected to adopt features of the legislative drafting processes of these surrounding 
jurisdictions. And to some extent, this has been the case historically as well as in the post-
communist era. At transition in 1989, Poland accepted technical assistance in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Melo, M. A. (2004). Institutional choice and the diffusion of policy paradigms: Brazil 
and the second wave of pension reform. International Political Science Review / Revue 
Internationale De Science Politique, 25, 320-341. 
207 Djelic, M., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2006). Transnational governance: Institutional 
dynamics of regulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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strengthening its parliamentary capacity from parliaments in Western Europe and from 
the EU. MPs and Sejm and Senate staff received donor sponsorship to visit the Austrian, 
Belgian, Finnish, German, Spanish, and British parliaments, as well as the European 
Parliament. Germany and the UK also provided considerable training for the 
parliamentary staff on topics ranging from parliamentary services, committee 
functioning, and rules of procedure.208 In its route to becoming an EU member state in 
2004, Poland harmonized much of its legislation with European norms; a committee in 
the Sejm continues to ensure the compliance of Polish draft legislation with these norms, 
supported by the European Information and Documentation Centre in the Sejm 
Chancellery. Poland is also a participant in the Interparliamentary EU Information 
Exchange project,209 and through this and other fora the staff who support legislation 
drafting have been exposed to European best practices in legislation as well (see, for 
example, Appendix B). 
The Polish parliament was also the recipient of a major “Gift of Democracy” from 
the US Congress, support that had a deep influence on the development of legislation 
drafting capacity in the immediate post-communist period. After a number of US 
representatives and senators visited Poland upon the end of one-party rule in 1989, the 
US Senate’s resolution authorizing the Gift commissioned a delegation to visit the Sejm 
and newly re-constituted Senate and to determine the parliament’s needs. The delegation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J. (1996). Impact evaluation: Legislative strengthening in 
Poland, No. 6, USAID.	  209	  IPEX. National parliaments and the European Parliament. 
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/neparliaments.do	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which included US Senate staff, concluded that the parliament desperately needed 
equipment and training to handle the workload of supporting an entirely new chamber 
and an existing chamber in which almost ninety-two percent of the members were 
freshmen, all the while developing legislation to handle both an economic transition and a 
legal one. The first support from the US Senate came in the form of over two million 
dollars worth of new and surplus IT equipment. The US House Special Task Force on the 
Development of Parliamentary Institutions in Eastern Europe laid out a program 
eventually known as the Frost Task Force (chaired by Rep. Frost of Texas) to support the 
parliamentary development of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The Congressional 
Research Service provided the technical assistance under the program, focusing on 
strengthening the Polish parliament’s capacity to provide research in support of 
legislation drafting and assessment of draft legislation. In addition to providing further 
materials and equipment, the Frost Task Force provided ongoing institutes and staff 
orientations for Polish personnel and politicians in Washington, D.C.; regional 
conferences; and visits to the Polish parliament by congressional and CRS staff to consult 
on parliamentary research techniques, legislation drafting, and legislative procedure, 
among other topics. The Polish parliament built on this foundation, investing in 
additional equipment.210 
Several elements of the post-communist Polish drafting process were affected by 
contact with this program. The parliamentary staff gained credibility for their technical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 For more on this history, see Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J. (1996). Impact evaluation: 
Legislative strengthening in Poland, No. 6, USAID. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
175 
skills and professionalism, as well as an expanded conception of their own role in 
legislation development, drafting, and analysis. Polish MPs came to rely on parliamentary 
research, including information packets modeled on the InfoPacks that the CRS provided 
to the US Congress, as the basis for legislation development. The use of new databases of 
Polish law greatly reduced the problems of errors and duplication in draft legislation and 
helped the Sejm and Senate avoid conflicts of law. In technical drafting, improved staff 
capacity and access to equipment cut the time to edit and print draft legislation for 
members from over a week to overnight, increasing the volume and speed of 
parliamentary action on draft legislation, as well as the quality of the legislation itself. 
Civil society groups found it easier to gauge the development of draft legislation as 
parliamentary transcripts that had previously taken six months to appear could be 
produced overnight as well.  These efforts did have some effect on the evolution of 
consensus-based drafting in Poland; MPs rather than the ministries initiated the majority 
of draft legislation by 1996, shifting Polish drafting from its communist-era extreme 
centralization in the executive to a consensus-based process shared between the 
parliament and the Cabinet and inclusive of public input.211  
As discussed briefly in the introduction to this chapter, however, diffusion falls 
short of explaining the Polish drafting processes. First, it only loosely predicts which 
neighboring or influential state Poland would imitate– and its drafting process has almost 
no features in common with the processes of transitional or contemporary Belarus or 	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Ukraine (see Chapters 4 and 7 for analysis of these cases) despite their shared borders, 
history, and closely related languages; and does not exactly mirror those of Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, or Slovakia. Second, even under the clear influence of EU 
norms concerning legislative quality, the Polish drafting process and those of other EU 
member states diverge widely (see the introduction to this chapter).  And finally, 
although US technical assistance has arguably strengthened the Sejm’s capacity to 
perform technical legal drafting and supported the development of new research 
capacities in the parliament, since its contact with pluralist US drafting traditions and 
expertise, Polish legislation drafting remains firmly consensus-based212 and only slightly 
less coordinated than Estonian drafting. Meanwhile, as Chapter 7 details, another 
eventual recipient of US CRS technical assistance and parliamentary development 
support, Ukraine, has diverged from Poland in the development of its legislation drafting 
process. So clearly, this has not been a straightforward case of transplanted institutions or 
institutional contagion. Instead, as my own argument anticipates, the consensus-based 
drafting process in contemporary Poland has evolved as political actors have followed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 US efforts to introduce organized interest lobbying formally to post-communist 
Poland’s legislative drafting process were met with resistance; one official American 
report on these efforts expressed concern that “lobbying is neither completely understood 
nor accepted as legitimate” in Poland (Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J.: 9). US efforts to 
locate greater technical legal drafting capacity in the parliament may have been one 
influence on Poland’s slightly less centrally coordinated legislation drafting process in 
comparison to Estonia’s. However, the Polish process also did not follow the American 
example of pluralist legislation drafting nearly so far as it might have. The reasons for 
this choice seem better explained by the structure of factional conflict; see below. 
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incentives shaped by the structure of factional conflict, strategically choosing some 
drafting innovations from a range of examples from other polities while rejecting others. 
The Structure of Factional Conflict 
My argument centers on how the structure of factional conflict produces the 
incentives that explain the variation in legislation drafting processes. This approach takes 
into account the motivations of actors while allowing also for cross-national state-level 
comparison. The choice of legislation drafting process is made against the backdrop of 
the past, in the context of existing institutions and surrounding polities. At the moment of 
transition, Poland had a corpus juris of mixed descent, owing to its early modern and 
interwar national traditions as well as annexation by Austria-Hungary, Prussia, and 
Russia; but most of its operative legislation had been drafted and implemented under one-
party communist rule. The country had a tradition of evidence-based research and 
analysis conducted by the Sejm Library and its parliamentary services sections, and a 
strongly engaged civil and political society that remembered its history of parliamentary 
democracy and had maintained ties to Western Europe and North America – but it also 
had a long history of authoritarian rule, not only under partition and under the communist 
regime, but even for several of the interwar independence years. The choices made at 
transition were framed by these facts. These choices were also made in the context of 
overwhelming attempts by donor countries and international and supranational bodies to 
encourage diffusion of their own legislation drafting approaches and norms. Though 
Poland adopted some of these innovations, the question remains: why some innovations 
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and not others? Why did certain neighboring and donor polities offer examples that held 
allure for Polish decision makers at transition, while other examples were rejected? To 
answer these questions requires an investigation of the structure of factional conflict 
during transition.  
Political factions. As noted previously, one important strand of this historical 
institutional literature shows that the relative strength of various blocs participating in the 
transition to democracy—factions aligned with radical or conservative forces—shapes 
the institutional choices that they make during the framing of the constitution.213 If 
conservative and radical blocs have relatively equal strength, this theory anticipates that 
they would choose a consensus-based drafting process, expecting that they will enjoy 
veto rights during drafting over provisions or text in draft legislation they find intolerable. 
This was the situation in Poland. In the years leading up to transition, the communist 
Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) had marginalized and eliminated any political party 
likely to offer actual opposition, and it had alternated between repression and 
accommodation of opposition social factions,214 particularly the independent trade unions 
that, after a history of general strikes dating to 1956, coalesced under Solidarity in 1980. 
When the commander-in-chief of the Polish military, Wojciech Jaruzelski, assumed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Smith, S. S., & Remington, T. F. (2001). The politics of institutional change: The 
formation of the Russian State Duma, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Pérez-Díaz, 
V. (1993), The return of civil society: The emergence of democratic Spain, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
214 Previous research has shown that this dynamic is likely to lead to regime failure. See, 
for example, Francisco, R. A. (2005). The dictator's dilemma. In C. Davenport, H. 
Johnston & C. Mueller (Eds.), Repression and mobilization (pp. 58) University of 
Minnesota Press. 
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leadership of the PZPR and imposed martial law in 1981, Solidarity leaders were 
imprisoned, the Gdansk Agreement with the unions permitting strikes and expanding 
civil rights abandoned, and Solidarity repressed, though it continued its relentless 
resistance to the regime nonetheless. But in the context of Gorbachev’s liberalization in 
the USSR and widespread Polish opposition to the regime, including a new round of 
strikes, Jaruzelski finally agreed to “Round Table” talks with the opposition. Solidarity 
negotiated for its own legalization and for multiparty elections to be held in June 1989, in 
which sixty-five percent of the Sejm’s seats would be guaranteed to PZPR and its satellite 
parties and the rest open to free election.  
Solidarity won all of the remaining seats and all but one of the newly re-
constituted Senate’s seats. In addition to making apparent PZPR’s near-universal 
unpopularity in Polish society, the election allowed Solidarity to form a government with 
the previously inconsequential non-PZPR parties and introduce constitutional 
amendments abolishing PZPR’s special status on December 29, 1989. The Republic of 
Poland was reborn: the conservative (in this case, communist) faction was in numerical 
superiority, but political power was firmly in the opposition’s hands. In the lead-up to the 
1991 free election, both the communist faction and Solidarity shattered into a multiplicity 
of proto-parties arrayed along the ideological spectrum; twenty-eight were elected to the 
Sejm and eleven to the Senate. However, these parties were still mostly identifiable as 
favoring continuity with the conservative faction or reform with the Solidarity faction. 
The electoral law adopted before the 1993 election introduced a threshold that reduced 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
180 
the number of parties in the Assembly (the twenty-eight parties in the first post-
communist Sejm dropped to six in 1993, while the eleven in the Senate dropped to five), 
largely at the expense of Catholic and nationalist proto-parties that had failed to organize 
sufficiently to overcome the threshold, and this failure along with rising dissatisfaction at 
the effects of economic liberalization returned a revitalized communist faction to 
effective competition with the opposition.  
As the theory anticipates, the balance of these political factions throughout the 
first years of transition provided a strong incentive for consensus-based drafting, and the 
slim chance of reaching any sort of consensus among these factions seemed to call for 
information. By 1990, “demand for information and for expert support increased 
markedly. It became necessary to set up both [the Sejm’s] own Research Bureau and to 
strengthen and unify the information and documentation facilities of the Sejm.”215 Each 
chamber established its own research service (the Senate in 1990 and the Sejm in 1991) 
to support legislation development, including research, technical legal drafting, and 
analysis of drafts for legal quality and impact.216 As the result of an explicit choice to 
renew the interwar tradition, a gesture meant to evoke continuity with the pre-communist 
past, the Sejm Library served both the Sejm and the Senate and regained administrative 
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  Kulisiewicz, W. (2009). The Sejm Library 1919-2009. World Library and Information 
Congress: 75th IFLA General Conference and Council, Milan, Italy, 75.	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  Staśkiewicz, W. (1998). Republic of Poland: Bureau of Research of the Polish Sejm. 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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responsibility for the Archives217; and although this could be seen as a feature of 
institutional persistence, it was more accurately a political decision to appropriate to the 
present the Second Republic norm of parliamentary democracy. The Polish drafting 
process was already taking shape: an evidence-based search for equilibrium between 
minority interests and political cohesion, strategically echoing the past and drawing on 
institutional diffusion as these sources served the interests of the factions in parliament. 
Social factions. The organization of social factions also shapes the structure of 
factional conflict during democratic consolidation. The organization of various interests 
in society affects the benefit legislators or parties gain from including them in the drafting 
process.218 If group organization is high, legislators would be expected to gain the most 
support by choosing consensus-based drafting processes that draw on the information of 
social groups to reduce policy uncertainty. Polish civil society had remained more 
resilient and organized throughout the communist era than that in many of the communist 
polities surrounding it, partly due to the clear illegitimacy of Polish communist rule from 
the outset, when the USSR recognized a small communist faction rather than the popular 	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  Kulisiewicz, W. (2009). The Sejm Library 1919-2009. World Library and Information 
Congress: 75th IFLA General Conference and Council, Milan, Italy, 75.	  
218 For more, see Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995), Voice and 
equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; Mutz, D. C. (2002), The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political 
participation, American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 838-855; Stein, R. M., & 
Bickers, K. N. (1994), Congressional elections and the pork barrel, Journal of Politics, 
56, 377-399; Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1995), Citizens, politics, and social 
communication, New York: Cambridge University Press; Dalton, R. J. (2002), Citizen 
politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies, New 
York: Seven Bridges Press. 
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government-in-exile. Although organized interests proliferated at transition, these groups 
were already quite strong in the communist era, with a fourth of the Polish population 
belonging to Solidarity and an overwhelming majority of Polish citizens united in 
Catholic faith and mobilized by the Catholic Church.  
Polish society was broadly and deeply engaged as the communist era drew to a 
close, and groups coordinated with increasing centralization and openness as the regime’s 
antagonism to organization weakened. The same Catholic faith and traditions that had 
sustained Polish identity through wars, annexations, and occupations over the centuries 
was a source of civil society cohesion during the communist period; but rather than being 
merely the fabric of civil society, the Catholic Church had served as an active leader of 
resistance to the PZPR regime. Poland’s Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, who had been 
imprisoned as an opponent of the regime in the early 1950s, lent moral authority to the 
social factions opposing the regime and condemned the PZPR’s corruption; Father Jerzy 
Popieluszko provided spiritual guidance to Solidarity until he was murdered by the secret 
police (provoking widespread Polish outrage); and the elevation of Polish Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyla to the papacy gave Polish Catholics a prominent international ally in the Vatican.  
Following a long period of academic opposition to the regime and student protests 
inspired by the Prague Spring, intellectuals and students had organized to protest human 
and civil rights violations in the 1970s, founding the Committee for Defense of Workers 
and the Committee for Student Solidarity. The Solidarity movement that re-established 
Polish multi-party democracy had begun in the Polish trade unions, whose demands for 
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independence from PZPR control and for the right to strike had introduced undeniable 
cognitive dissonance to a Polish politics dominated by a party that claimed to embody the 
interests of workers. In a sense then, post-communist Poland, like Estonia, did not have a 
strongly organized civil society so much as it was the invention of Polish civil society, 
and because Solidarity also transformed into a political party in 1989, political and social 
factions were especially entwined in transitional Poland. As a result, as the theory 
predicts, MPs of the first post-communist Sejm (many themselves active participants in 
the Solidarity and other social movements) had a strong incentive to design consensus-
based institutions that would draw on the information and support these social factions 
could offer. 
However, the tendency in Poland toward inclusive consensus-based legislative 
drafting did not originally manifest where one might hypothesize, in the first step of the 
drafting process –formulating policy concepts; nor in the third part of the process – 
arranging for public input during drafting.219 While Polish society engaged deeply and 
with a high degree of political organization in the electoral process at transition, and 
elected a parliament whose ideological distribution required consensus-driven or 
negotiated government, the first several Governments notably failed to create clear public 
input mechanisms or to provide drafters with considered, detailed policy concepts 
decided in Cabinet, and legislation initiated in the Sejm similarly lacked clear policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 In fact, the Polish parliamentary research services staff initially hesitated even to 
supply information they produced with outside groups (Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J., 
1996, 9, fn. 8), and the ministries remained relatively inaccessible to most groups. 
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formulation for drafters.220 Instead, during the earliest days of the transition to 
parliamentary democracy, the inclination toward negotiation and consensus centered on 
the second feature of the legislative drafting process (conducting research to guide 
drafting) and the fifth feature (formal technical assessment of draft legislation); both of 
these features of Polish drafting had long institutional histories and support from 
international donors (see above).  As it turned out, the participation of social groups in 
legislative drafting would evolve (as in Estonia) from these more technocratic features of 
the drafting process.  
Features of the state. State structure further shapes how political and social 
factions interact in ways that form the incentives of those choosing the legislation 
drafting process. Fenno was an early observer of the tendency for legislators strategically 
to choose forms of responsiveness on the basis of district characteristics such as district 
size.221 As detailed earlier, the literature suggests that, at least at the high end, greater 
district magnitude222 can motivate legislators to choose consensus-based drafting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Well into Poland’s post-communist era, policy formulation remained almost an 
afterthought in the legislation drafting process, as the ministries and the parliament 
tended to start with draft legislation before even assessing whether the problem to be 
addressed was framed meaningfully or addressed effectively in substance for the 
purposes of policy formulation – a case, perhaps, of “ready, fire, aim!” (see Zubek, R. 
[2006]. Reforming legislative process in Poland: What, how and why? Unpublished 
manuscript). 
221 Fenno, J.,Richard F. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Glenview: 
Scott, Foresman and Company. See also Cox, G. W. (1987). The efficient secret: The 
Cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England. New York: 
University of Cambridge Press 
222 Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy : Government forms and performance in 
thirty-six countries, New Haven: Yale University Press; Wink, K. A., Livingston, C. D., 
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processes that produce more coherent or predictable policy responsiveness. The post-
communist Polish National Assembly is a bicameral legislature.223 The Senate’s 100 
members in transition were elected by party list, two for each of the 47 voivods224 and 
three for each of the voivods of Warsaw and Katowice.225 The Sejm’s 460 members are 
elected through proportional representation, 391 from multimember districts through 
regional lists and the rest from national party lists; the Sejm is the dominant legislative 
chamber. Average district magnitude is above twelve; an electoral law passed between 
the first multiparty election and the 1993 election set a five-percent threshold for parties 
or an eight-percent threshold for coalitions.  
As a result of district magnitude and the thresholds, two dynamics have 
contributed to the development of consensus-based drafting. First, Polish parties and even 
candidates (due to open-list rules) have needed to distinguish themselves within their 
multi-member districts to gain seats, and district magnitude is so high that broad policy 
responsiveness has appeared as the most efficient differentiation strategy.226 Second, 
Polish legislative politics has stabilized with the introduction of the thresholds, and the 
number of effective parties plummeted. A major locus of conflict and electoral 
competition during transition has been the need to balance economic liberalization with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& Garand, J. C. (1996), Dispositions, constituencies, and cross-pressures: Modeling roll-
call voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House. 
223 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of bicameralism and legislation drafting. 
224 These are administrative and electoral units, not federal units; Poland is unitary. 
225 In 2011, Poland adopted plurality SMD for the election of the Senate. 
226 See, for example, Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-
magnitude proportional electoral systems (data). American Journal of Political Science, 
55(2), 383-397. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
186 
economic stability, and the remaining parties have tended to compete (and alternate) in 
equilibrium on their relative competence and trustworthiness to achieve this difficult 
balance while avoiding corruption.227 Attempts to achieve policy certainty on a complex 
economic transition and integration with the EU has strengthened informational 
incentives, and each successive parliament and Government has worked to rationalize the 
drafting process further, regardless of party. In 1996, in interviews with American 
evaluators of the Frost Task Force program,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Following Solidarity’s triumphs in the 1989 parliamentary election, in 1990’s 
presidential election, and (in the fractured form of many parties carrying Solidarity’s 
mantle) the 1991 parliamentary election, the communist-successor parties of the Left won 
the 1993 election. This victory was due both to nationalist and Catholic parties’ failure to 
clear the new threshold as Solidarity fractured (as noted above), and to the failure of 
Solidarity to provide economic transition without economic trauma (for more on this 
challenge, see Przeworski, A. (1991), Democracy and the market: Political and economic 
reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
The Left candidate also beat Solidarity’s Lech Walesa in the presidential election of 
1995. However, by 1997, Solidarity Electoral Action (a coalition of Solidarity and the 
proto-parties that had fractured from the original Solidarity after 1991) won a plurality of 
seats in the Sejm and formed a government with a liberal center-Right party, Freedom 
Union, promising growth and orienting Poland toward NATO and EU membership. 1997 
also saw the ratification of a new constitution. Despite successes in some key policy 
dimensions, Solidarity again lost the presidential election of 2000, and failed even to 
clear the threshold to have seats in the Sejm in 2001 (because it was a coalition of the 
parties that fractured from the original 1989 Solidarity, and not a formal party, it was 
required to meet the eight percent threshold). This alternation between the (now-distant) 
communist successor coalition Democratic Left Alliance and the parties of the Right 
favoring liberalization continued even after Solidarity’s demise, however; the center-
Right Law and Justice won both the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2005, and 
formed a government with center-Right Civic Platform. From that point, the center-Right 
began a period of political ascendancy that continues to the present, with Civic Platform 
winning a plurality in 2007 and 2011; its leader Donald Tusk is the first prime minister to 
serve a second term since the end of communist rule. Upon the death of Law and Justice 
President Lech Kaczyński in an aviation accident in Smolensk in 2010, Civic Platform 
also won the presidential election, ushering in a period of unified center-Right 
government under the party. 
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majority and opposition MPs pointed out that parliament does not yet have the 
information resources or analytical ability to review adequately executive branch 
budget submissions. Some information can be obtained from the Ministry of 
Finance, they said, but it is not routinely available on a timely basis—a problem, 
given that parliament must complete action on the budget in 90 days.228  
Just over a year later, the Bureau of Research of the Polish Sejm had two entire divisions 
dedicated to providing supporting research on the budget and economic issues and 
assessing budgetary and economic legislation. With a staff of twelve, the Budget 
Analyses Division provided research and impact analysis on budgets proposed by the 
Cabinet, and also scored proposed parliamentary amendments. With a staff of twenty-
two, the Economic and Social Analyses Division provided information and analysis of 
legislation on economic policy, European integration, and a number of other issues, even 
attending parliamentary committee meetings to support legislation development and 
assessment.229 Research to support the Senate was provided through the Bureau of 
Research and Analysis of the Senate of Poland Quick Reference Unit; the unit’s name 
reflected the need to produce research quickly, given the Senate’s constitutional duty to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J. (1996). Impact evaluation: Legislative strengthening in 
Poland, No. 6, USAID (emphasis added). The President has the power to dissolve the 
parliament if the budget is not approved within the time limit. 229	  Staśkiewicz, W. (1998). Republic of Poland: Bureau of Research of the Polish Sejm. 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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respond to Sejm legislation within thirty days.230 In the development of the Polish 
legislative drafting process, the trend toward rationalization and consensus in many 
respects – toward more organized research and legislation analysis services, and greater 
coordination between the Chancellery’s offices and the ministries – was often in tension 
with the tendency toward fragmentation in policy proposal making, in ad hoc technical 
legal drafting, and (in the larger legislative process) in proliferating use of legislative 
initiative in the Sejm.231 Nevertheless, the infrastructure of a consensus-based, research-
driven legislation drafting process was taking shape in a politically fractious parliament. 
Features of the communication network. Finally, although social organization can 
shape the benefits available to legislators and parties as they organize the drafting 
process, communication networks structure their costs: who is able to pay attention—or 
might begin to pay attention—to parliamentary behavior?232 When communication 
networks are highly connective for multi-directional information flows, this theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Michalowski, J. (1998). Republic of Poland: Bureau of Research and Analysis of the 
Senate of Poland. In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and 
research services in Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. 
Munich: K.G. Saur.	  231	  Zubek, R. (2006). Reforming legislative process in Poland: What, how and why? 
Unpublished manuscript. Indeed, following Cox’s (1987) argument concerning the 
development of Cabinet government in the British Parliament, it becomes apparent that 
some actors in and around the early transitional Sejm could foresee a collapse of the 
“commons” looming on the horizon as European integration neared and required 
parliamentary action on all harmonized legislation, and they sought to forestall this 
outcome by requiring some coordination with the Cabinet ministries and some quality 
checks on draft legislation. See, for example, Michalowski, J. (1998), Republic of 
Poland: Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Senate of Poland.	  
232 Arnold, D. (1990). The logic of congressional action. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
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anticipates that legislators and parties would choose consensus-based drafting processes 
that allow them to gain information and reduce policy uncertainty, since the cost of doing 
so is low. At transition, Polish television, radio, and telephone networks had been well 
developed. The PZPR’s capacity to transmit its message on state networks was of 
somewhat limited value, however, given the large scale of the opposition’s personal 
networks through the Catholic Church and through trade unions organized under 
Solidarity. In fact, at transition, Polish citizens retained a strong distrust of government 
and a propensity not to be swayed by televised messages, and even the post-communist 
Sejm’s broadcast of its proceedings left the public with a profound distaste for what they 
saw.233 As a result, partisan incentives simply to broadcast a message at social factions 
were not as strong as informational incentives to seek and exchange evidence and 
opinions. 
During the transition years the country was of moderately high connectivity for 
the region, with high telephone access and some email and online access.234 Paralleling 
the sophisticated practice of intellectuals and students who used digital networks to 
organize before transition,235 the parliamentary staff themselves saw the urgent need for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J. (1996). Impact evaluation: Legislative strengthening in 
Poland, No. 6, USAID.	  234	  UNCTAD. (2003). Information and communication technology development indices 
(data). New York and Geneva: United Nations.	  
235 Polish students organizing in resistance to the communist regime found inspiration in 
the example of Czech student resistance dating to the Prague Spring.  By 1989 students 
were organizing through a modem network, a communication technology the secret 
police were not even yet monitoring. For more, see Kedzie, C. (1997). Communication 
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greater network infrastructure and impressed on foreign donors the need to increase this 
capacity. The Sejm Library had full internet access from 1996, building on its history of 
automation and internal networking dating back to the 1970s.236 In this context, the cost 
of gaining information from the public, and providing information to the public in real 
time, became quite low. As described below, Polish citizens and social factions had 
increasing opportunities to see the entire work of the National Assembly and the 
Government online, to read Polish legislation, and to interact with research services in the 
Sejm Library and the Chancellery.  Perhaps more importantly, Poland’s communication 
networks allowed for the creation of linkages between highly organized social factions, 
national associations, university researchers, and drafters in the ministries and in 
parliament, and for reports of their work to be made available to the public, increasing the 
legitimacy and consensus that surrounded draft legislation.  
Expectations. Given the alignment of these factors to produce informational 
incentives, then, following my theoretical argument, one would anticipate that the 
executive and the legislature would do roughly what Polish politicians did next: create an 
even more evidence-driven, consensus-based legislation drafting process, with increasing 
attention to policy formulation and formal opportunities for public input. The structure of 
factional conflict in the early transitional years created incentives for choosing processes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and democracy: Coincident revolutions and the emergent dictators. Frederick S. Pardee 
RAND Graduate School. 236	  Karamać, B., (1998), Deputy librarian of the Sejm Library. In W. Robinson, & R. 
Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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that could deliver policy certainty and the electoral rewards of policy responsiveness, and 
in the further development of the legislation drafting process, as I trace below, political 
factions continued to follow these informational incentives. In informational models, as 
discussed above, the legislature wants to know that legislation will effectively embody its 
policy preferences (or more technically, those of the median legislator). To achieve this, 
legislatures reward policy specialization while minimizing distributional losses.237 They 
conduct “legisprudence,” rationalizing lawmaking processes through evidence-based 
policymaking and drafting.238 As such, my argument anticipates (to restate these 
hypotheses) that legislators motivated by informational interests would create drafting 
processes that transparently compile credibly unbiased research on which to base drafts, 
assign technical drafting activities to neutral or balanced drafters, and require the input of 
competing interests in order to signal the bill’s likelihood of effectiveness upon 
enactment. They would be likely to avoid choosing drafting processes that designate a 
single official body (subject to partisan capture) to draft bills following an established 
legislative program or that allow organized interests to submit their own preferred draft 
bills. (As Forgette notes, the rationales for these choices can change over time.)  The 
development of the drafting process in Poland follows these expectations: the Polish 
drafting process today is an increasingly expertise-rich system in which both the Cabinet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See Krehbiel, K. (1991), Information and legislative organization, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press; Kiewet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1989), The spending 
power: Congress, the president, and appropriations, unpublished manuscript. 
238 Wintgens, L. (Ed.). (2002). Legisprudence: A new theoretical approach to legislation. 
Oxford, OR: Hart Publishing. 
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and the parliament both have resources for research, technical legal drafting, and 
analysis. Public input is incorporated by increasingly systematic, widespread, and 
consensus-based means, and institutional participants in Polish legislation drafting have 
been intentional in improving the quality of policy formulation in the drafting process. 
Effects on the legislation drafting process. In the early-established Sejm Library 
and Archives, Bureau of Research of the Polish Sejm, and Bureau of Research and 
Analysis of the Senate of Poland, efforts were already well underway by the mid-1990s 
to digitize their work; to create databases of Polish legislation and legal commentary 
dating back to the interwar era; to publish journals and translations of legal scholarship; 
to produce info-packs, reports, and other information for parliament; and to make the 
parliament’s information resources available online. The research materials were 
catalogued in an integrated library system (ILS) called ALEPH (the system has been 
twice upgraded since its introduction in the mid-1990s). An electronic thesaurus of Polish 
terms was built to bring consistency to Polish legislation, and it was modeled on (and 
eventually integrated with) the European multilingual online thesaurus EUROVOC.239 
Perhaps more importantly, the research and analysis divisions of the Chancellery were 
providing not just research to support legislation development, but also analysis of draft 
legislation. In the Sejm’s Bureau, separate divisions provided substantive policy and 
budget analysis, while the Legal Opinions Division began providing analysis of legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Karamać, B. (1998), Deputy librarian of the Sejm Library. In W. Robinson, & R. 
Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	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quality and advice on legislation development (including technical legal drafting 
issues).240 The early investment of the Assembly’s (and donors’) resources and the staff’s 
unremitting professional effort created an enduring characteristic of Polish legislation 
drafting: its reliance on research as a source of draft legislation development and 
impact/quality analysis. Today, each MP is provided with an iPad that is set up at issue 
with homescreen access to both the publicly available online resources of the Sejm 
Library (for example, Polish legislation dating back to early modern times), and to secure 
parliamentary resources (for example, a database of the Research Bureau’s answers to 
every question an MP has asked it on a wide-ranging array of topics not always confined 
to topics before parliament). The parliamentary services offices occupy a prominent spot 
in the parliament building, and the demand for their services grows each year. 
What was slower to develop in the Polish drafting process was a formal emphasis 
on formulating policy with clarity, thorough consideration, and deliberation before 
beginning technical legal drafting; as well as open, formal mechanisms for receiving 
broad public input to the drafting process.241 In the Sejm, whose Members and 
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  Staśkiewicz, W. (1998). Republic of Poland: Bureau of Research of the Polish Sejm. 
In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary libraries and research services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective legislatures. Munich: K.G. Saur.	  
241 In contrast to the formal of inclusion of public comment on draft Government 
legislation instituted in the mid-1990s, the law of 2007 “On Lobbying Activities in the 
Lawmaking Process” laid out the limits of lobbying as a means of participation in the 
drafting process. A “lobbying report” noting “expressions of interest in work on the 
draft” must accompany the draft under public review.  
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committees initiated forty-five percent of draft legislation by the 2007-2011 term,242 the 
previous years of transition had seen too many drafts of too little quality being produced 
(and in the larger legislative process, too few mechanisms for keeping these drafts from 
the agenda), too many of which contained conflicts of law or conflicts with draft 
legislation initiated by the Cabinet; draft Cabinet legislation did not have priority.243 In 
the Cabinet, prior to 2009 the ministries commenced technical legal drafting of 
legislation on the basis of their own research, then sent the full drafts on, first for public 
notice-and-comment or consultation244 and to inter-ministerial conference with ministries 
whose portfolios the legislation touched, then to the committee of the Council or 
Ministers. Only after it had cleared these hurdles would draft legislation be sent to the 
Legal Committee of the Government Legislation Center for legal assessment. Once the 
draft legislation was essentially finished – researched, drafted in legal form, submitted for 
public comment, and assessed by the ministries and the Legal Committee of the GLC – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Zubik, M. (2011). The legislative procedure in Poland 2007-2011. European 
Commission Legal Service: Commission Legal Revisers Group, Brussels.	  243	  Zubek, R. (2006). Reforming legislative process in Poland: What, how and why? 
Unpublished manuscript. 	  
244 While a few public-interest groups and other organized interests had seen some 
success in securing revisions to draft Government legislation and amendments to draft 
legislation before the Sejm in the early 1990s, during the initial years of transition 
parliament and especially the ministries remained relatively closed to lobbying, 
considering it inappropriate (and perhaps bothersome) meddling by interest parties. 
However, it became clear that providing equitable access for all citizens and obtaining 
reliable information and opinion would require widespread input to the drafting process. 
In the late 1990s, the Government had introduced public-input mechanisms to the 
legislation drafting process, and the Assembly increasingly included an array of interests 
in its committee proceedings. (See Lippman, H., & Jutkowitz, J. [1996]. Impact 
evaluation: Legislative strengthening in Poland No. 6, USAID).  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
195 
only then did it finally arrive before the Council of Ministers.245 Not only did this mean 
that the Cabinet was not really collectively setting policy; it also meant that there was no 
formal process for ensuring that the problem to be regulated was important or correctly 
framed, or that the proposed solution was the best one even if so. More problematic still, 
ministries could easily propose draft legislation that was not on the Government’s 
legislative agenda, as there was no competition for a place on the plan due to the 
Council’s late entry into the process of drafting a piece of legislation.246  
The status quo was widely seen as degrading the quality of Polish legislation and 
economic growth and stability, and by the time the center-Right coalition was 
establishing its political dominance in 2007, it recognized the necessity for policy 
certainty of heeding longstanding calls for reform. Since the Government’s 2009 reform 
of the process, Government legislation has begun in the ministries not as draft legal text, 
but as an “assumptions” or policy concept document. These concept documents are sent 
out for public consultation and comment, and for inter-ministerial comment, and the 
public and other ministries have a chance to remark on the necessity and quality of the 
proposed policy itself before it was enshrined in legalese. Those who participate at this 
stage must also be included in input procedures on significant changes made during 
development when the draft legislation is complete. Certain types of legislation are 	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  Berek, M. (2011). Government legislative process and publication of legal acts in 
Poland. European Commission Legal Service: Commission Legal Revisers Group, 
Brussels.	  246	  	  Zubek, R. (2006). Reforming legislative process in Poland: What, how and why? 
Unpublished manuscript.	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developed in consultation with local government, churches and other social partners 
(trade unions and employers organizations).247 After clearing the committee of the 
Council or Ministers, the concept document may go to the Council for approval. Once 
approved, the policy concept document is sent to the Government Legislation Center for 
technical legal drafting, and then sent back to the committee and the Council for 
adoption. In addition, the Government has devised mechanisms for coordinating with 
MPs in parliament.248 For its part, the Sejm adopted some limits on MPs’ rights of 
initiative by establishing quality requirements for draft legislation to be registered in 
parliament: when submitted, a draft must include a justification, a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment, a statement of compliance with EU law, a statement of consultation, and 
draft regulations to implement the law. In addition, the Marshal of the Sejm can rule the 
draft unlawful.249  
The contemporary Polish legislation drafting process, though consensus-based 
like Estonia’s, is not as centralized in the executive as Estonia’s; instead, the National 
Assembly and the Government share in the development of legislation. Each has 
extensive resources for research to support legislation development and for assessment of 
the quality and impact of draft legislation. Each also has some resources for policy 	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  Rządowego Centrum Legislacji. (2014). Podmioty, którym należy przedstawić projekt 
w ramach konsultacji publicznych/konsultacje publiczne lub opiniowanie projektu 
ustawy/etc., http://www.rcl.gov.pl/books/?q=podrecznik-rpl.	  248	  Berek, M. (2011). Government legislative process and publication of legal acts in 
Poland. European Commission Legal Service: Commission Legal Revisers Group, 
Brussels.	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formulation, public input, and technical legal drafting, and through increasing capacity 
and coordination drafting, they are moving toward an even more consensus-based 
system. 
Conclusion 
The development of the contemporary Polish legislation drafting process was 
driven by informational incentives produced by the structure of factional conflict, 
although in important ways this dynamic was mediated by drafting legacies and the 
diffusion of institutional innovations from supranational and international organizations. 
The origins of the consensus-based legislation drafting process in Poland are framed by 
the past, in the persistence of joint executive-legislative responsibility for developing 
draft legislation and of the research traditions established in the interwar period. During 
and since transition from communist rule, framers, legislators, the executive, and the 
ministry and parliamentary staff have responded to informational incentives created by 
the structure of factional conflict in ways that, as theory anticipates, have contributed to 
consensus-seeking in the process, sharing between the Cabinet and the National 
Assembly (particularly the Sejm) all five functions of legislation drafting: (1) formulating 
policy concepts for translation into draft legislation; (2) conducting supporting 
professional research to guide drafting (3) arranging public input during drafting; (4) 
technical legal drafting, and (5) non-political, formal technical assessment of draft 
legislation for legality and impact. The Polish legislation drafting process demonstrates 
deep institutional capacity in both the executive and the legislature for conducting 
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supporting research and providing assessment of draft legislation; but during transition 
Poland steered a middle course between centralization and fragmentation, following 
neither Estonia’s course of strong executive coordination in consensus-based drafting  
nor the US example of pluralism and organized-interest capture of the drafting process. 
This institutional choice of diffuse consensus-based drafting serves the informational 
interests of the Sejm, whose initially volatile party system and ideological balance in the 
midst of a profound economic transition demanded stable, efficient policy; but whose 
mandate to reject executive consolidation of power led to a process suspended between 
the Cabinet and the parliament.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PLURALIST DRAFTING IN UKRAINE 
Introduction 
In a conference center surrounded by the Carpathian Mountains at the edge of 
Ukraine bordering Hungary, staff members from the ministries gathered in a working 
group with staff members from the parliamentary services in late 2008. As a seminar 
exercise, they were discussing new techniques of improving legislation relating to a small 
field of regulation. As they waited for the next session to begin, their work temporarily 
done, they fell to discussing their daily commutes into central Kyiv. Suddenly, two of 
them, one from the executive offices and one from the parliament, realized that they had 
been working on similar draft legislation in offices just a few yards from each other for 
years. One recalled watching the daily routine of the other’s office light coming on in the 
morning and shutting off at night. They had never met. 
More than twenty years have passed since the transition from Soviet rule, and 
Ukraine has an increasingly sophisticated but still fragmented legislation drafting 
process. Its policy formulation function, which does not consistently follow any clear 
process or result in clear policy concept documents for drafters,250 has not only been 
conducted in the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the committees, 
parties, and presidium of the Verkhovna Rada, as has been constitutionally authorized, 
but has been subject to a virtual tug-of-war among these competing power centers during 	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  Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2014). The current state of Ukrainian legislation. In 
T. Fuley, L. Lucas & L. Seitz (Eds.), Developing and drafting legislation (2nd ed., pp. 
11-32). Kyiv: Indiana University/Ohio State John Glenn School of Public Affairs (PDP 
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the transition years, with consequent incoherence in the substance of much resulting 
legislation.251 Executive research capacity to support drafting has grown, and through 
transition, the Rada has also had increasing research capacity of its own, but these 
capacities have not always translated into consistent policy research, or analysis of draft 
legislation, except in regard to legislation’s technical legal form; assessment of the 
substance of draft legislation has often been ad hoc and expert critiques routinely ignored. 
The inclusion of public input through committees in the Rada has been a work in 
progress, and the executive routes for public input to draft legislation have often been 
seen as porous to elite interests but closed to the broader public. Amid these centrifugal 
tendencies, there has been little coordination. In short, Ukrainian legislation drafting is 
decentralized, fragmented, and open to interest capture, and often, in the judgment of 
Ukrainian legal scholars and practitioners, it produces legislation that is incoherent, 
conflict-ridden, not predictable, and unresponsive to the needs of Ukrainian society at 
large.252 And yet, in this fragmented legislation drafting landscape, Ukrainians have 
found space for contestation, for protest, for reform. 
Recalling the American case, one might reasonably guess that the source of this 
fragmenting pluralism in Ukrainian drafting lies in the direction of federalism, or of 
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  Fuley, T. (2009). Policymaking and drafting in transition. Unpublished manuscript.	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  Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2014). The current state of Ukrainian legislation. In 
T. Fuley, L. Lucas & L. Seitz (Eds.), Developing and drafting legislation (2nd ed., pp. 
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district magnitude and size.253 But Ukraine is a unitary state, and although it used 
majority SMD in the first elections during transition, it also switched to a mixed electoral 
system in 1997 (then to PR and back to mixed electoral rules) – and neighboring Belarus, 
which used SMD throughout its post-Soviet history, has created a highly centralized 
drafting process. Although Ukraine’s districts are part of the story of its evolving drafting 
process, its electoral system cannot adequately explain its choice of drafting process.  
The pluralist and fragmented nature of the Ukrainian legislation drafting process 
might also be attributed to institutional persistence and the policy legacies of the interwar 
or Soviet-era state, or older eras of Polish and tsarist rule. Though the contemporary 
legislation drafting process relies on some institutions and staff departments that existed 
in earlier eras, including the Department of Library and Information of the Verkhovna 
Rada (created from the Library of the Verkhovna Rada founded in 1938), persistence also 
fails to explain the divergence of the drafting process during transition from the 
centralized Soviet drafting process, as well as its trajectory away from Belarus’s 
centralized post-Soviet process, though Belarus shared similar history and institutions 
with Ukraine through several eras, including the Soviet era. Neighboring Poland, on the 
other hand, which also has shared much of this history and ruled a large segment of 
Ukraine for centuries, has consensus-based drafting.  
I suggest that the structure of factional conflict is essential to understanding 
fragmentation of the Ukrainian drafting process since transition. The reform factions in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 See, for example, Fenno, J. Richard F. (1978). Home style: House members in their 
districts. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company. 
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the Rada at transition, though quite determined in their opposition to the ruling party and 
strongly supported by diverse social factions, were amalgamating into proto-parties and 
loose coalitions within the parliament, as the parties had not been organized during the 
election. They also did not have a chance to establish numerical strength in parliament (as 
Polish Solidarity had) during the weeks and months immediately following independence 
in December 1991; the first parliamentary election in post-Soviet Ukraine was not held 
until 1994. In addition, social factions in Ukraine, though many were engaged and highly 
organized and united at the moment of independence, were not so nationally cohesive as 
those in Estonia and Poland, and a significant number of them were closely linked to the 
old regime. Single-member districts, while not decisive in comparative context, in this 
particular context gave the conservative (Communist) faction an electoral advantage even 
in the 1994 election, and uneven communication networks reinforced this asymmetrical 
structure of factional conflict. This structure produced strong distributional incentives for 
the choice of a pluralist (and fragmented) legislation drafting process that was able to 
deliver preferred outcomes and particularistic benefits to factions of supporters through 
carve-outs in legislation produced across a range of political institutions. To the extent 
that these objectives could be accomplished quietly at the drafting level, political factions 
could, at least temporarily, shield from public scrutiny any inequities this legislation 
would introduce, although Ukrainian social factions have become increasingly attuned to 
these inequities (as the story of TaxMaidan in Chapter 1 makes clear). Ukrainian 
experience demonstrates the influence of the structure of factional conflict on the 
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evolution of the legislation drafting process, and an analysis of this record lends support 
to the central argument that this structure is crucial to explaining the country’s 
contemporary pluralist/fragmented legislation drafting. 
Theories of the Origins of Pluralist Drafting in Ukraine 
Institutional Persistence and Policy Legacies 
As in the previous three cases considered, constitutional framers, legislators, the 
executive and their staffs in Ukraine have not made their institutional choices from an 
unrestricted number of institutional possibilities. As in these other cases, the past creates 
the bounds of the present in Ukraine, and the choice of legislation drafting process is a 
story that has unfolded within these bounds. In 1866, the State Library of Ukraine was 
founded, a research institution that would survive through numerous foreign wars and 
regime changes, through occupations and civil war and Soviet rule, enduring in post-
Soviet Ukraine as the National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine. Today, the Library 
answers requests for information for MPs and their staff as they develop and assess 
legislation.254 The theme of increasingly organized research resources for legislation 
drafting – appearing alongside overlapping or limited resources for other drafting 
functions – continues through the development of the Ukrainian drafting process over 
time. It is reinforced by the fragmented quality of larger political and social institutions in 
Ukraine, and it reinforces the pluralist, fragmented, and particularistic qualities of these 	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  Gastelum, R. (1998). Ukraine: Parliamentary library and information services of the 
Supreme Rada of Ukraine. In W. Robinson, & R. Gastelum (Eds.), Parliamentary 
libraries and research services in central and Eastern Europe: Building more effective 
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political institutions by bringing certain elite and organized interests and their agents into 
the process as law as developed and drafted.   
 The State Library was one manifestation of the long Ukrainian tradition of 
establishing state institutions to support the growth of Ukrainian knowledge, and the 
Library’s development reflected that of the national project and of the legislation drafting 
process, which has clearly evolved under the pressures of Ukraine’s history. This history 
dates to the founding of the Kievan Rus in the late ninth century by Oleg, the Varangian 
(Viking) ruler of Novgorod, who united Finns and Slavs after taking control of Smolensk 
and Kyiv and established trade with Constantinople. The influence of the Kievan Rus 
reached its peak under Yaroslav I (the Wise), whose rule as grand prince of Kyiv began 
in 1019. In addition to integrating Byzantine Christianity with the state, he founded at 
Kyiv an intellectual center (whose ambitions foreshadowed those of the State Library), 
employing a large staff of scholars to translate Greek manuscripts into the Slavic 
language of the Rus. Perhaps most importantly, he codified the customary law and 
princely decrees of the Rus, laying the foundation for the Russkaya Pravda code. A 
modern Ukrainian legend holds that when Ukraine is fully sovereign and its law 
grounded in its democratic values, Yaroslav will reveal the location of ancient, now-lost 
manuscripts of his code, bringing order once again to Ukrainian law.  
Perpetuating a pattern of shifting control over Central European territory in this 
period that would create enduring fault lines between Ukrainian social factions, Yaroslav 
conquered Galicia, which had been under Polish rule, and extended his territory into the 
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Baltic region, overpowering the Lithuanian, Estonian, and Finnish people there. Although 
he tried and failed to conquer Constantinople, he conducted successful dynastic 
diplomacy with Norway, France, and Hungary through the marriages of his daughters. 
After his death, warring factions led by his sons fragmented his empire, and by the 
thirteenth century, Mongol invasions brought an end to Kievan power, opening the way 
for the rise of Moscow and St. Petersburg as centers of Slavic power. By the sixteenth 
century, much of the territory of the former empire was under Polish-Lithuanian control 
but unsettled by an insurgency of (Ukrainian) Cossack fighters at the frontier between 
Polish and Ukrainian lands. Polish-Lithuanian provocations of an ascendant and 
expansive tsarist Russia, including Polish repression of the Ukrainian rebellion, led to 
war, and at its conclusion, Russia gained the territory east of the Dnieper River, the so-
called “Left Bank,” which would become an industrial and mining center in the Russian 
Empire, a regional distinction that endures in post-Soviet Ukraine. Tsarist Ukraine was 
subjected to two periods of Russifying suppression of the Ukrainian language, another 
policy whose effects persist in the politics of particularism in post-Soviet Ukraine (see 
Chapter 9). Under the partitions of Poland, the province of Galicia (a region whose 
history still provokes debate among Polish and Ukrainian nationalists) fell under 
Hapsburg control, not to be incorporated into Ukraine until the end of World War II.  
The Bolshevik Revolution and the end of tsarist rule in Russia in 1917 opened an 
opportunity for Ukrainian independence. A Rada was established, and in 1918 Ukraine 
declared independence as the Ukrainian People’s Republic, but rather than enjoying a 
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period of interwar sovereignty as Estonia and Poland did, and setting up parliamentary 
institutions such as a library, Ukraine collapsed into brutal civil war; Soviet Russia, many 
of the Central European states, and numerous Ukrainian factions fought for control. 
Eastern Ukraine emerged a Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1922, the Communist Party in 
Soviet Russia declared the founding of the USSR, of which the Ukrainian SSR was made 
a (not authentically consenting) constituent. Under Stalinist policy, the collectivization of 
Ukrainian farms led to the starvation of millions of Ukrainians in 1932-33, an event that 
Ukrainian nationalists continue to regard as genocide rather than shocking policy failure, 
and Russian repopulation of the devastated region left a large Russian-speaking minority 
in eastern Ukraine that remains to this day. Just four years later, Stalin deported and 
executed Ukrainian intellectuals in a mass purge. 
It was at this horrifying and unlikely point in Ukraine’s history that the story of 
the development of Ukrainian legislation drafting continues. In 1938, the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR was established, and the Ukrainian SSR’s Rada created the Library of the 
Verkhovna Rada. Stocked mostly with Russian-language collections, this Library’s focus 
was Soviet political theory, but it also provided fiction and other materials to the MPs and 
their staff.255 Since legislation drafting was a central committee function and the Rada’s 
legislative function perfunctory, MPs needed little more than these diversions. Unlike 
many of the region’s parliamentary libraries, this Library (like the State Library) survived 
World War II, its collections eventually serving as the nucleus of the Library Reading 	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Room in the Rada’s contemporary Section of Library Services of the Library and 
Information Department. But almost everything around the Rada and its Library was 
devastated under German occupation; five million Ukrainians died, along with most of 
Ukraine’s Jewish population. Previously known as Polish Lwów and Hapsburg Lemberg, 
Lviv experienced the war in ways that offer it as a sort of microcosm of Ukraine, a city 
that suffered the volley of destructions that has created many of Ukraine’s contemporary 
social factions: the Germans massacred the city’s Jewish population, the Red Army drove 
out the Polish population, and ethnic Ukrainians settled in the city, many of them going 
on to fight the Russian Soviets in hope of re-establishing Ukrainian independence.256 It 
was not to be; at the end of World War II, western Ukraine, now including Galicia, (as 
the lands to the east had been) was part of the Ukrainian SSR. The Library, designed to 
be little more than a perquisite of office for the Soviet-era Rada’s MPs, continued to have 
little influence on legislation drafting (a central party function conducted in Kyiv or 
Moscow) and only provided books and documents at official request. 
Theories of institutional persistence and policy legacies anticipate that during 
transition, Ukraine would retain existing drafting institutions.257 The past is indeed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 For a brief but insightful introduction to these events, see Snyder, T. (September 21, 
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257 North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989), Constitutions and commitment: Evolution of 
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prelude, and to some extent it introduces choices available to political actors in the 
present, shaping their understanding of their options and sometimes even denoting the 
politically possible. And institutional persistence and the legacies of the pre-communist 
Ukrainian and Soviet periods do help to explain the context in which post-Soviet Ukraine 
chose and built its legislation drafting process. The institutional legacies that remained in 
the drafting process itself at transition were limited, however. The libraries that served 
the state during the Polish/tsarist, war, and Soviet periods remained deep wells of 
Ukrainian knowledge and research capacity – but they had little experience in applied 
policy research, and their role within the drafting process would expand so much at 
transition as to constitute a transformation. Long-established Ukrainian universities 
would enter the drafting process as research partners to the post-Soviet Rada as well, but 
here, too, their role would expand beyond theoretical and scientific work and teaching 
and into policy research and applied practice. As for the Soviet Verkhovna Rada, the 
Communist Party had maintained an enormous support staff, but rather than researching 
or analyzing draft legislation, conducting technical legal drafting, or organizing public 
input processes on draft legislation, the decided majority (at one point, over ninety 
percent) of the staff members, the “administration,” provided direct services to the 
Communist Party and its deputies, including managing a Crimean resort for the 
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deputies.258 Beyond this administration, a small secretariat that provided support to the 
Rada and its commissions in their legislative work also existed, although it expanded 
rapidly in size as well as in responsibility in the months immediately surrounding 
Ukrainian independence. As Acemoglu and Robinson point out, however, institutional 
persistence involves both de jure and de facto components.259 And what Ukraine lacked 
in the continuity of formal institutions for legislation drafting at transition, it partially 
compensated with a continuity of people with expertise (and sometimes interests) in the 
status quo drafting process. Such people remained as elected politicians in the larger 
political and legislative processes (as I discuss below, in the subsection on political 
factions at transition). But some of them also remained from the technocratic staff 
surrounding the Soviet-era central party drafting process, retained during transition 
because they worked in personal networks with the MPs of the Soviet regime who held 
their seats in the Rada for nearly three years after Ukraine declared independence from 
the USSR. Those who were lawyers had been trained in Soviet law, and their technical 
legal drafting style reflected certain characteristics of this law that have persisted: 
tendencies to rely on the passive voice (a drafting characteristic that can in some cases 
leave the official norm addressee unspecified and perhaps unaccountable); to specify 
rights and duties in great detail while delegating to the normative legal acts any 	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specification of how the rights and duties listed will be implemented (an approach at the 
extreme end of continental drafting tradition); and to use imprecise language to limit the 
discretion of implementing officials.260 
Despite these facts, and despite the fact that many of the factions and interests that 
existed at transition were the products of Ukraine’s political past, institutional persistence 
in features of the drafting process itself was limited. Almost immediately at transition, the 
drafting process became the work of many more people than it had been before,261 and 
sophistication and fragmentation have continued to increase in contemporary Ukraine’s 
drafting process. This is partly because post-Soviet political factions have continued to 
shape the drafting process to their own ends, as my own theoretical argument anticipates 
and explains. 
Diffusion of Institutional Innovation 
Theories of institutional diffusion suggest that at transition, in need of a modern 
democratic legislation drafting process, Ukraine would borrow rules, organizational 
structures, and processes from other jurisdictions.262 These theories suggest, first, that 	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institutional diffusion might spread legislative drafting processes from contiguous states 
(most likely from Belarus, Russia, and Poland, given their deeply shared history and 
linguistic connections with Ukraine, but also from Hungary, Moldova, and Slovakia), or 
that diffusion might proceed from influential states and international or supranational 
polities (particularly the CIS, US, and EU).263 As in the previous cases, whether these 
polities had pressured Ukraine to replicate foreign institutions, incentivized it with 
development aid, or simply influenced Ukrainian observers with the apparent 
effectiveness, “modernity,” or “scientific” quality of a particular process, Ukraine might 
have been expected to adopt features of the legislative drafting processes of these 
surrounding jurisdictions. And this has been the case historically and, to some extent, in 
the post-Soviet era. For most of Ukraine’s history after it came under Polish and Russian 
rule, its drafting institutions were simply those of its ruling neighbors.  
Since transition, for reasons partly of geopolitics (the EU’s disinclination to 
antagonize Russia) and partly of Ukraine’s political and economic institutions, the 
country has not yet been accepted as a candidate for EU membership. However, one 
particularly consistent source of diffusion of EU legislation drafting norms has been the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court has frequently held in favor of 
Ukrainian plaintiffs who point to conflicts of law governing their circumstances and 
resulting in consequently unlawful conviction in Ukraine (see Chapter 9 for a larger 
discussion of a typical case). As a result, Ukrainian law developers and drafters have 	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perceived increased professional pressure from their continental colleagues to ensure that 
drafts they produce are consistent with existing sources of Ukrainian law.264 This source 
of diffusion has had a slow and limited effect, however, because Ukrainian politicians do 
not necessarily share this sense of professional obligation with the experts in the 
ministries and parliamentary services departments, and expert advice is frequently 
bypassed or ignored. Under the Yushchenko administration (2005-2010), the period of 
post-Soviet Ukraine’s most intentional orientation toward Europe and steps toward 
European integration, Ukraine began work to harmonize some important legislation with 
European norms.  And as the ECHR has created some pressure for the diffusion of 
European norms in the drafting of Ukrainian legislation concerning human, civil, and 
political rights, the IMF has created similar pressure on those who draft tax, budget, 
banking, and other trade and economic legislation; the IMF has demanded some reforms 
to particular legislation in exchange for loans (see, for example, Chapter 1).265 But 
Ukraine has had other influences on its legislation drafting process as well.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2012). Розробка проектів нормативно-правових 
актів відповідно до методики вирішенняПроблем. Kyiv: Indiana University/Ohio 
State John Glenn School of Public Affairs (PDP-II). 
265 This type of legislation drafting process is widespread: model legislation is drafted by 
technocrats in international or supranational organizations and must be adopted in full by 
national legislatures in exchange for aid, loans, trade, or other benefits. This type of 
drafting can produce public opposition (as in TaxMaidan; see Chapter 1); or it can create 
legal distortions if enacted without revision, such as provisions that call for official action 
despite the fact that no such office exists in the country, or provisions that call for state 
action that the state has little capacity to carry out. Harmonization of national legislation 
with EU norms is a common example in the European cases, but citizens can plausibly 
affect these norms through EU elections and in some countries (such as Poland, whose 
parliament must adopt EU norms as statute) through their national legislatures. UN and 
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Perhaps most unusual of all of the sources of diffusion in the Ukrainian case (or 
the Belarusian, Estonian, or Polish cases, for that matter) was a unit established within 
the Legal and Scientific Services of the Rada known as the Council of Advisors. Though 
the Council was the invention of post-Soviet Ukraine, and not an institution borrowed 
from another polity, its purpose was to diffuse innovations in legislative organization and 
legislation drafting. Its members were from Western Europe, the US, and Japan, all of 
them senior political advisors who could consult with the Rada on legislation and who 
provided translation of relevant foreign documents into Ukrainian (and from Ukrainian 
into foreign languages).266 In addition to bringing foreign expertise in legislation 
development and drafting into its parliamentary services through the Council, the Rada 
commissioned its staff to participate in activities of the European Center for 
Parliamentary Research and Documentation and other international fora.  
In addition to the involvement of US political advisors in the Council of Advisors, 
the US sponsored a number of projects in support of the Rada. From 1990 to 1993, 
Indiana University organized an exchange program of Ukrainian MPs and US Members 
of Congress. As with the Frost Task’s funding for the Congressional Research Service to 
provide Poland’s parliament with technical assistance, the CRS supported the Ukrainian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
IMF model legislation presents a different case, as these organizations have little direct 
accountability to citizens in the countries that adopt this legislation, and these states 
might also have little accountability to their own citizens. 266	  Bach, S. (1994). From Soviet to parliament in Ukraine: The Verkhovna Rada during 
1992-94. Frank Cass Journals: Journal Offprint, 213-230.	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Rada’s efforts to establish a Library and Information Department,267 with a Section of 
Library Services (managing the Reading Room built from the Library of the Verkhovna 
Rada founded in 1938), a Section on Foreign Literature, and a Science and 
Methodological Section. In 1994, the US also funded the Parliamentary Development 
Project to work in cooperation with the Rada; the project and its successor ran through 
July 2013. The project provided publications and materials, training, consultation, and 
support for a variety of innovations in all five components of the Ukrainian drafting 
process. The project worked to support increased transparency and the use of policy 
analysis techniques in policy formulation in the executive and legislative branches, and to 
support Ukrainian experts as they built research, technical legal drafting, and legislation 
assessment skills and procedures in the ministries and in the parliamentary services. 
Perhaps most importantly, at the end of its implementation, the project was working to 
make legislation development more consultative, transparent, and accountable to 
Ukrainian citizens, and to ensure that Ukrainian civil society organizations could 
participate more fully in the process. One means of achieving these goals was through 
working groups:  the project “participates in, supports or organizes working groups to 
improve specific legislation regarding the work of the Ukrainian legislature (e.g., 
procedures, staff development, and committee operations) as well as legislation 
addressing various aspects of public policy,” the project staff explained. “PDP has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  267	  Giucci, R., Kirchner, R., Betliy, O., & Otten, T. (2010). Reforming the simplified 
taxation for individual entrepreneurs in Ukraine (Policy Paper Series. Berlin/Kyiv: 
German Advisory Group, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting.	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designed and conducts various training programs jointly with MPs and staff of the 
Verkhovna Rada Secretariat and committees, MP aides, civil servants in executive 
government, and civil society on various topics,” including advanced techniques for 
developing and assessing draft legislation.268 Other national donors also supported 
technical assistance to the Rada, such as the Ukrainian think tank Institute for Economic 
Research and Policy Consulting’s partnership with the German-funded German Advisory 
Group from 1999, and various Canadian programs. 
As discussed briefly in the introduction to this chapter, however, diffusion falls 
short of explaining the Ukrainian drafting processes. First, it only loosely predicts which 
neighboring or influential state Ukraine would imitate– and its drafting process has is 
profoundly different from those of Belarus or Poland (see Chapters 4 and 6 for analysis 
of these cases), states from which diffusion could easily occur given the shared history of 
all three. Furthermore, although the Ukrainian process bears some features that resemble 
those of Russia (see Chapter 3), this is more accurately a case of parallel development 
along a common path due to a similar set of endogenous determinants; Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation did not borrow each other’s drafting processes so much as they 
evolved in the same direction. In fact, the transitional Rada and President Kravchuk, who 
was elected at the same referendum that confirmed Ukrainian independence, had actively 
demonstrated their autonomy from (Soviet) Russia, holding back on the negotiations that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  268	  Parliamentary Development Project - II. (2013). www.iupdp.org. As in the Polish 
case, project advisors and participants worked on the development of a law on lobbying, 
and also worked on freedom of information and public input legislation. 	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established the CIS as the referendum drew near and openly campaigning for the 
independence the Rada had already declared.269 And finally, although Ukraine has 
borrowed some innovations recommended by American advisors or European best 
practices, this diffusion has been ad hoc, leaving Ukraine with a drafting process that is 
neither so technocratically directed as EU best practices might suggest nor so open to 
broad public input as the US has generally suggested. Ukrainian legislation drafting is 
carried out by a patchwork of presidential, ministry, and parliamentary support services, 
elected politicians, and outside interests of varying capacity and influence, and over time 
and across the branches of government, public access to the process has varied. This has 
not been a straightforward case of transplanted institutions or institutional contagion.  
Instead, as my own argument anticipates, the fragmented pluralist drafting process in 
contemporary Ukraine has evolved as political actors have followed the incentives 
shaped by the structure of factional conflict, strategically choosing some drafting 
innovations from a range of examples from other polities while rejecting others. 
The Structure of Factional Conflict 
My argument centers on how the structure of factional conflict shapes the 
calculations of those who make institutional choices about legislative organization and 
process – often from a set of existing institutional rules, and on how each of these choices 
shapes the subsequent evolution of the drafting process. This approach remains sensitive 
to the motivations of actors while allowing also for cross-national state-level comparison. 	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  Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (1992). The December 1, 1991, 
referendum/presidential election in Ukraine. Vienna: OSCE.	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
217 
Of course, these choices are made against the backdrop of the past, in the transition-era 
context of existing institutions and surrounding polities. At the moment of independence, 
Ukrainians had a thoroughly Soviet corpus juris, although its professional legal class also 
included many experts oriented toward Polish and European norms of law and legislation 
drafting. They had a general research and reference capacity of high quality in the 
existing parliamentary libraries, secretariat staff, and universities (though not such a 
strong tradition of applied policy research270) – but they also had a long history of state 
collapse followed by central authoritarian rule. The choices they made were framed by 
these facts. 
Political factions. As noted previously, one important strand of this historical 
institutional literature shows that the relative strength of various blocs participating in the 
transition to democracy—factions aligned with radical or conservative forces—shapes 
the institutional choices that they make during the framing of the constitution. If the 
conservative faction leads or dominates the transition to democracy, framers and 
conservatives seated in the first session have an incentive to replicate legislative drafting 
processes from the previous regime; they can anticipate that their skills, knowledge of the 
process, and social networks will allow them to maintain political power if the drafting 
process remains unchanged (see also the discussion of institutional persistence and policy 
legacies, above). If conservative and reform/radical factions splinter into multifactional 
conflict, each faction will have a distributional incentive to create fragmented or pluralist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  270	  Bach, S. (1994). From Soviet to parliament in Ukraine: The Verkhovna Rada during 
1992-94. Frank Cass Journals: Journal Offprint, 213-230.	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drafting processes that will allow them to deliver particularistic benefits to their 
supporters. These expectations played out in tandem in transitional Ukraine. 
The Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, a body with 450 members and the 
intended legislative duty of rubber-stamping the central committee’s draft legislation, had 
been elected in March 1990 in Soviet Ukraine’s first multi-candidate elections. A third of 
the new MPs represented the reform/radical democratic opposition factions of Ukraine 
(although many had no party affiliation), and they began to foment for legislation giving 
Ukrainian law sole authority in Ukraine. In July, the Rada declared Ukraine sovereign 
and put the decision to referendum; in March 1991, Gorbachev held a USSR-wide 
referendum asking Soviet citizens to indicate their desire to remain part of the USSR. 
Eastern more-Russian Ukraine had backed the continuation of the union; voters in 
western Ukraine (the longstanding center of Ukrainian national sentiment, and Soviet 
only since the end of World War II) had expressed their preference for independence. 
After the failed coup attempt in Moscow, the Ukrainian SSR’s Rada declared 
independence on August 24, 1991, asserting that only the Ukrainian Constitution, law, 
decrees, and other normative legal acts would be valid in Ukraine. Under pressure from 
Moscow to remain in the USSR to reject the declaration, Ukrainians voted in a 
referendum on December 1, overwhelmingly affirming the Rada’s declaration of 
independence (ninety percent voted in favor). They also elected Communist Leonid 
Kravchuk, the chairman of the Rada and Soviet-era head of state for Ukraine, as president 
with sixty percent on the first round, rejecting two prominent Soviet-era dissidents, in 
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part because the fragmentation of the opposition led Ukrainian voters to believe that 
Kravchuk was the most credible leader for a stable, independent Ukraine navigating a 
diplomatically fraught departure from the USSR.271 All of the candidates for the office of 
president ran on platforms favoring Ukrainian independence and respect for human 
rights, the rule of law, and Ukraine’s minority populations. 
At transition from Soviet rule, then, Ukraine had a more significant set of 
reform/radical factions in parliament than Belarus would have at transition – nearly a 
third in Ukraine versus ten percent in Belarus. Furthermore, Ukraine’s Rada had already 
been operating increasingly like an authentic lawmaking body before independence, 
evolving under the reform faction’s pressure away from its token role (the pre-1990 Rada 
had met just twice a year, and then only long enough to approve the Party’s decisions). 
One of the reform factions, Rukh, had the strength of being tied to a well-organized 
social faction. But Ukraine also headed into its transitional period with a popularly 
elected Communist majority (from the partly free 1990 election) and president (from the 
1991 independence/presidential referendum), unlike Belarus, whose new office of the 
president was not filled until 1994. This division among factions and across branches, 
given the fact that it was produced by elections, created an obvious and politically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Kravchuk embraced the position of his rivals on Ukrainian independence, refusing to 
participate in talks with Soviet Russia and the other USSR member states on the status of 
a trade agreement and federation until the referendum. As the reform faction’s Rukh 
candidate Vyacheslav Chornovil “put it when asked what distinguished his platform from 
Kravchuk’s, “’almost nothing, except that my program is 30 years old and Kravchuk’s is 
three months old.’” (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. [1992]. The 
December 1, 1991, referendum/presidential election in Ukraine. Vienna: OSCE). 
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legitimate source of fragmentation from the outset. Of the communist faction (around 375 
MPs), most had been official Communist Party members or candidate members at 
transition; many had been secretaries of the Communist Party at the oblast level, many 
had been ministry officials (the ministries have national, regional, and local bodies) or 
employed by the Communist Party, many were active duty military officers or directors 
of state enterprises. As a result, the communist faction was not only in a large majority in 
the Rada and recognized in the electoral districts, but also tied to state and social 
institutions at almost every level of Ukrainian society. The reform factions had an 
advantage, though, in the fact that less than half of the MPs were full-time legislators; the 
rest had work outside the Rada (more than 100 were engineers), and since the Rada met 
in plenary only a week a month, the part-time members might spend as much as three 
weeks a month in their constituencies. As a result, those who did work full time as MPs 
could wield disproportionate influence on changes to legislative organization, including 
the drafting process, and on the enormous corpus of law the Rada needed to create.272  
 But other fragmenting tendencies were also at work. The opposition candidates 
had not, for the most part, been elected in 1990 as members of organized parties, and 
after independence, a few began to affiliate with emerging parties in the Rada, of which 
there were nine registered by November 1992. Even those who were affiliated with a 
party didn’t sit together; instead, they were seated alphabetically by name in sections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  272	  Bach, S. (1994). From Soviet to parliament in Ukraine: The Verkhovna Rada during 
1992-94. Frank Cass Journals: Journal Offprint, 213-230. As a CRS advisor, Bach had 
“a front-row seat” as the Rada organized itself and its drafting process in the first three 
years after independence. I am indebted to him for sharing his recollections of this period.	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denoting regions of Ukraine. By early 1993, there were over forty loose coalitions, and 
many MPs participated in more than one. An unaffiliated conservative faction of 239 
MPs had a majority by itself. In addition to the fragmentation of these proto-parties, the 
committee system introduced another layer of fragmentation. There were twenty-four 
committees to which MPs self-selected, an institutional rule retained from the Soviet-era 
Rada in which the activities of the committees and the Rada itself had been virtually 
meaningless. In the transitional Rada, the fact that neither the presidium nor any party 
could constrain an MP’s choice meant that MPs chose committees whose issues 
interested them, and the issues that interested them tended to be tied to the particular 
interests of their constituencies or supporting social factions.273  
 There was also intra-branch factional fragmentation in the executive. In the first 
months of transition, President Kravchuk had authority to issue decrees to implement 
law, setting up an enduring source of incoherence in the drafting process as the Office of 
the President competed with the Cabinet of Ministers in developing legislation.274 (In 
fact, in late 1992 the Rada granted the prime minister similar authority for six months in 
the domain of economic legislation). In their areas of competence, the Cabinet ministries 
drafted most of the legislation that came before the Rada, and due to the overwhelming 
work the MPs faced in creating an entirely new corpus of law (most of them while 
working part time), they left to the staff of the committee secretariats the work of drafting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  273	  Ibid.	  
274 Here, I use the word legislation in its general sense, inclusive of law and normative 
legal acts. 
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any amendments. But though the committee secretariats had answered to the secretariat 
of the Rada before independence, they were now to answer to the committees as well, 
setting up a dual reporting structure that introduced additional confusion. Finally, the 
presidium of the Rada, a body comprising the chair and his two deputies elected by the 
Rada, as well as the committee chairs, had considerable authority over the agenda that 
gave it the opportunity to undermine any legislative agenda set by the Cabinet of 
Ministers: since the presidium scheduled the work to be done in the plenary sessions, it 
could easily place items it wished to de-prioritize at the end, and given the overwhelming 
amount of legislative business before the Rada and its short monthly sessions, the odds 
were high that these items would not come to the floor.275 
Given the fragmentation of these factions – split between communists (who 
themselves were split into proto-parties and an unaffiliated majority of the Rada) and 
several reform factions and proto-parties in the Rada, between the executive and 
legislative branch, between communist-successor factions in the Cabinet and others in the 
Office of the President, between committees populated by self-selecting members 
responsive to their constituencies and supporters, among the institutions of the Rada – 
there was little constituency among decision makers in the transitional Rada for 
centralizing the drafting process under any one party, faction, or institutional authority.276 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  Bach, S. (1994). From Soviet to parliament in Ukraine: The Verkhovna Rada during 
1992-94. Frank Cass Journals: Journal Offprint, 213-230.	  
276 In fact, these factional and intra-factional disputes would intensify, first as Kravchuk’s 
successor and fellow Soviet-era Communist Leonid Kuchma was accused of favoring 
Russian interests and engaging in corruption, cronyism, and authoritarianism; next, as the 
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Instead, the conservative factions advocated the status quo, a system that had already 
elected and empowered them, while conservative and reform factions alike felt the draw 
of creating features of a drafting process they could use to serve their personal interests 
and the particular interests of their constituencies. In the meantime, they voted to increase 
the size of the Rada secretariat (numbering nearly 300 during this term) and committee 
secretariats (over 200 all together) and to provide each MP with enough funds to hire an 
aide. Although the administrative staff far outnumbered the professional staff, very few 
of whom had policy analysis expertise, by 1992 the secretariat of the Rada did have a 
Legal and Scientific Services Division whose Legal Department included thirteen 
lawyers who could provide expertise and assistance with technical legal drafting. The 
Division also included a Center of Computerized Information Systems that tracked bills 
from the Cabinet of Ministers’ draft legislation submissions through the Rada’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002 parliamentary elections were deemed fraudulent by the opposition parties and 
resulted in a hung parliament; then as Kuchma advanced his own preferred successor, 
Victor Yanukovych (a former governor from eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk) in the 2004 
election, which was widely seen as fraudulent. In the wake of the Orange Revolution that 
followed, opposition candidate and former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko won; he 
was respected by EU and North American observers and by the Ukrainian opposition 
factions for fighting corruption and introducing reforms that alienated the Ukrainian 
“oligarchs,” and popular among European-leaning Ukrainians (especially in western 
Ukraine) for his orientation toward Europe. His term was marred by an intense rivalry 
that developed between him and his 2005 nominee for prime minister, Yulia 
Tymoshenko, leader of the second-largest party in the Rada (after Yushchenko’s). 
Although Yushchenko was forced to agree to her return as prime minister to avoid calling 
new elections or allowing Yanukovych to form a government in 2006, their rivalry and 
inability to coordinate on effective policy was seen as the reason for the return to narrow 
majority of the pro-Russian conservative factions in the 2007 parliamentary elections and 
Yanukovych’s win in the presidential election of 2010. Under Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions, Tymoshenko was jailed, a move her supporters called out as politically 
motivated. 
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successive revisions and amendments, and that maintained a database of independent 
Ukraine’s enacted legislation.277  
Social factions. The organization of social factions shapes the calculations of 
legislators and parties during democratic consolidation. The organization of various 
interests in society structures the benefit legislators or parties gain from including them in 
the drafting process. If social faction organization is uneven or moderate (some interests 
mobilize but mobilization is uneven along class, ethnic, religious, or geographic lines), 
political factions have a distributional incentive to gain electoral support by creating 
pluralist drafting processes through which they can distribute particular benefits to 
“service the organized.”278 In Ukraine, as preceding sections of this chapter have 
indicated, this was the situation at transition. Although Ukrainians of many social 
factions and political orientations had supported independence, including student 
protesters whose hunger strike brought down Vitaliy Masol’s government in 1990, social 
factions were unevenly mobilized to engage in politics and in the legislation drafting 
process. Typical cleavages were not as salient in Ukraine as in other fractionalized 
polities: Ukraine’s predominant religious affiliation was Orthodox Christianity, but there 
were also significant numbers of Roman Catholics and Eastern-rite Catholics, as well as a 
small Jewish population and returning Muslim Crimean Tatars, and Ukrainians generally 
voiced strong support for respecting these and Ukraine’s linguistic minorities. 	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1992-94. Frank Cass Journals: Journal Offprint, 213-230.	  
278 Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
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Nevertheless, “regional pluralism”279 was strong: eastern Ukraine, populated by a 
significant Russian and Russian-speaking minority and tied to the mining and industrial 
sectors of the region, had strong connections to the relatively organized communist 
factions in the Rada. Western Ukraine, long the center of Ukrainian nationalism and only 
annexed to Soviet Ukraine since the end of World War II, had stronger ties to factions 
that advocated for independence: the Popular Movement of Ukraine, Rukh (as the 
Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring was known; Rukh was founded by 
dissident writers and intellectuals in 1988), and others. These social factions, aligned with 
the reform factions in the Rada, were individually well organized but not unified 
nationally.  In interaction with the fragmented political factions in the Rada and features 
of the state, this regional, ethnic, and economic fragmentation and uneven organization 
created distributional incentives, as I describe below. 
 Features of the state. State structure further shape how political and social 
factions interact in ways that shape the incentives of those choosing the legislation 
drafting process. As discussed in the preceding chapters, surveying the American case, 
Fenno observed that legislators strategically choose forms of responsiveness on the basis 
of district characteristics such as district size, and in the American case, single-member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 See Snyder, T. (September 21, 2010), New York Review of Books.  Serhii Plokhii, 
director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard, has pointed out that the 
“demarcations between the steppe and the forest, a diagonal line between east and west,” 
show a "’striking resemblance’ to political maps of Ukrainian presidential elections in 
2004 and 2010,” indicating that Ukraine’s topography may be one historical source of 
this divide (Conant 2014). 
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districts in a federal state have been linked to distributional politics.280 In the run-up to 
the 1994 elections, factions in the Rada debated the electoral rules under which the first 
post-Soviet election would be conducted. The conservative factions, now coalescing 
around a revived Communist Party, favored SMD due their organization across the 
country and in existing constituencies, their well-known candidates, and their strong 
linkages to the national administration, local governments, and pro-Russian, mining, and 
industrial sectors in the east. Several reform factions argued for a mixed system, hoping 
to run on democratic, nationalist, pro-European, or anti-corruption platforms that could 
succeed nationally in winning PR seats.281 In the end, the conservative factions carried 
the debate, and the election proceeded under majority SMD rules. The turnout 
requirement (at least half of eligible voters had to vote) and the majority requirement 
meant that only forty-nine MPs were elected on the first round, the rest requiring second-
round run-offs and even third rounds and repeat elections. At the end of this grueling 
electoral process, only about a third of incumbents who sought re-election won, 
constituting less than a fifth of the Rada’s seats. The Communist Party’s candidates were 
elected in much larger numbers than those of other parties, none of which nominated 
more than twelve, but just over ten percent of the candidates had been nominated by any 
party, and around half of those elected had no party affiliation. Just after the new Rada 
was seated, the MPs adopted rules requiring that a parliamentary faction have a minimum 	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of twenty-five members to register, and that MPs could join only one; committee 
memberships, equipment, staff, and office space were to be distributed among the 
factions. The Rada’s organization was taking shape, but most MPs were coalescing 
around loose factions rather than parties, a development that allowed them access to and 
control over parliamentary resources without subjecting them to party discipline.282 In 
this fragmented structure, factions began cultivating the development of drafting 
arrangements that would allow them maximum flexibility and minimal accountability in 
making legislation responsive to their supporters. 
 Subsequent electoral law changes have switched the electoral advantage between 
conservative and reform factions, reinforcing the alternating structural advantage each 
side had in changing features of the drafting process. Under 1997 changes, the proposal 
for a mixed electoral system was finally instituted, with half of the MPs elected under 
majority SMD and the rest by PR with a four percent threshold. Ukraine’s factions had 
devised a system that matched the factional fragmentation of the country’s political and 
social factions; the new system allowed for both constituency-based local and regional 
politics (especially important to the communist-successor factions) and responsiveness to 
interests organized at the national level (more attractive to the opposition factions).283 In 	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283 Herron and Nishikawa (2001) find that mixed-superposition electoral systems like the 
one Ukraine introduced punish small parties less than SMD does, contributing to the 
development of multiparty systems, and that these systems do not merely function like re-
arrangements of SMD and PR, but instead offer their own incentives and costs. In 
Ukraine, the party system and the changing electoral system co-evolve, with each 
electoral system change influencing the development of the party/factional structure, 
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the wake of 2004’s Orange Revolution that protested Viktor Yanukovych’s election as 
fraudulent and brought reform-faction candidate Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency, 
the constitution was amended to convert the SMD seats to PR and to shift power to the 
Rada from the Office of the President. As a result, the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary 
elections were pure PR (closed-list). When Viktor Yanukovych returned to power, this 
time as president, in a 2010 election recognized as free and fair, Yanukovych and his 
Party of Regions changed the electoral law yet again. Against the protests of reform 
factions in the Rada and in Ukrainian society at large, and against the ruling of the 
Venice Commission (the European Commission for Democracy through Law), the law 
returned Ukraine to the mixed system that favored the Party of Regions due to its eastern 
constituency concentration. I trace the consequences below. 
 Features of the communication network. Finally, although social organization can 
shape the benefits available to legislators and parties as they organize the drafting 
process, communication networks structure their costs. As the connectivity of the 
communication network increases in scope and interactivity (as it is characterized by 
greater access for more groups to transmit information via broadcast media, more mobile 
phones, personal computers, and hosts per capita), so too does the capacity of political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
leading to new changes to the electoral law meant to fortify the ascendant party/factional 
gains. By the 2006 parliamentary election, with the country now under a reform-faction 
president, Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine had adopted a PR electoral system (closed list). 
Ukraine returned to a mixed system in 2012 under conservative President Yanukovych 
and his Party of Regions. See chapter 2 for a discussion of this feature. 
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factions to offer particularistic benefits, and the capacity of “the heavenly chorus”284 
across the country to demand these benefits. As such, as connectivity increases, political 
factions have a distributional incentive to choose increasingly fragmented/pluralist 
legislation drafting processes. In Ukraine, even as early as the period of the 1991 
referendum on independence and the presidency, all of the candidates, from communist 
and reform factions alike, had access to television, radio, and newspapers as networks for 
transmitting their messages. Ukraine was at the low end of interactive connectivity 
among the sixteen cases studied in this dissertation,285 but this was partly due to the 
uneven development of more interactive networks across the country and high 
development in some cities and oblasts, a fact that (though not anticipated in the 
hypotheses) seems likely to have increased the distributional incentives for political 
factions with access to these communication networks and supporting social factions 
connected to them. 
 Within the Rada, on the other hand, network capacity was high. The Rada’s 
reading and reference rooms were online by the early 1990s, and their resources 
searchable by standard terms in the EUROVAC thesaurus, making it possible for MPs 
easily to research specific policy questions in comparative context. Ukrainian legislation 
since transition was available through the Rada’s network in databases maintained by the 	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Center of Computerized Information Systems. The Center had also networked the Rada’s 
five buildings with a fiber-optic network and provided the Rada with 550 computers, 350 
of them on the network; and the Rada had internet access by the mid-1990s. These 
developments help to account for Ukraine’s divergence from Belarus in the choice of 
legislation drafting process, as this capacity in the Rada gave it a clear technical edge 
over the executive: the Rada’s automation had increased the speed of its process by nine 
times between independence and 1997, and had allowed the Rada to publish legislation in 
ten days to the executive’s 110.286 
Expectations. Given the alignment of these factors to produce distributional 
incentives, then, following my theoretical argument, one would expect the executive and 
the legislature to do what Ukrainian politicians and officials proceeded to do: create a 
pluralist legislation drafting process. The structure of factional conflict in the early 
transitional years created incentives for choosing processes that could deliver 
particularistic benefits to constituents and supporters of political factions, and the 
electoral rewards of this responsiveness, and in the further development of the legislation 
drafting process, as I trace below, political factions continued to follow these 
distributional incentives. In distributional models, parties and MPs attempt to organize 
the legislature to facilitate gains from trade. Premised on recognition of majority-rule 
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instability,287 as noted, these models focus on MPs’ desire to gain majority support for 
policies that return particularistic benefits to their own constituents. To do this, they set 
up rules that allow them to self-select their committee assignments and then engage in 
logrolling with other committees and members to obtain anti-majoritarian outcomes that 
nevertheless constitute equilibrium.288 As such, my argument anticipates that MPs 
motivated by distributional goals would create drafting processes that allow organized 
interests or constituents to make policy demands and submit or comment on draft bills 
directly to legislative committees or their members. They might avoid choosing drafting 
processes that either designate an exclusive official body to draft bills following an 
established legislative program or require competing interests to provide information and 
participate in a consensual drafting process. The development of the drafting process in 
Ukraine follows these expectations: the Ukrainian drafting process during transition has 
been extremely fragmented, with no central body exercising coordination or control of 
drafting – indeed, with numerous bodies competing, and with professional support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 For more, see Arrow, K. (1951), Social choice and individual values, Wiley: New 
York; Black, D. (1958), The theory of committees and elections. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic; Schofield, N. (1983), Generic instability of majority rule, Review of Economic 
Studies, 50, 695-705; Johnson, P. E. (1998), Social choice: Theory and research, 
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services for research, technical legal drafting, and legislation analysis that are 
increasingly sophisticated in their expertise but lacking any authority over the contents or 
form of legislative texts. In addition, public participation in the drafting process is 
fragmented across institutions, pluralist, and porous to well-connected interests while 
frequently closed or opaque to others. 
  Effects on the legislation drafting process. In Ukrainian law, as in most European 
legal systems, the sources of law are the Constitution, the Laws of Ukraine, normative 
legal acts, and international law and treaty obligations. In the early years after 
independence, President Kravchuk exercised the authority to issue decrees that did not 
contradict existing Laws of Ukraine. Amid economic crisis, in autumn of 1992, the Rada 
gave the prime minister and the Cabinet of Ministers authority to implement Cabinet 
draft legislation in the field of economic matters for six months, an emergency measure 
that did not seem particularly inappropriate at the time given the fact that the Rada relied 
on the Cabinet ministries to draft legislation on economic matters in any case. In May 
1993, the debate over whether to renew this Cabinet authority produced a storm of 
disagreement, as several factions aligned with the president wanted to subordinate the 
Cabinet of Ministers to the Office of the President.289 Intra-branch executive conflict has 
remained a continuing feature of Ukrainian politics, and it has also introduced a frequent 
source of conflicts of law through uncoordinated drafting; the Office of the President 
drafts and issues decrees not harmonized with legislation drafted by the ministries and 	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adopted by the Rada, and the Rada fails to adopt any law reconciling these norms or 
setting aside the presidential decree (for an example, see Chapter 1). Under successive 
administrations, the Office of the President has also been a source of legislation 
responsive to particular interests aligned with the president, as “oligarchs” and regional 
interests have maintained close ties to the presidents aligned with communist factions. In 
the 1994 election Leonid Kuchma succeeded Kravchuk as president; he and Viktor 
Yanunkovych of the Party of Regions (elected in 2010) provoked especially strong 
criticism in this regard. Article 92 of the 1996 Constitution sets out a long list of matters 
that “shall be determined exclusively by Laws of Ukraine”; despite the Rada’s 
constitutional authority on these matters, in practice it has sometimes failed to express its 
will concerning presidential decrees. 
 Despite its continued reliance on the Cabinet ministries to draft most legislation, 
the Rada seated after the 1994 election began to provide itself with new legislation 
drafting resources. The committee secretariats were still relatively small and had few 
policy experts. Having expanded the Rada secretariat’s Legal and Scientific Services 
Division during the term ending in 1994, thereby giving itself a Legal Department to 
assist with technical legal drafting (especially of amendments) and legal analysis, a 
Computerized Information Systems Center to track draft legislation and record enacted 
legislation, and a Council of Advisors to provide comparative foreign expertise, the Rada 
still lacked much capacity for comparative policy analysis at the policy formulation stage, 
for research to support drafting, or for assessment of draft legislation. Slowly, it began to 
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address these deficiencies. Its first solution was to call on universities for support. 
Although over time these linkages have become an important source of expertise for the 
Rada, in the early years of transition, universities had little experience with policy 
analysis and could offer only limited advice on policy formulation or legislation 
development, even in areas of academic expertise. In 1995 the Rada created the 
Parliamentary Research and Analysis Department to conduct research on matters before 
the parliament. Its three sections, the Analytical Information Section, the Macroeconomic 
Monitoring Section, and the Section on Social Process Forecasting, had a large mandate: 
to analyze market economic development and other economic and financial issues, to 
analyze social systems and social development, to evaluate legislation on these issues and 
provide technical legal drafting of amendments if improvements were required, to 
provide the committees with social and economic analysis during legislation 
development, and to submit summaries and reports on socioeconomic issues.290 By 1998, 
the Department had 30 staff members, most with advanced degrees. The Rada’s services 
departments remained understaffed, however, partly because the Rada’s workload in 
developing an entirely new body of law while managing an economic transition was 
enormous, and partly because the various departments, some with overlapping mandates, 
remained uncoordinated, an arrangement that was not designed coherently but assembled 
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ad hoc in pieces in ways that served the varied interests of the fragmented factions of the 
Rada.  
As the political factions in the Rada have continued to organize into parties, partly 
co-evolving with changes to the electoral system (see above), the Rada has organized its 
drafting support services more efficiently, though it has not imposed on itself much 
accountability. Very few who develop or initiate legislation consider whether legislation 
is needed or what the policy substance of the draft legislation should be. Since 2010, draft 
laws registered in the Rada are submitted at first reading to the Main Scientific Experts 
Department of the Verkhovna Rada for expert analysis, and to the Main Legal 
Department at second and third reading and upon enactment. Per Article 103 of the Law 
of Ukraine “On the Rules of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” of February 10, 2010, the 
chairman of the Rada, a deputy chairman, or a committee may make the mandatory 
submissions for these forms of expertise. If the expertise departments do not return their 
conclusions within 14 days, the advice is deemed “unavailable.” The initial expertise 
conclusions are returned to the committee to which the draft is assigned. Despite this 
requirement for expertise, however, the Law “On the Rules of the Verkhovna of Ukraine” 
makes no explicit quality requirements for draft legislation itself.291 Articles 90 and 91 
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require an explanatory note, and a calculation of expenses if the draft legislation will 
affect the budget, but there is no requirement that the explanatory note or the draft 
legislation itself clear any standards of analysis or meet any quality requirements. 
Although few parliaments constrain themselves to act on expert analysis of draft 
legislation, the Rada’s particularly loose rules for expertise and quality of draft legislation 
have continued to allow interpolations to the texts that serve the interests of various 
constituencies (see Chapter 9 for these effects).  
  Within the Cabinet of Ministers, the Cabinet of Ministers Rules sets out specific 
procedures for legislation drafting. Cabinet ministries develop and draft legislation, then 
circulate it at their discretion for interministerial review, or convene a working group 
with other ministries if the draft legislation proposes to regulate fields within other 
ministries’ competence. Once drafted in technical legal form, the draft legislation is 
subject to multiple forms of review. This may include a requirement for approval from 
the Cabinet of Ministers legal department or the ministries (Section 2, paragraph 44). It 
also includes a legal review by the Ministry of Justice to ensure legal quality, compliance 
with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
compliance with EU legislation, and gender-impact and anticorruption standards (Section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29, 2010. See Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2012). Розробка проектів нормативно-
правових актів відповідно до методики вирішенняПроблем. Kyiv: Indiana 
University/Ohio State John Glenn School of Public Affairs (PDP-II). 
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1, paragraph 44).292 Normative legal acts issued by the Cabinet of Ministers require 
review by the Ministry of Justice to ensure legal quality.  
 Formal procedures for public input are still evolving and largely at the discretion 
of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada. Notice-and-comment procedures in 
the ministries, when used, do not yield transparent results, and interested factions and 
individuals may participate in the drafting process in ways that remain opaque. In 
addition, the Verkhovna Rada itself has made not required that draft legislation receive 
public input, and its use of committee hearings to secure this input through the normal 
legislative process remains subject to political calculations.  
 In short, the legislation drafting process of Ukraine, although increasingly 
sophisticated and possessing increasing capacity to receive expert opinions on policy 
analysis and formulation, on research to support legislation drafting, on technical legal 
quality, and on assessment of draft legislation, remains fragmented and pluralist, with 
overlapping staffs and institutional bodies participating without clear coordination. Its 
public input on draft legislation remains pluralist and porous to interested parties, and its 
technical legal drafting, while conducted with expertise, remains subject to some pitfalls 
of Soviet legislation drafting technique and disconnected from questions of substance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Gender-related expertise is required, per the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On 
Gender-Related Expertise” of April 12, 2006, No. 504. Anticorruption expertise is 
required per Ministry of Justice “The Methodology of Anti-Corruption Expertise for 
Draft Normative Legal Acts” of June 32, 2010, No. 1380, amended September 30, 2011, 
No. 3099/5. 
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Conclusion 
The origins of the highly fragmented pluralist legislation drafting process in 
Ukraine are framed by the past, in the persistence of Soviet drafting style and the 
retention of some of the Soviet-era staff. The drafting process is also informed by contact 
with other polities during transition, especially EU and the US. However, during and 
since transition from Soviet rule, framers, legislators, and the executive have responded 
to distributional incentives created by the structure of factional conflict in ways that, as 
theory anticipates, have contributed to fragmentation and to delivery of particularistic 
benefits to supporters of various political factions acting under an evolving electoral 
system. As a result, policy formulation is not particularly formal or analytical, and it is 
conducted across the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Rada and 
its committees, factions, and parties. Research capacity in the ministries and especially in 
the Rada has grown considerably, as has the scope of technical legal drafting expertise 
and capacity. However, this capacity exists in overlapping departments and sections 
whose work continues to be relatively uncoordinated. In the Cabinet of Ministries, 
analysis of draft legislation is systematic, but public input mechanisms are opaque and 
used with discretion. In the Rada, analysis of draft legislation remains inconsistent and 
the application of expert recommendations or any quality standard non-compulsory. 
However, the Rada’s use of committee hearings to gather public input has introduced 
growing opportunities for a wider array of organized interests and social factions to 
comment. In Ukraine, the incentives that shape the choice and evolution of the drafting 
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process may be changing as the new government establishes itself, and ongoing research 
on this evolution is warranted. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZED BELARUSIAN 
DRAFTING ON LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIVENESS 
Introduction 
Does the choice of legislation drafting process matter? In this chapter and Chapter 
9, I turn to this question, focusing on how legislation drafting processes affect the 
responsiveness of legislation in centralized-drafting Belarus, consensus-drafting Estonia, 
and pluralist-drafting Ukraine. In these chapters, the type of legislation drafting process 
becomes the independent variable, and I consider its effects on the responsiveness of 
resulting legislation. While a country’s legislation is the product of many forces, I argue 
that the particular institutional arrangements through which legislation is developed 
influence to “whose voice” legislation responds. As the first part of this dissertation 
demonstrates, this effect is not an accident, but is rather one reason that factions with the 
power to make institutional choices during transition select one type of process rather 
than another.  
Institutional Effects on Legislative Responsiveness 
A large literature on legislative bargaining analyzes institutional effects on 
political behavior and legislative outcomes. Since Shepsle’s important formal modeling 
of “structure-induced equilibrium,”293 empirical research has explored the effects of 
various institutional rules and processes on legislative bargaining, demonstrating that 
institutional rules affect the strategies of participants in iterative bargaining, consequently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Shepsle, K. A. (1979). Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional 
voting models. American Journal of Political Science, 23, 27-59. 
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affecting legislative outcomes.294 This literature has assessed the effects of such 
important but relatively unknown institutional rules as those that govern cabinet decision-
making,295 however, this literature has paid little attention to the “rules” (formal and 
informal) that constitute legislative drafting processes. While drafters, lawyers, and 
judges have written a great deal about drafting practice and ethics, the literature on 
development and transitions has (like the legislative bargaining literature) overlooked the 
effects of legislative drafting processes (though sometimes engaging the question of 
drafting technique), despite international donors’ strong focus on “legislative 
strengthening.”296 The drafting process has often been ignored because it is seen as 
merely technocratic; elected officials are supposed to be debating every provision and 
word of proposed legislation in a form of pure “communicative action”297 and simply 
committing their comprehensive policy decisions to drafters for transcription into 
“legalese.”298 As noted above, this assumption has fictional properties even in most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 See, for example, studies of portfolio assignment, Tsebelis 1995; term length, McLean 
1987; coalition formation/termination, Lupia and Strøm 1995; cabinet decision-making 
rules, Huber and McCarty 2001; vote-of-confidence procedures, Diermeier and 
Fedderson 1998; dissolution, Strøm and Swindle 2002; amendment rules, Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989, Huber 1992; committee assignment rules, Diermeier 1995, Dion and 
Huber 1996, presidential-legislative interaction, Shugart and Carey 1992. 
295 Huber, J. D., & McCarty, N. (2001). Cabinet decision rules and political uncertainty in 
parliamentary bargaining. American Political Science Review, 95(2), 345-360. 
296 USAID (2000), USAID handbook on legislative strengthening, Washington, D.C.: 
USAID Center for Democracy and Governance; UNDP (2010), Benchmarks and self-
assessment frameworks for democratic legislatures UNDP. 297	  Habermas, J. (1983). The theory of communicative action. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.	  
298  Seidman, A., Seidman, R., & Abeyesekere, N. (2001). Legislative drafting for 
democratic social change Kluwer. 
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advanced industrial democracies; in many developing democracies it has an even looser 
relationship to reality.  
Institutional arrangements for drafting legislation are important to the extent that 
they influence legislative responsiveness. Ragsdale notes the “overarching interest in 
responsiveness” in current research on representation in democracies.299 As noted, this 
type of representation extends beyond elections into the daily activities of legislators, and 
it can have different meanings for different legislatures and for parties and legislators in 
different types of electoral districts. Legislators and parties demonstrate responsiveness 
by staking out ideological positions; sponsoring bills and aligning floor votes with 
constituents’ policy preferences (policy responsiveness); doing casework on behalf of 
constituents (service responsiveness); gaining appropriations for constituents (allocation 
responsiveness); and “keeping in touch,” taking stands, and publicizing their support for 
legislation preferred by various interest groups (symbolic responsiveness).300 While 
previous research has demonstrated collective legislative responsiveness in advanced 
industrial democracies—the national electorate’s choice of the legislature on the basis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Ragsdale, L. (1994). Old approaches and new challenges in legislative election 
research. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19, 537-582. 
300 For more, see Downs, A. (1957), An economic theory of democracy, New York: 
Harper and Row; Romero, D. W. (1996), The case of the missing reciprocal influence: 
Incumbent reputation and the vote, Journal of Politics, 58, 1198-1207; Baron, D. P. 
Electoral competitiveness with informed and uninformed voters, American Political 
Science Review, 88, 33-47; Burgin, E. Influences shaping members’ decision making: 
Congressional voting on the Persian Gulf War, Political Behavior, 16, 319-342; Bartels, 
L. M. (1991), Constituency opinion and congressional policy making: The Reagan 
defense buildup, American Political Science Review, 85, 457-474; Eulau, H., & Karps, P. 
D. (1977), The puzzle of representation: Specifying components of responsiveness, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2). 
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aggregate preferences301 and the extent to which the legislative agenda reflects aggregate 
constituent priorities302—little empirical work has been done on the potential for the 
drafting process to privilege certain voices in ways that make actual legislative 
enactments relatively more or less responsive to the “represented,” especially in 
developing democracies.303 In developing and transitional states, moreover, legislative 
responsiveness may not correspond to the preferences of constituents, but to the 
executive or to particular factions. In short, legislation may prove unresponsive to public 
interests – and responsive to elite interests. 
In this dissertation, I argue that legislation drafting processes in transitional 
polities are one set of institutional rules structuring bargaining over the content of 
legislation, privileging certain information and preferences and excluding others. Highly 
centralized drafting processes tend to produce legislation that favors the preferences of 
the executive, and in transitional polities, the preferences of the conservative faction (and 
parties that emerge from it). These processes also predictably produce legislation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  301	  Weissberg, R. (1978), Collective vs. dyadic representation in Congress, American 
Political Science Review, 72, 535-547; Hurley, P. A. (1982), Collective representation 
reappraised, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 7, 119-136; Tufte, E. (1975), Outcomes of 
midterm congressional elections, American Political Science Review, 69, 812-826; Tufte, 
E. (1978), Political control of the economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.	  
302 Erikson, R. S., & Wright, J., Gerald C. (2001). Voters, candidates, and issues in 
congressional elections. In L. C. Dodd, & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress 
reconsidered (7th ed., pp. 67-95). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
303 Feldblum describes the legislative lawyer as the “individual responsible for 
developing the content of the proposed legislation, or the content of amendments that 
may stop or effectively alter proposed legislation. The legislative lawyer must be well 
versed in both politics and law in order to craft the content of legislation effectively” 
(Feldblum, C. R. [2003]. Five circles of an effective coalition, Georgetown Law). 
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favors the elites aligned with the executive and the conservative faction. Consensus-based 
drafting processes tend to produce legislation that is relatively the most thoroughly 
grounded in empirical analysis and reflective of broad interests, legislation that articulates 
stable, efficient policy. And fragmented drafting processes tend to produce legislation 
that is highly responsive to organized, connected factions and unresponsive to other 
interests, often in ways that prove highly inefficient and cost-ineffective. 
As I acknowledge above, some might hypothesize that the drafting process is 
nothing more than a penumbra of the larger legislative process, a mere reflection of the 
characteristic representation and responsiveness of the political system itself and, to the 
extent that it is carried out by ministry staff or parliamentary staff, subject to the demands 
of the political principals – and thus exerting no independent effect on resulting 
legislation. It is the case that ministry and parliamentary staff involved in the drafting 
process are usually legally (and sometimes managerially) constrained to serve their 
elected “clients” in the executive or in parliament, and that the legislature generally has 
the constitutional authority and political capacity to change or override the legislation 
drafting process at will. But empirically, as this chapter and the next will show, drafting 
processes vary in the ways they bestow discretion, in the extent to which they 
“outsource” or delegate decision making from the elected executive and legislature, in the 
number of constituencies they generate for their preservation as the status quo, and in 
their independence from political control. In fact, even when drafting processes are 
overrun by political processes and political principals, becoming little more than 
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projections of the larger political situation – as has happened under authoritarian 
communist-successor regimes in both centralized-drafting Belarus and pluralist-drafting 
Ukraine, they tend to succumb in different ways. As this chapter and the next one detail, 
in Belarus, centralized drafting is not the cause of arbitrary decision making or autocratic 
rule, but is instead the means by which an authoritarian regime precisely legitimates its 
undemocratic actions by legalizing to the letter what it intends to do in any case and 
criminalizing any action its opponents might reasonably take. In Ukraine, fragmented 
drafting is not the reason for incoherence in the dual executive, nor can it fully account 
for the staggering conflicts of law in Ukrainian legislation – but by allowing elite and 
regime-connected factions to express their preferences in the law and excluding others, 
the process influences the development of legislation that becomes a source of 
contestation and political protest. Because legislation drafting processes designate 
principals and agents in a diverse range of configurations, and because they privilege 
information from certain sources over others, this theoretical framework anticipates that 
the type of drafting process exerts an independent effect on the specific content of 
legislation. 
Centralized Drafting: Effects on the Responsiveness of Legislation Governing 
Religious Minorities 
 On November 25, 2003, an executive official of the Republic of Belarus stated, 
“If a mosque or a synagogue stands in the way of the city development plan, I believe it 
is acceptable to bulldoze it.”  He characterized lower house deputies’ appeal for the 
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preservation of Jewish landmarks as attempts to “turn Belarus into a springboard for 
Zionism.”304  On August 1, 2002, officials in Pogranichny, a town in the Grodno Oblast, 
actually had demolished the sanctuary of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church, for which they claimed the group had no legal building permit, although the 
community had received construction permission in July 2001.305 Synagogues seized in 
the Nazi and Soviet eras have remained in use as theaters and sports arenas—and a beer 
hall, and officials have refused to mandate their return to local Jewish communities.306 
On June 1, 2003, officials in Minsk ordered Hindus to leave an unauthorized prayer 
meeting, and while they disbanded, officers with machine guns searched the participants, 
forced them to the ground, and inflicted heavy damage on the apartment during a search 
of the premises.307 Similar incidents occur regularly despite an explicit constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion for all citizens. The international 
community has repeatedly censured these practices.308  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Belarus,” released 25 February 2004, 2.c. 
Throughout this chapter, in addition to citing the relevant legislation, I provide citations 
of published diplomatic, human rights, and journalistic documentation consistent with 
interviews conducted in the course of this research. Due to the current political context, 
these interview sources remain confidential.  
305 Ibid. 
306 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 18 
December 2003, 2.b. 
307 Cline, A. “Belarus religious freedom report,” The New York Times, 18 December 
2003. Available: http://about/library/irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm.  
308 Fagan, G. “Belarus: religious freedom survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php.   
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 While one might argue that this is merely an uninteresting example of political 
repression of minority rights in Europe’s most authoritarian state, the particular features 
of the legislation drafting process in Belarus interact with the regime’s other features to 
produce results that differ markedly from the results of pluralist drafting in neighboring 
(and also frequently authoritarian) Ukraine. The story of this interaction – the story of 
one of the world’s most centralized drafting processes and its effects on legislative 
responsiveness – is the story of this chapter. It is a story that complicates the 
straightforward narrative of an authoritarian regime constraining minority and individual 
rights with the particular ways in which the centralized drafting process produces 
particular types of legislative responsiveness – and particular forms of repression. In this 
chapter I detail the case of legislation drafting effects on legislation governing the rights 
of religious minorities. 
In Belarus during the transition from Soviet rule, members of religious minorities 
have faced systematic, unconstitutional restrictions on their religious freedom, freedom 
guaranteed by the 1994 Constitution of Belarus.309 This effect, though part of a broader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 1994 Belarus Const. § I, art. 16: “All religions and faiths shall be equal before the law. 
The establishment of any privileges or restrictions with regard to a particular religion or 
faith in relation to others shall not be permitted. The activities of denominational 
organizations, their bodies and representatives, that are directed against the sovereignty 
of the Republic of Belarus, its constitutional system and civic harmony, or involve a 
violation of civil rights and liberties, shall be prohibited. Relations between the State and 
religious denominations shall be governed by the law.” The Constitution was amended 
through illegal referendum in 1996; this amended Constitution has not received 
international recognition. Per this amendment, ““Religions and faiths shall be equal 
before the law. Relations between the State and religious organizations shall be regulated 
by the law with regard to their influence on the formation of the spiritual, cultural and 
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context of authoritarianism, arose from discretion granted by a 2002 law. Under this law, 
officials regularly denied registration to minority religious communities and then 
disbanded them for failing to register; imposed administrative limits on religious practice; 
harassed individual members of minority religious communities and broke up meetings; 
denied visas to foreign rabbis, priests, and ministers (there were no recorded cases of 
imams applying for visas during this period); and seized, retained, or demolished 
religious buildings. 
The Rights of Belarusian Minorities in Context 
In Belarus, the official restrictions that religious minorities have endured during 
the transition years reflect the government’s generally poor post-Soviet record in regard 
to democratic practice and human rights. These difficulties stemmed historically from 
unreformed tsarist- and Soviet-era institutions that perpetuated practices outlawed by the 
1994 post-Soviet constitution. Democratic institutions remained underdeveloped. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe described the 2001 Belarusian 
presidential election and the 2003 local elections bookending the drafting of this 2002 
legislation as neither free nor fair.310 The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
state traditions of the Belarusian people. The activities of confessional organizations, 
their bodies and representatives, that are directed against the sovereignty of the Republic 
of Belarus, its constitutional system and civic harmony, or involve a violation of civil 
rights and liberties of its citizens as well as impeding the execution of state, public and 
family duties by its citizens or are detrimental to their health and morality shall be 
prohibited.”  
310 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, “Republic of Belarus Presidential Election: Limited 
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Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) conducted policing and internal security measures, 
and the Presidential Guard repeatedly took extra-judicial action against the President’s 
political enemies.311 
 The Government’s ministries and implementing agencies also exhibited a weak 
commitment to human rights, especially the rights of the accused. The Ministry of Justice 
regularly undermined criminal procedure. Authorities failed to investigate or explain the 
disappearances and presumed deaths of opposition political figures.  Citizens (especially 
those who voiced support for the political opposition) faced arbitrary searches, arrest, and 
detainment, and security forces monitored the activities of the opposition and of human 
rights organizations.312 Police frequently abused and sometimes tortured prisoners. 
Prisoners suffered from severe prison overcrowding, food and medicine shortages, and 
epidemics of tuberculosis, syphilis, and HIV/AIDS. 
 The government restricted constitutional freedoms of speech, the press, 
association and assembly generally, not only those of religious minorities. In 2003, 
officials closed several independent newspapers and jailed journalists on charges of libel.  
The state continued to own all national radio stations and television networks and 
suppresses freedom of speech. Workers could not associate, organize, or engage in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Election Observation Mission Final Report,” released 9 September 2001. Available: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2001/10/1237_en.pdf. 
311 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Belarus,” released 25 February 2004, 1.a-d. 
312 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, “OSCE Office Concerned over Closure of NGOs in 
Belarus,” released 11 September 2003. Available: 
http://www.osce.org/belarus/item_1_7750.html. 
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collective bargaining. Groups associated with the political opposition were not permitted 
to meet or protest. The 1997 Law on Gatherings, Meetings, Street Processions, 
Demonstrations, and Picketing imposed severe restrictions on public assembly of any 
kind.313 The government frequently failed to protect individual rights.  Women suffered 
social violence and discrimination, and the country was a source and a route for 
trafficking in women and children. Unknown persons harassed and intimidated 
academics and members of the intelligentsia, but authorities did not apprehend them.  
The government restricted foreign publications and foreign visitors.314   
In this context of official disregard for human rights and constitutional guarantees, 
social discrimination and hate crimes against minorities also went unchecked, and 
prejudice flourished. During the first decade of transition, public polls demonstrated that 
anti-Semitism and negative attitudes toward religious minorities increased.315 Citizens 
frequently lobbied officials against minority religious groups.  Social groups that 
discriminated or acted violently toward minority religious groups often went unpunished, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Law of the Republic of Belarus on Gatherings, Meetings, Street Processions, 
Demonstrations, and Picketing, No. 114-Z of 30 December 1997, No. 233-Z of 7 August 
2003, and No. 253-Z of 29 November 2003. Available at the National Center of Legal 
Information of the Republic of Belarus (NCLI), 
http://ftp.ncpi.gov.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf.  
314 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Belarus,” released 25 February 2004, 2.d, 3, 
4. 
315 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 18 
December 2003, 3. 
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even when officials witnessed the crimes.316 The majority faith, the Belarusian Orthodox 
Church (BOC), had autonomy in its internal affairs and enjoyed a special relationship 
with the state; the BOC had the exclusive legal right to employ the word “orthodox” in its 
name. In one case, members of the BOC called for the removal of a Baptist member of 
the National Assembly on the grounds that he was “protecting neo-cults and sects.”317  
The BOC promoted its own status by disseminating anti-minority materials.318  
 In short, official restrictions on minority groups’ constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of religion have constituted part of a much broader social problem, and the 
drafting process alone does not explain it. Nevertheless, the drafting process mediates the 
effects of legislation by allowing the regime to legitimate its autocratic decisions by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Ibid. The report documents a number of cases. For example, in 2002, skinheads 
attacked non-Belarusian Jews in Minsk, and police on the scene did not arrest them.  
Anti-Semitic groups have repeatedly vandalized Holocaust memorials. Another group 
assaulted members of the Light of Kaylasa and vandalized an apartment where they met. 
Others vandalized a Muslim cemetery and a mosque in 2002. In 2003, unknown persons 
destroyed crosses at Kuropaty, the site of the NKVD’s murder of 300,000 people in the 
1930s. Vandals scrawled the word “antichrist” on the Living Faith Evangelical Church’s 
sign.  In each of these cases, local authorities failed to assist the victims or apprehend the 
perpetrators. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Ibid. The BOC’s official calendar marks the May 20 death of a child allegedly 
murdered by Jews, and the May 20 liturgy includes a prayer that refers to this event. 
Orthodox bookstores, hospices, and event organizers sell or distribute anti-Semitic, anti-
Catholic, and other anti-minority literature.  BOC clergy have made anti-Catholic 
remarks on state broadcasts, issued anti-Protestant letters to local officials considering 
construction permits, and claimed churches that traditionally belonged to Belarus 
Autocephalus Orthodox Church (BAOC) communities. (“Autocephalus” or “self-headed” 
Orthodox communities adhere to a longstanding Orthodox principle of equality among 
the various national branches of the church; the BAOC does not recognize the formal 
authority of the Moscow patriarchate). 
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drafting provisions that precisely legalize these decisions, as this analysis will 
demonstrate. 
History and Culture of Minority Religious Rights in Belarus 
 The general pattern of human-rights violations and the repression of minority 
faiths in contemporary Belarus arose from the country’s nineteenth-century history and 
reproduces nineteenth-century patterns.  The country’s very earliest political leaders 
tolerated free competition between faith groups even though those leaders often 
privileged adherents of their own faith. Early Belarus shifted between Russian and 
Lithuanian-Polish control, beginning with the region’s medieval connection to the 
federation of the Kievan Rus during the tenth century. The grand prince of the Rus 
adopted Orthodox faith in A.D. 988; the Catholic Church remained prevalent in 
neighboring Poland. During this era, the two faiths interacted and competed freely in the 
territory that would comprise modern Belarus. The region became part of the Grand 
Duchy Lithuanian in the mid-thirteenth century, and when Lithuania and Poland formed 
their dynastic union in 1386 and a Commonwealth in 1569, Catholic Poland also 
governed the territory that would become Belarus. The balance between Orthodox and 
Catholic faith traditions continued throughout the Lithuanian and Polish eras in 
Belarusian history. The Greek Rite Catholic Church, which at one point counted three 
fourths of Belarusian citizens as members, illustrated this balance by practicing Greek 
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Orthodox rites but remaining in communion with Rome, under papal authority (an 
arrangement negotiated during the Counter-Reformation).319    
 Problematic contemporary institutions derived partially from nineteenth-century 
institutions implemented by the tsar, since both the Soviet regime and the 1994 
democratic constitution left these repetitive patterns of behavior unreformed. As the facts 
below demonstrate, officials in Belarus today replicate the behaviors of officials in 
regimes dating back to the early nineteenth century. Although some international 
religious groups have charged the Soviet regime with creating these repressive patterns, 
the country’s history reveals that such patterns extend back nearly a century before the 
formation of the Communist government. 
 Under the partitions of Poland, when Russia gained control of the Belarusian 
territory in the late eighteenth century, the tsar began to implement repressive policies. 
Perceiving loyalty to the pope as opposition to state authority and Catholic faith as 
sympathy with Poland, the Russian regime repressed both Greek Rite and Roman 
Catholicism with special vigor (the tsar banned the Greek Rite Catholic Church outright 
in 1839). The tsar promoted the Russian Orthodox Church, whose Slavic identity and 
close relationship with the state since A.D. 988 reinforced loyalty to Russian culture and 
government. As a result, the majority of Belarusian citizens (roughly sixty percent) still 
identify culturally and historically with the Orthodox Church rather than Catholicism or 
another faith. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 For the official Belarusian Administration account, see “History of Belarus: Short 
overview.” Available: http://president.gov.by/eng/map2/hist/ist2.html.  
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 Repressive official behavior toward religious groups continued in the Soviet era, 
an example of persistence of tsarist institutions. Official curtailment of religious practice 
under the Soviet government, which promoted atheism (much as the tsar had promoted 
Orthodox faith for political reasons), resulted in a largely secular culture; in the post-
Soviet era, less than half the population claimed to believe in God.320   
 Since Belarus’s secession from the USSR in 1991, most contemporary Belarusian 
governmental agencies have derived from their Soviet-era precursors. For example, the 
internal security agency, the Committee for State Security (KGB), still bears the name of 
the security agency notorious for human-rights abuses under the Soviet regime. The same 
civil servants continued to carry out central planning of the economy even as workers in 
the state-controlled industries (comprising eighty percent of all industry) a little more 
than a decade after transition made less on average than workers in the private industries. 
Local officials often still performed the same duties they performed under the Soviet 
government, making administrative decisions without participation, transparency, or 
accountability.321  
 As the country’s history makes clear, contemporary political institutions and 
official behaviors toward disfavored religious groups in some sense have replicated 
nineteenth-century institutions of repression of religious minorities; tsars supported the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 See, for example, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, “International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 
18 December 2003, introduction. 
321 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002). Available: http://www.keston.org.  
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Orthodox Church because its Slavic identity and integration with the state reinforced state 
authority, and the regime suppressed other faiths whose alleged foreign loyalties 
appeared to present a political threat to the regime. Similarly, Soviet officials repressed 
religious practice that the Communist Party identified as competition—an intrinsic threat 
to communist ideology and a political threat due to extra-national relationships among 
members of religious faiths. 
 Just as the transition to communism failed to transform many institutions of the 
tsarist state, the 1991 transition from Soviet rule failed to transform the state apparatus 
that formerly carried out repressive Soviet-era policies against religious minorities. 
Rather than acting as catalysts for democratic change, however, the agencies perpetuated 
the same anti-pluralist policies they implemented before Belarusian independence, and 
this history remains current in contemporary restrictions on the religious freedom of 
minority groups under the Lukashenko regime. As the Norwegian human-rights 
organization Forum 18 states, “the extensive infrastructure of religious affairs 
officialdom inherited from the Soviet period lends itself to intrusive activity.”322 
 
Centralized Drafting: The 2002 Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations 
 Following Belarusian secession from the USSR in 1991, reformers drafted a new 
democratic constitution in 1994.  Article 16 of the Constitution states, “Religions and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php.  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
256 
faiths shall be equal before the law…”323 Article 33 simply states, “Everyone is 
guaranteed freedom of thoughts and beliefs and their free expression.  No one shall be 
forced to express one’s beliefs or to deny them…”324 A 1992 law had established a 
registration procedure for religious groups but did not ban the practice of unregistered 
faiths.  
 Despite these guarantees of religious freedom and freedom of conscience, 
however, reformers failed to transform longstanding patterns of official behavior, and 
these institutions continued in transitional Belarus.  In this regard, the Belarusian case 
differs from the other post-Soviet states, including Russia, all of which made deliberate 
and largely effective efforts to transform their religious-affairs institutions during their 
early transitions from Soviet rule.325 This is in part because centralization of the state, 
including legislation drafting processes, under the executive met with an executive 
particularly hostile to any religious activity not explicitly aligned with the regime (as the 
BOC is). 
 Contemporary official repression of minority religious groups began with 
President Lukashenko’s election in 1994. Lukashenko called in 1996 for an 
unconstitutional referendum to extend his term and consolidate executive authority, 
demanded the replacement of the sitting legislature, and began implementing policies 
aimed at curtailing opposition of any form (political, religious, or otherwise). In this, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. National Center of Legal Information of the 
Republic of Belarus (NCLI), http://ftp.ncpi.gov.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf. 
324 Ibid. 
325 See below for further details. 
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although his activities constituted a fairly uninteresting case of authoritarianism, he 
succeeded in creating one of the world’s most centralized legislation drafting processes, 
as Chapter 4 details. While it is not surprising that an authoritarian regime can carry its 
agenda, the particular features of the drafting process have mediated the responsiveness 
of the resulting legislation and the discourses available to affected stakeholders, as this 
case demonstrates. In October 2002, Lukashenko put the new process to work, pressuring 
his new legislature to pass an amendment to the 1992 religious registration law. This 
2002 Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations326 established specific registration requirements and procedures 
for religious communities, which the Committee for Religious and Nationalities Affairs 
(CRNA) began to implement, as detailed below. 
 The circumstances of the legislation’s drafting help to explain a paradox, namely 
that CRNA officials most effectively restricted freedom of religion set out in the 
constitution when they most precisely followed the letter of the 2002 law. In this exact 
sense, Belarusian law is highly responsive to its single source: the executive – and almost 
entirely unresponsive to any constituencies shut out of the process of developing it. 
Under an order from the executive Council of Ministers, the National Center for Draft 
Legislative Activity drafted this legislation in secrecy, and the Council of Ministers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Official Russian text available: 
Национальный центр правовой информации Республики Беларусь (the National 
Center of Legal Information of the Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
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secretly revised the text with specialists from the CRNA—the very agency whose powers 
the legislation would expand.327 Some human rights organizations asserted that the 
CRNA chairman, Aleksandr Bilyk, initiated the new law in order to increase CRNA’s 
bureaucratic authority. Bilyk’s successor at the CRNA, Stanslav Buko, claimed that 
religious groups submitted objections that the CRNA considered during the legislation 
revision process. Oleg Gulag of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee countered that the 
CRNA only responded to comments from the Belarusian Orthodox Church, and not from 
any minority faith groups.328 In effect, CRNA officials wrote their own discretion into the 
text of the law, so they appeared to operate “by the book” while actually doing exactly 
what they had done under the Soviet regime: restricting the practice of minority faiths. 
 In drafting the law, the CRNA and the National Center for Draft Legislative 
Activity also created conflicts of law between the constitution and the new law. These 
ambiguities in the Constitution and inconsistencies with the 2002 law forced many 
groups to break the law in order to engage in constitutionally protected religious activity. 
In essence, religious minorities were required to choose between conflicting bodies of 
law: the Constitution and the 2002 statute. Many chose to engage in religious behaviors 
that remained paradoxically constitutional and illegal, subjecting themselves to official 
persecution under the 2002 law. Although certain ambiguities in the text left room for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002). Available: http://www.keston.org. 
328 Ibid. 
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official restrictions on religion, the Constitution asserted freedom of conscience and the 
equality of religions before the law. 
 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations329 required groups to register and forbade them to assemble or 
practice their faiths publicly or privately if officials denied registration. Article 16 of the 
law stated, “The religious organizations are subject to obligatory state registration…The 
state registration is carried out by…the Republican body of state management on affairs 
of religions [CRNA].”330 According to the law’s Article 21, “The state registration of the 
religious organization can be refused [if]…the order of creation of the religious 
organization established by the present law is broken [that is, if the religious group does 
not meet the registration requirements].”331 Article 23 of the law provided consequences 
for non-registered groups: “The religious organization can be liquidated…[for] 
infringement of the present law.”332 
 The law noted the importance of certain faith communities (termed “traditional 
faiths”333) in Belarusian history.  Echoing the constitution, the law also identified the 
“determining role of the Orthodox Church in the historical formation and development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой 
информации Республики Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the 
Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid. 
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spiritual, cultural and state traditions of the Belarusian people.”334 After the passage of 
the law, the Government termed religious groups not mentioned in the law 
“nontraditional,” “sects,” or “cults” and denied them registration. These groups engaged 
in constitutionally protected religious behaviors (holding services, carrying out rites, 
meeting for observances) and thus fell into violation of the 2002 law.   
 The law established three levels of registration: religious community, Republican 
[national] religious association, and religious association. These three-tiered registration 
requirements also forced some groups to engage in religious behaviors illegally if their 
demographic patterns made them ineligible for registration, as the following details 
demonstrate.335 
 The first tier, “religious communities” (local individual religious bodies), were 
required to have twenty adult members who lived in a local area.  The registration 
application required founders’ full names, addresses, citizenship, and signatures; minutes 
of the founding meeting; and official permission to use property listed in the founding 
statutes. Registration of religions unfamiliar to officials also required a description of the 
faith. Groups were to submit these applications to the Oblast Executive Committees or 
the Minsk City Executive Committee.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Ibid. 
335 For the three-tiered registration requirements summarized below, see the Law of the 
Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 
31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой информации Республики 
Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
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 The second tier, “Republican religious associations,” had to demonstrate to the 
CRNA that they had active communities in a majority of the six oblasts in the country.  
 The third tier, “religious associations,” had to have a minimum of ten 
communities, one of which had been active for a minimum of twenty years.  Only 
republican religious associations were permitted to form religious associations, meaning 
these third-tier communities also had to be distributed throughout a majority of the six 
oblasts. The registration application required a list of members of the governing body and 
their biographies, official permission to use property listed, and minutes from the 
founding meeting of the association.  Only religious associations were permitted to form 
seminaries or monastic communities or invite foreign guests. Groups were required to 
submit applications for “religious association” registration to the CRNA.  
 The law’s three-tiered registration requirements posed a series of problems for 
minority religious groups, given their demographic distribution. Individuals feared 
harassment and hesitated to provide their names for the required registration lists. In these 
cases, groups had difficulty even registering as a local religious community. Since 
members of religious communities had to live in the local area, sparsely distributed 
groups found it similarly impossible to enlist twenty members in a single congregation. 
Without registering communities, groups could not register as associations.  This meant 
that groups had to attain sufficient population density in each area but also maintain a 
national presence (at least four of the six oblasts), a requirement only the BOC could 
easily meet. Some groups (such as the Greek Rite Orthodox Church) were in danger of 
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being too sparsely concentrated to register as religious communities (and thus as 
associations), while concentrated groups (such as the Jewish community, centered in 
Minsk) could not register as associations because they did not occupy enough oblasts.  
The requirement that one community must have a twenty-year history in Belarus 
effectively reinstituted Soviet-era restrictions and excluded newer faith groups from 
forming associations.  The three-tiered registration requirements forced many groups to 
break the law in order to engage in constitutionally protected religious behaviors because 
they simply could not meet the registration requirements. 
 The law forbade foreign leadership of religious organizations, and groups had to 
receive permission to import and distribute religious literature. Groups that could not 
form associations were not permitted to train their own clergy, nor were they permitted to 
invite foreign clergy.  Without access to clergy (either native or foreign), groups faced 
extinction. The structure of the law essentially required some groups to operate illegally, 
disband, or succumb to extinction. 
The Responsiveness of Legislation Governing Religious Minorities 
The situation under this law demonstrates to whose concerns the legislation 
responded – and whose concerns were ignored completely. In one sense, an authoritarian 
regime is often analytically unremarkable: ultimately, it might very well have just one 
veto point and respond to one ideal point: the executive’s.336 Nevertheless, Belarus offers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 However, as Tsebelis (77) notes, “it is not true that nondemocratic systems have 
necessarily a single veto player. While the decisionmaking process in democratic systems 
is usually more transparent to outside observers (like journalists or political scientists) 
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a nearly ideal type of centralized drafting, as the drafting process is consolidated in the 
executive and includes virtually no policy formulation, input, technical drafting, or 
assessment by non-executive actors. Through this process, the president and the 
Government advanced legislation that deliberately promoted harassment of minorities 
and granted executive implementing agencies broad discretion under the law to carry out 
Lukashenko’s anti-plural agenda. The law was almost perfectly responsive to the officials 
of the conservative faction who (like Lukashenko) began their careers in the Soviet era 
and supported this agenda, especially officials in the national Committee of Religious and 
Nationalities Affairs of the Council of Ministers (which participated in the drafting 
process), local officials at the oblast level, and local police – and indirectly to the 
regime’s supporters in the Belarusian Orthodox Church. It was almost entirely non-
responsive to the concerns and interests of affected religious minorities (who did not 
participate in the drafting process).  And yet, because the process itself was legally 
centralized, stakeholders who wished to register opposition to the law could not appeal to 
a discourse of Belarusian legality or political competition or procedural norms of 
inclusion; they had to resort to discourses centered on international norms and treaty 
obligations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
who have a good idea of how policy decisions are made, this is not the case in 
nondemocratic regimes. However, transparency does not necessary mean multiple veto 
players, and lack of it does not imply a single one.” Interviews conducted for analysis of 
the Belarusian case suggest that intra-executive bargaining takes place among key 
executive officials, and drafting proves responsive (as demonstrated below) to intra-
executive constituencies. See Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions 
work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
264 
Responsiveness of the Law to Religious Minorities.  By practicing or perpetuating 
their faith traditions when they lacked proper registration to engage in these activities, 
these groups acted illegally. Many groups remained incapable of meeting various 
components of the law’s registration requirements, however, since CRNA officials 
deliberately drafted the requirements to exclude them from at least some levels of 
registration. A religious group’s size, geographic distribution, ability to verify an 
approved legal address, form of religious practice, and degree of dependence on foreign 
clergy, ecclesiastical structure, or literature affected its eligibility to register (and thus to 
operate legally) and its vulnerability to official persecution.  
 None of the religious groups traced in this research was accused of engaging in 
specific religious practices forbidden by Belarusian criminal law (such as murder, 
treason, conspiracy, incitement to violence, sex offenses, polygamy, drug use, suicide, or 
criminal behavior); their illegal behavior consists entirely in practicing traditional 
religious rites without proper registration. The CRNA did identify certain religious 
behaviors as subversive, so members of religious minorities had to decide between 
engaging in behaviors that complied with the 2002 law (often in violation of conscience 
or in opposition to the long-term survival needs of the group) and behaviors that 
complied with the requirements of their faith (often in violation of the 2002 law). 
The Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) remained (and still remains) the majority 
faith in Belarus. The Lukashenko regime maintained that, of those who professed 
religious faith (less than half of the population), around eighty percent belong to the state-
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sanctioned Belarusian Orthodox Church (the name of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Belarus since 1989). Despite the government’s claims regarding the numerical superiority 
of the Orthodox Church, the Minsk-based newspaper Naviny reports that Orthodox 
congregations comprised only forty-four percent of faith communities in Belarus, down 
from fifty-two percent in 1988.337  
 The largest religious minority in Belarus was, at the time of the law’s drafting, the 
Roman Catholic Church (seven percent of the population, or approximately fifteen 
percent of those who claimed religious faith). Comprised mainly of ethnic Poles, many 
Catholic churches traditionally conducted the Mass in Polish, a behavior the state 
considered a threat to the country’s cultural integrity. In order to avoid alienating the 
Government and members of the non-Catholic majority by emphasizing the Church’s 
“foreign” connections (a purported justification for the 2002 law), the Cardinal prohibited 
the use in churches of Polish national symbols and advocated the use of the Belarusian 
language in worship.338  
 Despite greater Catholic population density in the regions near Poland, Catholics 
lived throughout the country (though the wide distribution meant that local congregations 
and monastic communities tended to be quite small).339 The balance of concentrated 
populations with the significant national presence of Roman Catholics qualified the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002), 2. Available: http://www.keston.org. 
338 For public documentation, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. 
Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Belarus,” released 8 
November 2005. 
339 Ibid. 
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Church for all levels of CRNA registration, so it could operate seminaries and invite 
foreign clergy legally (unlike most other minority groups). Due to shortages of native 
priests, the Roman Catholic Church since 1991 had brought in foreign priests and opened 
two seminaries. The Church systematically avoided conflict with the state by submitting 
to official CRNA decisions about the transfer of foreign priests from one parish to 
another within Belarus340 (although canon law assigns such decisions to the Church 
alone). In effect, the Roman Catholic Church avoided official restrictions on normal 
religious behaviors (conducting the Mass, celebrating holy days, carrying out baptisms 
and confirmations, hearing confessions, and educating members in Church doctrine) by 
submitting to restrictions on its cultural affiliations and internal governance (a tradeoff 
the BOC did not have to make). 
 Subjected to violence and genocide throughout the tsarist, Soviet, and Nazi eras, 
the Jewish community numbered, at the time of the law’s drafting, between 50,000 and 
70,000 (down due to emigration from 120,000 just twenty years ago), most of whom 
lived in Minsk. Some practiced Reform or Conservative Judaism; most were not 
religiously active. Jewish leaders asserted that their religious community no longer had 
enough members to support all the synagogues in Belarus even if the government 
restored these synagogues to them, but they continued to lobby for restitution and for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Why Were Catholic Priests Expelled?”  Forum 18 News Service 
(13 January 2006), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=715.  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
267 
return of especially significant buildings.341 The community’s small size made it 
dependent on foreign support (for example, to fund the Jewish Community Center in 
Minsk) and on foreign rabbis, but the emigration rate threatened to reduce the 
community’s national presence sufficiently to make impossible the national registration 
required to draw foreign support. As those who practiced Judaism continued to assimilate 
or emigrate, those who remained had to contemplate the choice (one that other religious 
minorities faced as well) either to cease religious activities or to perpetuate local 
congregations by obtaining foreign support illegally.  
 A similarly dwindling population threatened the legal existence of the Greek Rite 
Catholic Church. Subjected to tsarist prohibition in 1839 and intense persecution in the 
Soviet era, the post-Soviet Greek Rite Catholic Church had very small numbers at the 
time of the law’s drafting. By maintaining obedience to both the Roman pope and the 
liturgy of the Orthodox Church, members of the Church created the perception among the 
conservative (Communist) faction that they mean disloyalty to the state, but these 
religious loyalties remained central to the Church’s creed and practice (rather than 
constituting actual opposition to the state). The Church made efforts to revive its 
membership after 1991 (and thus its ability to register nationally); these efforts proved 
largely unsuccessful. Without national registration, the Church was not permitted to 
operate seminaries or bring in foreign clergy legally, and without priests to refresh its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 For public documentation, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. 
Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Belarus,” released 8 
November 2005, 1.a. 
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aging clergy, the locally registered congregations were in danger of also dying out 
altogether. By submitting to the law that prohibited the training of clergy, the Church 
avoided an outright ban on its religious rites (conducting the Mass, celebrating holy days, 
and carrying out baptisms) but faced extinction over time. 
 Despite BOC demands that the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
(BAOC)342 drop the word “orthodox” from its name in accordance with a BOC-
government concordat, BAOC leaders refused to surrender the title and thus remained 
ineligible for national registration. The BAOC also angered BOC leaders and their allies 
at the CRNA and in the Administration by refusing to recognize the authority of the 
Moscow patriarchate (the head of the Russian and Belarus Orthodox Churches) and 
instead maintaining its ties with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Because 
the BAOC’s stand disqualified it for national registration, the group also could not legally 
establish a seminary or invite foreign clergy; the Church could not maintain sufficient 
numbers of clergy to perpetuate its faith tradition. By continuing to submit to this 
restriction (as it was required to do to avoid an outright ban on its religious rites), the 
church faced eventual extinction. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, whose dioceses and local parishes remain 
ultimately under the authority of the Roman bishop (the pope), Orthodox ecclesiology 
recognizes the equality of the various regions (or patriarchates). For this reason, the 
patriarchates remain “autocephalous.” The Moscow patriarchate has headed the Russian 
Orthodox Church since the rise of the Moscow as a Slavic power following the 
conversion of the Rus to Orthodox faith in 988, and therefore claims to head Orthodox 
churches throughout its traditional territory, including Belarus, which it has designated 
one of its exarchates and termed the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC). The BOC 
recognizes the authority of the Moscow patriarchate; the BAOC sees Belarus as a 
separate autocephalous patriarchate, equal rather than subject to the Moscow patriarchate. 
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 The Muslim community numbered just 30,000 at the time of the law’s drafting, 
many of them ethnic Tatars with roots in Belarus that dated to around A.D. 1000. Most 
belonged to the Belarusian Muslim Religious Association or the Spiritual Office of 
Muslims.  Despite an official ban, a small community of foreign and Belarusian 
Ahmadiyya Muslims also existed. They systematically violated the 2002 law simply by 
continuing to practice Islam without registration. 
 Tiny groups of the “Light of Kaylasa” (a version of Hinduism), Hare Krisnas, 
Baha’i, Seven-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Unification Church members, and 
the Church of Scientology comprised less than one percent of the population at the time 
of the law’s drafting. Many did not have sufficient numbers to register even locally to 
conduct religious rites (none can register nationally to train clergy or invite foreign 
support). Most also could not afford to maintain religious buildings and thus could not 
legally engage in any religious activity except prayer anyway. Considering obedience to 
the law a violation of their religious obligations, members of these groups systematically 
violated the 2002 law by meeting for religious activities in private apartments, public 
parks, and other officially banned locations. Although the CRNA termed the groups 
“cults” because they did not represent a major world faith, members appear not to have 
been accused of engaging in or advocate violent, seditious, or otherwise criminal acts; 
their only illegal behavior consisted in conducting religious activities without 
registration. 
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 In addition to the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, some small Protestant 
Christian communities had traditional roots in Belarus dating to the seventeenth century.  
These included the Evangelical-Lutheran Church, priestless Old Believer communities, 
and Calvinist churches. After Belarusian independence from the USSR, Pentecostal, 
Baptist, Full Gospel, and other Protestant denominations began to flourish despite their 
ineligibility to register nationally and establish seminaries; these groups did not require 
nearly as much formal training for clergy as other religious groups did, nor did they 
depend on Western affiliations as their Russian counterparts sometimes did.343 Protestant 
communities comprised approximately two percent of the population at the time of the 
law’s drafting. Many of these congregations did not possess religious buildings, so they 
violated the 2002 law by meeting to conduct religious services in apartments, houses, 
theaters, and other banned locations.344 
 Responsiveness of the Law to the Executive Committee of Religious and 
Nationalities Affairs of the Council of Ministers (CRNA). In 2001, a Presidential Edict 
brought back into existence the Soviet-era State Committee for Religious and 
Nationalities Affairs, renaming it the Committee of Religious and Nationalities Affairs of 
the Council of Ministers (CRNA).345 Often, a systematic difference exists between law-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php. 
344 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Belarus,” released 25 February 
2004, introduction. 
345 Cline, A. “Belarus Religious Freedom Report,” The New York Times, 18 December 
2003. Available: http://about/library/irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm. 
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in-the-books and law-in-action,346 and this has been especially true in post-Soviet states, 
which have lost entire bodies of fundamental law with the dissolution of the USSR and 
have not yet had time to replace the entire code. However, the CRNA presents an 
exceptional case; its officials’ behaviors usually accord precisely with the requirements 
of the law because CRNA officials wrote the law that governs them—with the full 
support of the president and the Council of Ministers— to preserve their existing 
processes and expand their own power.347 CRNA officials ensured that their discretion 
became enshrined in the law. 
 The CRNA officials restricted minority groups’ constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of religion. The 2002 law and its relationship to the Constitution comprised the 
most important explanation for this official behavior. The law’s broad grant of 
discretionary powers cloaked in precise requirements gave CRNA officials opportunity to 
make arbitrary decisions regarding minority group registration and practice while still 
claiming to act in accordance with the law.  The law included no oversight provisions or 
appeals process. 
 Because the President personally re-established the CRNA by his 2001 Edict and 
the 2002 law sanctions its activities, the CRNA also was granted sufficient personnel and 
resources to do as its leaders (including CRNA chairman Stanslav Buko) saw fit in regard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346  Seidman, A., Seidman, R., & Abeyesekere, N. (2001). Legislative drafting for 
democratic social change Kluwer. 
347 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002). Available: http://www.keston.org. 
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to religious minorities.348 As an implementing agency of the government, CRNA 
administrators clearly understood how to achieve their ends while remaining compliant 
with the detailed provisions of the 2002 law, since CRNA officials themselves drafted the 
law and derived their broad powers from it. They seemed less well versed in explaining 
conflicts of this law with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and equality 
before the law. No record exists of any post-Soviet training for Belarusian religious-
affairs officials concerning constitutional requirements. Although no documented cases 
of official CRNA corruption exist, the agency and its officials gained enormous state 
power through the registration process. This situation existed by design, since former 
CRNA chairman Aleksandr Bilyk helped to draft the law with the specific aim of 
increasing CRNA bureaucratic authority.349  Many CRNA officials began their careers as 
Communist Party bureaucrats in the Soviet era and retained an ideology that disdained 
religious belief and suggested that religious minorities’ foreign ties threatened the 
state.350  Others identifed with the BOC and disliked minority faiths, which they 
perceived as a threat either to the true faith or the cultural integrity of the country.351  As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Ibid. 
349 Corley, F. “Belarus: Religion Law Goes to Parliament This Week,” Keston News 
Service, (28 May 2002). Available: http://www.keston.org.  
350 Fagan, F. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php. 
Because only international monitoring agencies document these cases publicly, 
quantitative data remain unavailable at this time. 
351 Cline, A. “Belarus Religious Freedom Report,” The New York Times, 18 December 
2003. Available: http://about/library/ irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm.  
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a result, they used their discretion to act on these ideologies and advance the interests of 
the conservative faction. 
 The CRNA oversaw local officials in registering local religious groups and 
decided whether to grant registration to “republican religious associations,” the term for 
religious groups that operated nationally.  If CRNA officials denied registration to a 
religious group that continued to engage in forbidden religious activities, CRNA officials 
called on local police to disband or arrest the group’s members. The 2002 law provided 
broad discretion for CRNA administrators who oversaw oblast-level officials and 
processed applications for republican religious associations and religious associations; in 
fact, (as described above) the 2002 law enshrined in law pre-existing patterns of official 
behavior that CRNA administrators wanted to preserve. In their oversight of oblast-level 
officials, CRNA administrators engaged in three documented patterns of discretionary 
behavior that infringe on constitutionally protected religious practice.352 First, they 
published guidelines for oblast-level officials detailing extra-legal grounds for denying 
local registration (such as public opposition to a group). Second, they refused to hear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 For public documentation, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. 
Department of State, “International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: 
Belarus,” released 18 December 2003. See also, Austin Cline, “Belarus Religious 
Freedom Report,” The New York Times, 18 December 2003. Available: 
http://about/library/ irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm. See also, Geraldine Fagan, “Belarus: 
Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News Service (24 November 
2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php. Because only international 
monitoring agencies document these cases publicly, and the CRNA does not publish 
statistics on its own actions, quantitative data remain unavailable at this time. My own 
sources have provided information under confidentiality due to current political 
conditions. 
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appeals from minority groups that claimed oblast-level officials wrongly denied them 
registration. Finally, they overrode oblast-level grants of registration.  Because the law 
provided no oversight provisions and no appeal process, CRNA administrators operated 
with virtually complete discretion in overseeing oblast-level officials. 
 The CRNA registration process involved three registration tiers and a number of 
application requirements, and CRNA officials denied registration at any point in the 
process if they deemed a group or its application unacceptable. No appeal existed.   
 First, a local religious group that sought registration as a “religious community” 
was to file an application with the Oblast353 Executive Committees or the Minsk City 
Executive Committee354 demonstrating that it had at least twenty local members and 
listing founders’ full names, addresses, citizenship, and signatures; minutes of the 
founding meeting; and official permission to use property listed in the founding statutes. 
Local officials required religious groups with which they were unfamiliar to provide a 
description of their faith as well. Oblast-level officials referred applications from 
unknown religions to CRNA researchers, who evaluated these descriptions and exercised 
complete discretion in determining whether the new faith warranted registration. If the 
faith was known to oblast-level officials, they decided whether to grant local registration 
or deny registration. No appeal existed.355  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 The oblast is the provincial or district government. 
354 As the capital, Minsk City constitutes a separate local district. 
355 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой 
информации Республики Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the 
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 In its oversight of oblast-level decisions regarding registration for local faith 
communities, the CRNA exercised wide discretion. In 2003, on its own authority the 
CRNA issued recommendations that oblast-level officials deny registration to a 
community in Minsk. The CRNA also advised oblast-level officials to assess public 
opinion before allowing religious groups to build or renovate religious buildings. At 
times, CRNA administrators even overrode oblast-level decisions, as when national 
CRNA administrators denied a Full Gospel community a permit to convert a home into a 
church despite the fact that oblast-level officials had registered the community and issued 
a building permit and municipal officials had granted construction permits. When 
religious groups appealed local decisions to the CRNA, however, the agency claimed that 
local officials had final authority in these matters.356 
 The CRNA required groups that operated nationally to register as “republican 
religious associations.” To apply, a group was to file an application directly with the 
CRNA, demonstrating that it had active, locally registered religious communities in a 
majority of the six oblasts in the country (rather than concentrated in one part of the 
country). CRNA administrators evaluated the application and exercised discretion to 
grant registration, demand changes to the application or the group’s religious practice, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
356 Due to the sensitive nature of the political situation, the specific officials responsible 
for these statements cannot be identified at the present time. For public documentation of 
these dynamics, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, “International Religious Freedom Report: Belarus,” released 18 December 2003; 
released 15 September 2004; released 8 November 2005. 
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deny registration outright. No appeal existed when a CRNA administrator denied such 
registration.357 The law also created broad discretion for CRNA administrators who 
processed applications for national-level registration. Article 16 of the law stated, “The 
religious organizations are subject to obligatory state registration…The state registration 
is carried out by…the Republican body of state management on affairs of religions 
[CRNA].”358 Missing information, incorrect addresses, insufficient documentation of 
property permits, objectionable articles of faith—all comprised grounds for denial of 
registration under the law: “The state registration of the religious organization can be 
refused [if]…the order of creation of the religious organization established by the present 
law is broken [that is, if the religious group does not meet the registration 
requirements].”359 Article 23 of the law provided consequences for non-registered 
groups: “The religious organization can be liquidated…[for] infringement of the present 
law.”360 The law provided no oversight provisions or appeal process, so CRNA decisions 
could not be overturned.   
 In order to operate seminaries or monastic communities or invite foreign religious 
workers to Belarus, a religious group was to apply to register as a “religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой 
информации Республики Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the 
Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Ibid, Article 21. 
360 Ibid, Article 23. 
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association.”361 To register, the group applied directly to the CRNA, demonstrating that it 
had a minimum of ten communities, one of which had been active for at least twenty 
years (in other words, during the Soviet era, when most faiths faced official repression).  
Only registered republican religious associations were permitted to apply to form 
religious associations, meaning the ten required communities had to be distributed 
throughout a majority of the six oblasts (rather than concentrated in one part of the 
country). The registration application required a list of members of the managing body 
and their biographies, official permission to use property listed, and minutes from the 
founding congress of the association.  As in the case of republican religious association 
applications, CRNA administrators evaluated the application and decided whether to 
grant registration, demand changes to the application or the group’s religious practice, or 
deny registration outright. No appeal existed when a CRNA administrator denied such 
registration.362 
  Since only the CRNA registerd groups as “religious associations” and only 
registered religious associations were permitted to operate seminaries or invite foreign 
clergy, CRNA officials exercised virtually unlimited discretion to determine which 
communities would survive. By denying registration and thus denying training or 
immigration of clergy, the CRNA could deprive a religious group of all leadership over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Ibid. Article 15 of the law states, “Religious associations have the right to 
create…monastic communities [and]…religious educational establishments which 
operate on the basis of their charters and are subject to the state registration in the order 
established by the present law.” 
362 Ibid. 
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time, a situation that could prove a practical or doctrinal hindrance to the perpetuation of 
the community. When the CRNA denied association status to a group, they also 
precluded it from obtaining religious-use permits for property, training clergy, or inviting 
foreign guests. In effect, therefore, an official decision at the CRNA level could lead to a 
minority group’s extinction (even if a local congregation received oblast-level 
registration) over time.   
 Finally, because the law required that groups provide membership lists, CRNA 
officials could target individuals for harassment. The law lacked implementation 
procedures or oversight provisions to curtail such behavior, even though it arguably fell 
outside the authority the law explicitly granted CRNA officials. 
 As described above, the decision-making process established by law allowed 
CRNA administrators to deny registration to groups that lacked a national demographic 
presence or a long (pre-transition) history in Belarus, groups that made administrative 
errors in their applications, groups whose faith tenets met with administrators’ 
disapproval, or groups that met resistance at the oblast-level registration and municipal 
property permit level.  In addition, the circular nature of the process (oblast-level 
registration preceded CRNA registration, but CRNA approval of the faith preceded 
oblast-level registration or property permit issuance) allowed CRNA administrators to 
blame oblast-level officials even when their own decisions created repressive outcomes 
for religious minorities. In another circular process, CRNA administrators exercised 
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discretion to override oblast-level registration grants at will, but had no obligation to hear 
appeals from the oblast level. 
 The CRNA denied registration to a number of minority religious groups, 
including Hare Krishna, the BAOC, the Light of Kaylasa, the Unification Church, and the 
Church of Scientology. In the last case, the CRNA refused to reconsider registration until 
the Church of Scientology responded to 264 objections to their application.363 The CRNA 
denied the Hare Krishna application for failing to provide a legal address although local 
authorities had certified the group’s address.364 CRNA administrators demanded that the 
BAOC drop the word “orthodox” from its name in order to receive registration.365 
Although quantitative data on registration denials are recorded in currently closed 
records, as these examples make clear, a group’s legal existence hinged on the discretion 
of CRNA administrators who processed applications. 
 Under the law, CRNA administrators (rather than immigration officials) also 
decided whether to grant visas to representatives of foreign religious organizations, even 
for charitable rather than religious duties; no appeal process existed. Officials denied 
Catholic priests (mainly from Poland) and Protestant clergy visas.366 CRNA 
administrators decided whether the Catholic Church would be permitted to transfer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 For more, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of 
State, “International Religious Freedom Report: Belarus,” released 18 December 2003; 
released 15 September 2004; released 8 November 2005. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php.  
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foreign priests from one Belarusian parish to another and even expelled two Polish priests 
for allowing their parishioners to participate in a political protest—without the priests’ 
instigation or participation.367  
 In 2004, the Vice Chairman of the CRNA instituted regular audits of unregistered 
groups to put a stop to their activities and also initiated official visits to registered 
groups’ meetings to monitor their activities. CRNA officials fined registered Pentecostal 
and other groups that met in private homes, usually charging them with disturbing public 
order or meeting without permission368 (the law permits prayer but not any other religious 
rites in private homes).369  
    Finally, the CRNA worked with state media to broadcast false charges against 
religious minorities.  For example, one program accused Protestant Christians of 
practicing human sacrifice.370 
Responsiveness of the Law to Local Executive Officials and Police at the Oblast 
Level.  While the CRNA oversaw oblast-level authorities and controlled the national-
level registration required for running seminaries and monastic communities or inviting 
foreign guests, oblast-level officials decided whether to grant registration and building 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367More thorough quantitative data on visa denials would prove enlightening; the CRNA 
also does not publish this information, and the records are closed. 
368 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, December 2004,” Forum 18 News 
Service (16 December 2004), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php.   
369 At this time, only international diplomatic sources provide public documentation of 
such official behavior, documentation that inevitably remains incomplete. However, 
interviews conducted in the course of this research indicate that these patterns persist. 
370 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 18 
December 2003, 2.b. 
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permits to local “religious communities.” These officials served as members of Oblast 
Executive Committees and the related municipal Religious Affairs Councils; or of the 
Religious Affairs Department of the Minsk City Executive Committee – all bodies with 
strong linkages to the conservative political factions in the Administration, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Rada.371  In one regular and circular pattern, local officials denied 
registration to groups that did not have a legal address—but groups could not rent, buy, 
or build without registration. Per the CRNA directive described above, local officials 
sometimes cited public opinion as a reason for denying permits. Just as CRNA 
administrators sometimes overrode oblast-level decisions, local officials sometimes 
ignored CRNA decisions that favored religious groups. For example, in 2003, Grodno 
officials denied local registration to a foreign rabbi because he did not speak Russian or 
Belarusian, even though the CRNA had granted him a visa.372   
 In addition to creating irregularities in the registration and permit process, local 
officials regularly harassed and threatened religious minorities. Oblast-level officials 
demanded lists of minors who attended Pentecostal churches, apparently in an attempt to 
intimidate parents and pastors. Oblast-level officials threatened people whose names 
appeared on the membership lists required for group registration, claiming they could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 As the capital, Minsk functions as a separate district and not as part of another oblast. 
372 Cline, A. “Belarus Religious Freedom Report,” The New York Times, 18 December 
2003. Available: http://about/library/irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm. 
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lose their state jobs (as actually happened to members of the Light of Kaylasa).373 Oblast-
level officials summoned a BAOC priest to a closed hearing and fined him for 
“hooliganism.” Members of his congregation received threats at work, and his sister lost 
her job.374  The chairman of the town council of Slobodka broke up Pentecostal prayer 
meetings in 2003, and local officials fined Hare Krishnas for distributing literature.375 
Officials gave the Pastor of New Life Church a warning for opposing the 2002 religion 
law.  On August 1, 2002, Grodno Oblast authorities demolished a BAOC church, 
claiming it was built illegally, although permits had been issued in July 2001.376  In 2004, 
local authorities fined unregistered Protestant and BAOC communities between $9 and 
$1500 (the average monthly salary was approximately 150 USD) for conducting 
unauthorized meetings, and threatened some with closure.377  Oblast-level officials also 
determined whether leaders of unregistered groups were permitted to enter oblasts and 
towns and expelled them at will. 
 The 2002 law granted oblast-level officials discretion to deny local registration 
(for the status of “religious community”).  Missing information, incorrect addresses, 
insufficient documentation of property permits, objectionable articles of faith—again, all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 For more, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of 
State, “International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 
18 December 2003. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Cline, A. “Belarus Religious Freedom Report,” The New York Times, 18 December 
2003. Available: http://about/library/irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid.  
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comprised grounds for denial of registration under the law.378  When oblast-level officials 
denied religious-community registration or religious-use property permits to a group, 
they precluded it from seeking association status (and thus from training clergy or 
inviting foreign guests). In effect, an oblast-level decision to deny local registration could 
lead not only to a prohibition on a minority group’s local activities, but also to its national 
extinction over time.  Worse, the requirement that groups provide membership lists 
provided oblast-level officials with convenient targets for abuse and harassment, although 
such behavior arguably fell outside officials’ legitimate powers under the law.379 Since 
the law did not prescribe specific procedures for local officials or include limits on 
official discretion, legitimate activities remained unclear. 
 The decision-making process allowed oblast-level Executive Committee officials 
to deny registration to groups that lacked a sufficiently large membership, groups that 
made administrative errors in their applications, groups whose faith tenets met with 
CRNA disapproval, or groups that met resistance at the CRNA registration level.  The 
circular nature of the process (as described above, oblast-level registration preceded 
CRNA registration, but CRNA approval of the faith preceded oblast-level registration or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой 
информации Республики Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the 
Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
379 For further publicly documented examples, see pages 24-5 in Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom – 
Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 18 December 2003. The law does not 
prescribe legitimate behaviors for oblast-level officials, nor does it provide oversight or 
appeals processes. 
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property permit issuance) allowed oblast-level officials to blame CRNA officials even 
when their own decisions contributed to CRNA denial of a group’s registration. 
 The law’s broad grant of discretionary powers gave local officials an obvious 
opportunity to make arbitrary decisions regarding minority group registration and 
practice. There was no appeal process (except to the CRNA, which invariably supported 
local officials). The dense bureaucracy carried over from the Soviet era provided oblast-
level Executive Committees with sufficient personnel and resources to act on this 
opportunity.380  As implementing agencies of the government, oblast-level Executive 
Committee officials cited the 2002 law as the source of their broad powers in regard to 
religious minorities. They did not receive any documented training, however, regarding 
how to manage the apparent gaps in practice between the law and the post-Soviet 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and equality before the law; the 2002 law 
purported in its text to protect these rights. 
 Although statistical evidence of official corruption is not available, oblast-level 
officials gained state power through the registration process. Also, many officials began 
their careers as Communist Party functionaries in the Soviet era and retained an ideology 
that disdained religious belief or maintained that religious minorities’ foreign ties 
threaten the state.381 As at CRNA, others identified with the BOC and disliked minority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Fagan, G. “Belarus: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2003,” Forum 18 News 
Service (24 November 2003), 2. Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php. 
Because only international monitoring agencies document these cases publicly, 
quantitative data remain unavailable at this time. 
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faiths, which they perceived as a threat either to the true faith or the cultural integrity of 
the country. As a result, they tended to use their discretion and the lack of oversight to act 
on their existing ideologies. 
 Per the 2002 law, officers of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and local police forces exercised their discretion 
routinely harass, arrest, detain, and abuse members of religious minority groups. 
Unfortunately, no quantitative data on these incidents are available, but documented 
cases abound. For example, police arrested eighteen members of the Light of Kaylasa, 
detained some of them for two days, and fined them heavily. They broke up one Hindu 
demonstration, detained six people for ten days, and did nothing to stop another inmate 
from beating one of the women.382  In another case, after ordering prayer meeting 
participants to disband, police brought in reinforcements armed with machine guns who 
threw participants to the floor and searched the premises, inflicting heavy damage. Police 
detained Hare Krishnas who tried to distribute literature and broke up Scientology 
meetings. Usually, CRNA officials assigned to monitor religious groups or oblast-level 
authorities acting on their own discretion called on the police to undertake these 
activities. Police also disbanded or arrested religious minorities assembled in public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom – Europe and Eurasia 2003: Belarus,” released 18 
December 2003. See also, Austin Cline, “Belarus Religious Freedom Report,” The New 
York Times, 18 December 2003. Available: http://about/library/ 
irf/irf03/blirf_belarus.htm. See also, Geraldine Fagan, “Belarus: Religious Freedom 
Survey, November 2004,” Forum 18 News Service (16 December 2004), 2. Available: 
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php. 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
286 
places such as parks or street corners, since all religious activities remained illegal in 
non-approved locations (including any publicly-owned space).  
 The 2002 law outlawed religious activity without registration and outlawed 
registered religious group activities in places other than their official religious 
buildings.383 The general duty of police officers to uphold the law meant that officers had 
a duty to enforce the 2002 law, and as described above, this duty fit their personal 
ideologies and interests. The law did not provide specific implementation or enforcement 
procedures, however, so officers enforced the law at their own discretion, or in accord 
with normative legal acts similarly designed to legalize their enforcement behaviors. 
They detained, arrested, or ordered to disband any members of unregistered religious 
groups that they found assembled for any purpose beyond prayer in private homes (and 
sometimes even disband legal private prayer in homes).    
 Police and security forces in Belarus also had frequent opportunity to engage in 
abusive, extra-legal behavior toward religious minorities because officers generally 
operated without oversight of their human-rights records; in fact, President Lukashenko 
himself called on police to make opposition figures “disappear.”384 (Although abuses also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 137-Z on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations, 31 October 2002. Available: Национальный центр правовой 
информации Республики Беларусь (the National Center of Legal Information of the 
Republic of Belarus [NCLI], 
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=v19202054&p2={NRPA}. 
384 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003: Belarus,” released 25 February 2004; Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices – 2004: Belarus,” released 28 February 2005. 
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occur once police have taken religious minorities into custody, such abuses comprise part 
of the broader pattern of disregard for criminal procedure and the rights of the accused 
and fall beyond the scope of this chapter). Because Lukashenko relied on the police and 
security forces to discourage opposition to the regime, these forces also had extensive 
resources and personnel, and they used these against unregistered groups or public 
religious activities (all of which are illegal). In addition to lacking oversight and 
possessing the capacity to act at will, officers operated without training about post-Soviet 
constitutional guarantees in regard to religion and the rights of the accused, as the 2002 
law did not articulate its own conflict with these guarantees or provide for any training to 
resolve potential conflicts. 
 Due to a lack of clear procedures under the 2002 law and its normative legal acts, 
oversight, or training, police officers took a rather ad hoc approach to making decision 
about religious minorities and other suspects.  Except in cases where the participants 
engaged in religious activities in public places, however, police generally acted to 
disband or arrest group members on the instructions of the CRNA and local officials. 
 Officers’ discretion in dealing with unregistered groups or with any religious 
group conducting activities on public property surely contributed to arbitrary 
enforcement. As in the cases of other implementing agencies, some police and security 
officers began their careers in the Soviet era and retained an ideology that disdained 
religious belief and suggested that the relationship of the state to religion should remain 
one of close control.  As with CRNA officials and oblast officials, others identified with 
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the BOC and disliked minority faiths, which they perceived as a threat either to the true 
faith or the cultural integrity of the country. Given discretion under law, as well as the 
opportunity and capacity to harass minorities, officers acted in accordance with these 
ideologies. 
 Local executive officials clearly benefited from broad discretionary  
powers and a lack of oversight, accountability, or an appeal process.  Although there is 
limited evidence of their use of these powers to gain bribes, they exercised virtually 
unlimited power in regard to religious groups they disdain.  In one sense, President 
Lukashenko and the communist faction profited by assuring themselves the support of the 
majority faith (BOC), but repressive measures may also have undermined the Church’s 
legitimacy over time. The Belarusian Orthodox Church and its supporters gained special 
privileges and a near monopoly on religious practice, as the members of minority 
religious groups continued to suffer restrictions on their freedom of conscience and 
religion, economic disadvantage through fines and workplace discrimination in state 
industries, and harassment, intolerance, and violence from officials. 
Responsiveness of the Law to Foreign Example and Interests. The Belarusian 
regime purported to function as the government of a modern secular state. The 
registration requirements might seem comparable to those of Western democracies such 
as the United States, which recognizes the tax-exempt status of religious and other 
organizations that apply for exemption under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC).  Under the IRC, however, “churches” (a term the Internal Revenue Services uses 
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to include mosques, synagogues, and other confessional associations) do not have to 
register in order to gain tax-exempt status if they meet the requirements for 501(c)(3) 
exemption.385 The only restrictions imposed on tax-exempt churches and religious 
organizations prohibit activities that result in inurement of assets or income to private 
members or shareholders, political lobbying or campaigning (although their members 
may do so as citizens), and illegal activities.386 Religious associations and organizations 
that do not register or qualify for tax-exempt status may also operate freely under the 
First Amendment of the Constitution. The United States and European Union had little 
influence in the Belarusian transition from Soviet rule, however, and diffusion of norms 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of conscience, is not 
much reflected in the 2002 law. 
 In culture, history, religious demography, and political development, the 
Belarusian case most closely resembled that of the Russian Federation, which remains 
deeply influential in Belarusian politics and whose 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Organizations387 also established a registration system. In both Belarus and 
Russia, the registration system was implemented with the stated purposes of protecting 
citizens from harm (although minority groups targeted in Belarus are not accused of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Internal Revenue Service, “Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations: 
Benefits and Responsibilities under the Federal Tax Law,” 2-3.  Available 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.  
386 Ibid, 3-5. 
387 Law of the Russian Federation on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations, 19 September 1997. Available: 
http://www.stetson.edu/%7Epsteeves/relnews/svobodasovesti1709eng.html.  
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engaging in criminal activities beyond the practice of their faiths) and protecting the state 
from foreign subversion (a task Russia subsequently assigned to its immigration 
officials). 
 Contemporaneous with the drafting of the 2002 Belarusian law, Russian religious 
associations were permitted to form and engage in religious activities freely, as Article 6 
of the Russian law states: 
A religious association in the Russian federation is defined as a voluntary 
association of citizens of the Russian federation and other persons permanently 
and legally residing on the territory of the Russian federation, formed for the 
purposes of corporate confession and dissemination of faith and manifesting the 
following characteristics appropriate to these purposes:  
  a confession of faith;  
  performance of religious services and other religious rites and ceremonies;  
  instruction in religion and religious education of its adherents.388  
 Religious associations could be established either as “religious groups” or 
“religious organizations.” Unlike the 2002 Belarusian law, the 1997 Russian law did not 
make registration compulsory. A religious group did not register yet held legal status. 
Article 7 of the law defines a religious group as  
a voluntary association of citizens, formed for the purposes of corporate 
confession and dissemination of faith, functioning without state registration and 	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acquiring the legal capacity of juridical person. The premises and property 
necessary for the activity of a religious group are acquired for the group's use by 
its participants…. Religious groups have the right to perform religious services 
and other religious rites and ceremonies and to conduct religious instruction and 
religious education of their adherents.389  
 Under the 1997 Russian law, religious associations were required to register to 
obtain the status of religious organization. Like the Belarusian law, the Russian law 
established three tiers: “local organizations” were required to have ten members in one 
locality and demonstrate a fifteen-year history in Russia; “regional centralized 
organizations” had to have three local organizations; and “centralized organizations” 
were required to have local organizations in at least half the constituent regions (or three 
regions in an “ethno-cultural” boundary) and demonstrate that they had operated in 
Russia for at least fifty years.390 Organizations were required annually to re-register or 
notify the body that granted registration of their continuing activities. The application 
requirements resemble those of the 2002 Belarusian law, and failure to comply with these 
requirements constituted grounds for officials to deny registration. Local organizations 
not founded by a pre-existing, registered centralized organization had to submit 
information about their beliefs, and officials were permitted to extend the normal one-
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month application review period to six months in such cases “to conduct a state expert 
analysis by scholars of religion.”391 
 Like the Belarusian law, the Russian law also reserved to registered religious 
organizations the rights to (1) “establish and maintain cult buildings and premises,” (2) 
“conduct religious rites in medical treatment and hospital institutions, children's homes, 
homes for the elderly and invalids, and in institutions of criminal punishment for 
deprivation of liberty, upon requests of citizens in them,” (3) “manufacture, acquire, 
export, import, and distribute” religious materials, (4) “conduct charitable activity” as a 
juridicial person, (5) “create cultural-educational organizations and educational and other 
institutions, and to establish mass media,” (6) “create institutions of professional religious 
education,” (7) “establish and maintain international communications and contacts,” (8) 
“own property” (domestic or foreign), and (9) “conduct entrepreneurial activity.”392 
 While the registration requirements for religious associations seeking to engage in 
the activities listed above created potential for repression of religious minorities, such 
incidents remained rare during the same period in Russia.393 The 1997 Russian law did 
not establish a central implementing agency to register groups or enforce the 
requirements, and it did specify a right of appeal both within the registering agency and 
in the courts.  In fact, the constitutional courts on several occasions upheld the appeals of 
minority groups, and ruled that the fifteen-year requirement was not retroactive (it did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Ibid. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Unregistered Religious Groups,” Forum 18 News Service 
(14 April 2005). Available: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=543. 
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apply to groups formed before 1997).394 Minority groups formed after 1997 also could 
circumvent the fifteen-year requirement by joining with a registered centralized 
organization that served as an umbrella for groups with similar beliefs. Even groups that 
opposed contact with the state or enrollment in a hierarchy on principle (such as the Old 
Believer communities) generally escaped penalties for engaging in the activities listed 
above if they did so inconspicuously.395 Finally, as outside observers noted, enforcement 
of the Russian law did not appear to be ideologically biased; officials restricted religious 
practice haphazardly, usually at the expense of the most dynamic or conspicuous groups, 
regardless of their beliefs, history, registration status, or affiliations.396 
Conclusion 
 The choice of legislation drafting process is not a choice without effect. Although 
it is easy to assume that observed outcomes in autocracies are simply effects of the 
regime type or the larger political process, this chapter suggests that the type of 
legislation drafting process mediates these effects, producing responsiveness in the text of 
legislation to some factions and not to others. In the Belarusian case, centralized drafting 
has allowed the executive to respond to its own official cohort and its supporters in the 
Belarusian Orthodox Church and to suppress minority religious factions under the cover 
of legitimacy. Centralized drafting has produced legalistic authoritarianism.  
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CHAPTER NINE: CONSENSUS TO FRAGMENTATION - THE EFFECTS OF 
ESTONIAN AND UKRAINIAN DRAFTING ON LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Introduction 
Far at the other end of the drafting continuum from Belarus, Ukraine has a deeply 
fragmented pluralist legislation drafting process, and the effects of this fragmentation on 
resulting legislation can be profound. Section 4.4.1 of the Taxpayer Liability Act of 
Ukraine specifies that, if Ukrainian legislation is found to be open to multiple or unclear 
interpretations, the tax authorities are to choose the interpretation most favorable to the 
taxpayer. Far from being a de rigeur legal nicety, this provision has been a necessity in 
the Ukrainian legal context, as two cases that came before the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2010-2011 made clear.  
In one, Serkov v. Ukraine (Application No 39766/05), the Court considered the 
case of an individual entrepreneur engaged in import activities who had elected to 
register and pay taxes under the Presidential Decree “On a Simplified System of 
Taxation, Accounting and Reporting for Small Business” No 727 of July 3, 1998. 
Paragraph 6 of this decree exempted payers of the simplified (or unified) tax from VAT. 
However, the Law of Ukraine “On Value-Added Tax of April 3, 1997, Section 2.4, 
specified that no matter what tax system the taxpayer selected, imports would be subject 
to VAT, while Section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On State Support for Small Business” 
allowed taxpayers to replace taxes and duties with the simplified tax. After the customs 
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authority charged the importer VAT, the ECHR found that Ukrainian law contained 
conflicts that created inappropriate discretion in linking these differing laws and 
normative legal acts, and that the legislation lacked predictability and clarity and thus 
failed to meet the “quality of law” requirement under the European Convention of 
Human Rights. As such, the Court found that Ukraine had violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 
of the Convention.397 A similar judgment of the ECHR in Shchokin v. Ukraine 
(Application No 23759/03 and No 37943/06) centered on conflicts between Article 7 of 
the Cabinet of Ministers Decree No 13-92 “On Citizens’ Income Tax” of December 26, 
1992, and the Principal Tax Inspectorate’s Instruction No 12 “On Citizens’ Income Tax” 
issued on April 21, 1993; in this case also, a taxpayer had been charged the higher of 
several possible amounts that could be calculated under the existing law.398 
As these cases show, the fragmentation of the Ukrainian drafting process – taking 
place in the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Rada, and various 
executive authorities – produces a potentially dizzying corpus juris, a far different 
outcome from the clear (and authoritarian) outcomes of the Belarusian drafting process. 
In this chapter, I explore the effects of increasingly decentralized drafting on legislation 
and on its responsiveness to various constituencies affected by this legislation. I begin 
with the effects of consensus-based legislation drafting in Estonia on the responsiveness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
398 For more, see Fuley, T., Lucas, L., & Seitz, L. (2012). Розробка проектів 
нормативно-правових актів відповідно до методики вирішенняПроблем. Kyiv: 
Indiana University/Ohio State John Glenn School of Public Affairs (PDP-II). 
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of legislation governing the rights of religious and language minorities. I then turn to the 
effects of pluralist legislation drafting in Ukraine on the responsiveness of legislation 
governing the rights of language minorities. As these cases demonstrate, the type of 
legislation drafting process can exert independent institutional effects on the 
responsiveness of legislation to various constituencies.  
Consensus-Based Drafting in Estonia: Effects on the Responsiveness of Legislation 
Governing Religious and Language Minorities 
The Rights of Estonian Minorities in Context 
 Prior to the Soviet occupation, nearly eighty percent of Estonians belonged to the 
Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church and many more to Orthodox churches. Following 
Soviet repression of religious practice, independent Estonia is largely secular, with 
around a quarter of Estonians professing religious faith (about half of these Lutheran and 
half Orthodox, with less than a percent belonging to other faiths).399 Religious minorities 
include Free Evangelical and Baptist, Roman Catholic, Christian Pentecostal, Armenian 
Apostolic, United Methodist, Seventh-Day Adventist, and Charismatic Episcopal 
churches,400 as well as tiny communities of Muslims, adherents of indigenous religions, 
Jews, and Buddhists.401  Since independence, religious associations and the state have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies. 
400 Siseministeerium (Ministry of the Interior). (2013). Statistics for religious 
associations in Estonia 1995-2013, from 
https://www.siseministeerium.ee/public/Statistics_1995-2013.pdf 
401 Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies. 
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cooperated formally and enjoyed an uncontentious relationship, while a fairly serene 
social and academic dialog has continued about whether the state should preserve the 
historical link between the Lutheran Church and Estonian national identity or simply 
guarantee the individual and collective religious rights of Estonians.402 
 The debate about the proper place of language minorities in post-Soviet Estonia 
has been distinctly less serene. In contrast to the irenic practice of Estonian religious 
communities in a cooperative state and tolerant secular society, language minorities have 
found themselves since independence in a state many find considerably less hospitable.  
In 1945, over ninety-seven percent of the population of Estonia was ethnic Estonian; by 
independence, just over sixty percent was ethnic Estonian, due to the emigration, 
deportation, and murder of Estonians, and the immigration of ethnic Russians. In 
addition, the Soviet policy of Russification eliminated Estonian-language publications, 
media, associations, and some schools, while prioritizing Russian as the language 
required for employment in state bodies and industries. Ethnic minorities – Ukrainians, 
Belarusians, Poles, Germans, and Jews – were assimilated as well, with over half 
speaking Russian at the end of the Soviet period. These policies not only threatened the 
existence of the Estonian language but also produced a profound source of conflict 
between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians that emerged during the perestroika period. 
As part of the national resurgence, carried out in part through legislation drafting (see 
Chapter 5), the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, after declaring the supremacy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Ibid. 
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Estonian national law over Soviet law, passed a constitutional amendment on December 
6, 1988 establishing Estonian as the official language of the state. On January 18, 1989, 
the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR passed a Language Law, including a coming-
into-force provision that delayed implementation until February 1, 1993, to give 
generally monolingual Russian speakers time to adapt. The Language Law required state 
administration to be conducted in Estonian and Russian, a provision that meant Russian-
only speakers in the state bodies would have to learn Estonian or find other employment; 
the law also thereby established a policy of setting language requirements rather than 
ethnic requirements per se as the standard of transition, thus respecting the longstanding 
place of ethnic minorities in Estonian society. On November 23, 1990, a Language Board 
was established to carry out the law; some Estonian legal scholars see the lack of a 
provision creating the Board in the original Language Law as detrimental to its early 
smooth implementation.403  The pre-independence decision to grant Estonian citizenship 
to descendants of those who were Estonian citizens prior to Soviet occupation, and to 
require proficiency in Estonian as a condition of naturalization for more recent 
immigrants, has also left a sizeable number of stateless people in Estonia, mostly ethnic 
Russians who still have not learned Estonian. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 For this history, see Rannut, M. (2004). Language policy in Estonia. Noves SL. Revista 
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Consensus-Based Drafting: The Churches and Congregation Act of 2002 and the 
Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017  
Law on religious minorities.  Article 40 of the 1992 Estonian Constitution 
establishes the individual and associational freedom of religion:  
Everyone has the freedom of conscience, religion and thought. People are free to 
belong to churches and religious organizations. There is no state church. 
Everyone has the right, individually and with others, either publicly or privately, 
to follow religious observances, as long as they do not interfere with public order, 
health or morality.404 
Estonian jurists have interpreted this Article to require neutrality and equality rather than 
strict separation; the Estonian state can work with religious associations on issues of 
mutual concern as long as the state does not discriminate against particular faiths.405 
Articles 3 and 123 of the Constitution also incorporate to Estonian law the norms of 
international law and Estonia’s treaty obligations, placing these norms above statutes and 
normative legal acts in the hierarchy of law.406  As in Belarus, the 1993 Churches and 
Congregations Act of Estonia required religious associations to register, and the Ministry 
of the Interior supervised this registration process; unlike the Belarusian law, under the 
1993 Estonian law, registration could only be denied if a religious association submitted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [The Constitution of Estonian Republic] (1992). Riigi 
Teataja toimetuse väljaanne. Tallinn.  
405 Maruste, R. (2004). Konstitutsionalism ning põhiõiguste ja –vabaduste kaitse. Tallinn: 
Juura. 406	  Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies.	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bylaws that did not accord with Estonian law.407 During the development of the 1993 law, 
some of the more prominent churches attempted to secure a privileged status, 408 but 
adherents of minority faiths and advocates of civil liberties countered these requests and 
the law affirmed the principles of nondiscrimination established in the Constitution. The 
Government and the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church created a joint commission in 
1995 in which to discuss cooperative social service efforts and the restoration of church 
properties confiscated during the Soviet era, a major priority of the Estonian state under 
the 1992 Constitution and Estonian law.409 
The 2002 Churches and Congregation Act, drafted by the Ministry of the Interior 
and reviewed through interministerial working groups, proposed by the Government to 
the Riigikogu and reviewed in committee, was open not only to general public comment 
and committee hearings, but also to formal comment from affected stakeholders and peak 
associations, including the Estonian Council of Churches. (In 2002 the Estonian Council 
of Churches agreed to a “Protocol of Common Interests” with the Government of 
Estonia, outlining issues of cooperation410). The Estonian Council of Churches, 
representing the larger and more traditionally prominent Christian churches, requested 
(much as the Belarusian Orthodox Church had) that the 2002 law restrict “non-
constructive religious communities,” possibly in an effort to limit proselytizing by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Churches and Congregations Act. (1993). 
408 Siseministeerium (Ministry of the Interior). (2013). Infomaterjal, from 
https://www.siseministeerium.ee. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
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outside or emerging-faith groups.411 However, minority faith groups and advocates of 
civil liberties included in the drafting process offered contrary advice, and the final draft 
legislation did not include the ECC’s proposed provisions for these restrictions.412 The 
2002 Churches and Congregations Act is subordinate to the Non-profit Associations Act, 
but it allows religious associations to attain legal personality even if structured in ways 
other than those outlined in the Non-profit Associations Act if their ecclesiastical and 
theological traditions so require413; this provision recognizes the special organizational 
forms of the long-established churches that participated in the drafting process, but it 
does not treat emerging-faith associations differently.414 Finally, although the Department 
of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior continues to coordinate with religious 
communities and to provide decisions upon request on the legal compliance of newly 
registering groups, the registration departments of county and city courts now register 
religious associations.415 Religious groups that do not register may still conduct religious 
activities even though they do not have legal personality. 
Law on language minorities.  The Preamble to the Estonian Constitution sets out 
the preservation of the Estonian language as one of the foundational purposes of the 
Estonian state: the state “shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies. 
412 See the Churches and Congregations Act. (2002). 413	  Churches and Congregations Act. (2002). Article 5 (2) and 5(3).	  414	  Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies.	  415	  Churches and Congregations Act. (2002). Article 17(3).	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and culture through the ages.”416 Section 6 asserts Estonian as the official language, 
Section 30 establishes the state’s duty to provide each person with an Estonian-language 
education, Section 51 declares each person’s right to communicate with the state 
administration in Estonian, and Section 52 establishes the duty of government offices and 
local administrations to conduct administration in Estonian.417  
  The Language Act of 1995 declared the 1989 Language Law null and void and 
set out several duties, delegated to the Government of the Republic: 
The basis of the official use of the Estonian language, in the context of the present 
Law, shall be the standard of the Estonian written language according to the 
procedures determined by the Government of the Republic.418 
The Government of the Republic, by Resolution of April 21, 1998, assigned the 
responsibility to the Ministry of Education and Research. (This delegation is confirmed 
by the Government of the Republic Act). The Decree of the Minister of Education of 
April 6, 2000 established the Estonian Committee of what would become the Estonian 
Language Council, and this committee drafted Development Strategy of the Estonian 
Language 2004-2010 with considerable formal input from affected stakeholders and 
associations. In 2008, the Ministry of Education and Research began drafting a new 
Language Act; the Cabinet approved it and submitted it with comments to the Riigikogu 
in August 2010, and it was adopted, entering into force on July 1, 2011. The law specifies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [The Constitution of Estonian Republic] (1992). Riigi 
Teataja toimetuse väljaanne. Tallinn. Preamble.  
417 Ibid. Sections 6, 30, 51, 52. 
418 Language Act (1995). Article 1(2). 
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domains in which Estonian is required in public administration and commercial activity 
and the level of fluency required, assigning enforcement to the Language Inspectorate. It 
is under the authority of this body of law that the Ministry of Education and Research and 
the Estonian Language Council undertook the drafting of the subsidiary legislation, the 
Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017, a project approved by the 
Government on May 28, 2009.419  
 Formal participation in the drafting process was extensive. Participants included 
seven universities and institutes (Tallinn University, the University of Tartu, the Institute 
of the Estonian Language, the Estonian University of Life Sciences, Tallinn University of 
Technology, the Institute of Cybernetics, and the Estonian Business School); the 
Consistory of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church; and several state entities, peak 
associations, and civil society groups (the Language Inspectorate, the National 
Examinations and Qualifications Center, the Integration and Migration Foundation “Our 
People,” Estonian Public Broadcasting, the Estonian Land Board, the Estonian Literary 
Museum, the Estonian Institute, the Estonian Terminological Society, the Mother Tongue 
Society, the Võro Institute, the French Lexicographic Society, the Institute of Mulgi 
Culture, and several other groups). After this participatory policy formulation, research, 
and technical drafting process, the draft was sent to the other ministries, all of which 
approved it with their comments. The draft was then posted to the “participation web” for 
public comment and further comment by partner institutions. Finally, the draft was sent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 For this history, see Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017, (2010). 
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to international experts.420 The plan regulates language support and development, 
Estonian language education, development of technology in Estonian, Estonian and non-
Estonian-medium general education421, support for Estonian dialects and Estonian 
speakers abroad, and enforcement of the Language Law requirements for the use of 
Estonian in public administration and certain commercial activities.  
The Responsiveness of Legislation Governing Religious and Language Minorities 
 Responsiveness of Estonian Law to Religious Minorities. Although all religious 
organizations are tax-exempt under the law, the Estonian Council of Churches receives a 
direct subsidy (and participated in the development of the legislation). In 2005, a similar 
commission was established for non-Christian associations, including state officials, 
experts, and adherents of indigenous religions; the commission undertook initial drafting 
of subsidiary legislation to protect sacred natural areas.422 The state has been generally 
cooperative in restoring religious sites to religious associations of all faiths. Religious 
symbols and clothing are permitted, and the requirement that identification photos 
include the forehead to the jaw are applied to all faith groups (for example, to nuns as 
well as to Muslim women).423 In short, except for the still-open question of whether 
minority-faith communities receive funding and formal participation equal to that of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 For this history, see Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017, (2010). 
421 The Language Law permits minority-language communities to conduct general 
education in minority languages, but lays out requirements for instruction in Estonian at 
the secondary and tertiary levels.  422	  Kiviorg, M. (2009). Religion and the secular state in Estonia. International Center for 
Law and Religion Studies.	  
423 Ibid.  
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Estonian Council of Churches, the law has been responsive to the interests of faith 
communities, including those of minority and emerging faiths.  
Responsiveness of Estonian Law to Language Minorities. Estonian legislation 
guarantees the rights of persons in Estonia to use their own “mother tongues” for 
expression. The law also allows minority-language communities meeting certain criteria 
to decide that local administration and education will be conducted in their language as 
well as in Estonian. Finally, the law makes available subsidies for minority-language 
speakers who want to learn Estonian. However, public employees who are native 
speakers of minority languages have been vexed by the requirement that they 
demonstrate proficiency in Estonian. The mode of enforcement is a source of special 
opposition; a Language Inspectorate official may show up unannounced to conduct 
interviews to assess proficiency, and a failed test can result in fines, employment 
restrictions, and requirements to attend Estonian classes that are only reimbursed when 
passed.424 Because proficiency is also a requirement for naturalization, residents 
descended from Russian immigrants find the Language Law an additional source of 
social alienation. The Language Law, while advancing an understandable priority for a 
recently occupied people, perhaps also demonstrates a weakness of consensus-based 
drafting in legal domains that regulate minorities whose own legal status excludes them 
from the drafting process.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 See, for example, Levy, C. J. (June 8, 2010). Estonia raises its pencils to erase 
Russian. New York Times, pp. A6. 
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Pluralist Drafting in Ukraine: Effects on the Responsiveness of Legislation 
Governing Language Minorities 
The Rights of Ukrainian Language Minorities in Context 
 Pre-Soviet Ukraine spent most of its history under foreign rule, with about eighty-
five percent under Russian control and most of the rest under Austrian control. Although 
Austrian Ukraine was generally permitted to speak Ukrainian, the language was repressed 
by the tsars and officially outlawed in public life and education by Alexander II in 1876. 
This policy had the effect of marginalizing Ukrainian; even peasants were ashamed to 
speak it.425 After the Bolshevik Revolution, two successive attempts at Soviet rule of the 
Ukrainian SSR failed and the Ukrainian Soviet government was compelled to take 
asylum in Moscow. Only at this point did the magnitude of the ethnolinguistic divide 
between Ukraine and Russia dawn fully upon Lenin, who responded by issuing the “Draft 
Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on Soviet Rule in 
Ukraine,” ratified by the Soviet in November, 1919. The policy of permitting Ukrainian-
language education and bilingual use of Ukrainian and Russian in official settings 
continued through the early Soviet period, although the Central Committee would only 
designate them “generally used languages” rather than official languages. Ukrainization 
persisted until the early 1930s, when Stalinist purges of the intelligentsia in Ukraine 
signaled the beginning of a new period of Russification. In 1958, the USSR Council of 
Ministers issued a decision that education in “mother tongues” would no longer be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Grenoble, L. A. (2003). Language policy in the Soviet Union. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
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obligatory; even the Ukrainian Communist deputies who participated in the drafting of 
the decision opposed it. By 1989, only fifty-six percent even of the population of Kyiv 
spoke Ukrainian as a first language; the proportion was much lower in the more heavily 
Russian east and south.426 Under the (pre-independence) 1989 Law “On Languages in the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” Ukrainian was declared the state language of 
Ukraine,427 with language minorities fully tolerated and minority-language education 
guaranteed, particularly in Russian-speaking regions. (Minority-language instruction for 
Crimean Tatars, for example, was not as widely available). Article 10 of the Ukrainian 
Constitution of 1996 states, 
The State language of Ukraine shall be the Ukrainian language. The State shall 
ensure comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in 
all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. Free 
development, use, and protection of Russian and other languages of national 
minorities of Ukraine shall be guaranteed in Ukraine. The State shall promote the 
learning of languages of international communication. The use of languages in 
Ukraine shall be guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and shall be 
determined by law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 For the history of language policy in Ukraine and additional statistics, see Grenoble, 
L. A. (2003). Language policy in the Soviet Union. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
427 Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny (VVR), 1989, issue 45, page 631; Carried 
into effect by Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine #8313-11 of 28 October 
1989, VVR 1989, issue 45, page 632; changed and amended by Law of Ukraine #75/95-
VR of 28 February 1995, VVR 1995, issue 13, page 85. 
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Although the 1989 law (still in force in 2012) and successive additions to the legislation 
governing language policy, language rights, and language minorities in Ukraine became 
increasingly outdated as post-Soviet Ukraine became a signatory to various conventions, 
treaties, and obligations under international law to protect minority language rights, in 
practice, post-Soviet Ukraine was largely tolerant of its language minorities, even while 
cultivating the use of Ukrainian. 
Pluralist Drafting: Law of Ukraine No. 5029-VI of 3 July 2012 “On Principles of the 
State Language Policy”428 
 The draft legislation, developed by Party of the Regions MPs Vadim 
Kolesnichenko and Serhiy Kivalov,429 permitted the use of “regional languages” in 
courts, public administration, and schools in regions with more than ten percent of 
minority-language speakers, but the formula for calculating a region’s percentage of 
minority-language speakers meant that Russian-speaking regions (most regions of 
Ukraine, under this formula) would see Russian attain “regional language” status, while 
other minority-language communities would be unable to clear the threshold (for 
example, Crimean Tatars would prove unlikely to qualify).  In addition, officials in 
regions with a regional language would be required to speak the regional language 
(including monolingual Ukrainian speakers), and people would have the right to receive 
official documents and communication in the regional language. The southern and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Law of Ukraine No. 505029-VI of 3 July 2012 “On Principles of the State Language 
Policy (2012), http://rada.gov.ua/. 
429 For their efforts, both would be awarded the Pushkin Medal by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin. 
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eastern predominantly Russian and Russian-speaking regions, oblasts, and cities and 
towns of Ukraine represented the chief sources of electoral support for President Viktor 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, which had a majority in the Verkhovna Rada. With 
parliamentary elections three months off, Yanukovych was widely seen as promoting 
legislation to recognize Russian as a regional language in regions with more than ten 
percent of Russian speakers in order to ensure the party’s victory despite Ukraine’s 
continuing economic challenges and amid growing concern about corruption. The 
opposition also suspected the draft legislation of being a ploy to keep predominantly 
Russian-speaking regions firmly in Russia’s orbit by reducing the incentives of Ukrainian 
citizens of these regions to learn Ukrainian. The developers of the legislation had strong 
ties to Russian-speaking constituents and to Yanukovych, whose previous actions also 
demonstrated close ties with Russia. 
 After being drafted by Party of Regions MPs with ad hoc input from their 
supporters, the 2010 Draft Law on Languages in Ukraine received profound criticism 
from the Venice Commission in its Opinion, adopted at is 86th Plenary Session.430 The 
Commission found that, although the draft purported to protect the rights of minority-
language speakers, it specifically mentioned only Russian speakers, and also had the 
effect of granting Russian state-language status. After making some revisions, many of 
them cosmetic, the developers registered the draft law with the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine (registration N° 9073) on August 26, 2011. The conclusion of the Main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Venice Commission, Opinion on Draft Law on Languages in Ukraine, (CDL-AD 
(2011)008). 
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Scientific Expertise Department of the Rada of May 23, 2012 cited numerous problems 
with the draft. Along with those in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance, 
experts determined that the draft law was in conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine and 
international norms, and (in accordance with the findings of the Budget Committee of 
November 3, 2011) that it would cost fifty to sixty billion UAH in implementation. The 
Rada Committee on Culture and Spirituality was so alarmed that its chairman referred the 
draft to the Venice Commission for a new review on October 21, 2011; the Commission 
found in its December 2011 Opinion that the revisions had removed some references to 
“Russian” (to the exclusion of other minority languages) and made references in support 
of Ukrainian as the state language but remained likely to undermine Ukrainian by setting 
up numerous new official languages, and that minority languages other than Russian 
would still have difficulty attaining “regional language” status.431 The draft law had not 
received support from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine’s specialized 
institutes on language, including the Institute of Linguistics, the Institute of Ukrainian 
Language, the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, the Institute of State and Law and 
several others. 
 Despite this chaos, widespread criticism of the draft’s substance and quality, and 
the united opposition of the reform factions and parties and an array of civil society 
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  Venice Commission, Opinion on the Draft Law on Principles of the State Language 
Policy of Ukraine, CDL-­‐AD(2011)047. 
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groups,432 the draft legislation advanced to a second reading. Amid protest over drafting 
and procedural irregularities, Party of Regions MPs surrounded the platform and 
opposition MPs rushed forward, a fistfight breaking out on the floor. Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
the speaker of parliament, submitted his resignation the next morning; it was not 
accepted. Opposition MPs and activists began a hunger strike, and Ukrainian protesters 
filled the yard of the Rada in what was to become “Language Maidan.” Nevertheless, 
Yanukovych signed the legislation on August 8, 2012. 
The Responsiveness of Legislation Governing Language Minorities 
 The Law of Ukraine “On Principles of the State Language Policy” is highly 
responsive to Russian-language minority interests, as they were the constituency involved 
in and electorally supporting those conducting the drafting of the law. However, as 
foreseen by the Venice Commission and the Ukrainian expert critics of the draft law, 
other language minorities had more difficulty clearing the ten-percent threshold for 
recognition of their “regional languages”; only three villages and one oblast managed to 
recognize other minority languages during the first months of implementation. Since the 
law went into implementation, Ukraine has undergone regime change, motivated in part 
by continuing opposition to the law, often articulated as opposition to the drafting 
irregularities and access of Russian interests to the drafting process. Civil society factions 
participating in the protests that led to the fall of Yanukovych’s Administration and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 For an open letter from many of them, see 67 civil society organizations arguments 
urging MPs not to vote for the bill "On the Principles of State Language Policy.” (July 2, 
2012). Kyiv: Maidan. 
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Government called for repeal of the law, and opposition factions introduced a draft law to 
accomplish this, passing it with no debate (a move seen by many international observers 
as anti-democratic and threatening to language minorities433). The vote sparked further 
protests that led to the Crimea crisis (and annexation of Crimea by Russia). Acting 
President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the repeal law on February 28, 2014, and assigned 
a working group to draft a new law. 
Conclusion 
As legislation drafting processes fall further along the continuum of 
decentralization, they can exert independent and varying effects on legislation and on the 
responsiveness of legislation to various interests. In consensus-based drafting in Estonia, 
the input of peak associations, experts, and affected minority stakeholders is included in 
the policy formulation, research, technical drafting and assessment stages of legislation 
development. As the cases analyzed here demonstrate, this can have the effect of 
balancing the responsiveness of legislation to competing interests and producing coherent 
legislation regarded as high in quality due to its predictability, clarity, and efficiency. 
This has been case for religious minorities in Estonia, which have received registration 
and its accompanying legal personality and tax-exempt status even when they do not 
belong to the Estonian Council of Churches (indeed, even if they are non-Christian 
minority faiths such as the indigenous religions or humanism). One potential difficulty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 See, for example, OSCE. (2014). Restraint, responsibility and dialogue needed in 
Ukraine, including Crimea, says OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The 
Hague: OSCE. 
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for consensus-based drafting is seen in the example of legislation governing language 
minorities, however, as minorities that are legally excluded from participating in drafting 
commissions or other forms of consultation may fail to see their interests reflected 
adequately in the resulting legislation. 
The Ukrainian example of pluralist drafting, especially at the fragmented extreme, 
demonstrates the potential for the drafting process to produce legislation responsive only 
to the concerns of elite, foreign, and constituency interests associated with those who 
develop the legislation. In this case, neither majority Ukrainian speakers nor minority-
language speakers of languages other than Russian saw their interests enshrined in the 
resulting legislation. As subsequent events have demonstrated, however, the perceived 
unfairness of this mode of drafting, and its tendency to ignore expertise and widespread 
input, can result in opposition, in protest, and even in the undermining of the regime, 
party, faction, or institution that undertakes it. 
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CHAPTER TEN: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
Introduction 
 
Do institutions such as the legislation drafting process matter? In the grand 
scheme of things, can these obscure and largely technocratic processes have any effect on 
the larger questions that have long concerned political scientists, legal scholars, 
democratic reformers, and development practitioners? It makes intuitive sense that the 
means by which legislation is drafted will affect its responsiveness, giving voice to those 
who participated in crafting its details, perhaps ignoring those who did not, and the 
preceding case studies have provided evidence for this kind of responsiveness. But do 
institutional rules generally, and the features of the drafting process specifically, have any 
effect on the quality of democracy?  
The quality of democracy has been linked to the question of whether mutually 
consenting minorities or a majority should control the decision-making process. Riker434 
has alluded to this continuum in the theory of democracy. Lijphart points to the two ends 
of the spectrum by differentiating between majoritarian and consensus democracies.435 At 
the two poles, democracies have “institutionalized decision-making procedures which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434  Riker, W. H. (1983). Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: Freeman. 435	  Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus 
government in twenty-one countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart, A. 
(1991). Majority rule in theory and practice: The tenacity of a flawed paradigm. 
International Social Science Journal, 43(3), 483-93. Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of 
Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: 
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either assist or constrain majority rule.”436 Dahl argues that majoritarian systems are more 
democratic.437 Conversely, Kaiser posits that consensus or “negotiation”-based systems 
(especially the consociational systems Lijphart describes) offer the “protection of vital 
minority interests by mutual veto rights.”438 In this view, negotiation systems are more 
democratic.439  
This chapter will assess whether the structure of institutional systems affects the 
quality of democracy. Are institutional systems with relatively more veto points 
associated with higher levels of democracy, and consequently, are negotiation (or 
consensus-based) systems associated with a higher quality of democracy? In this 
comparative analysis of 118 countries, I find that consensus-based systems are associated 
with higher quality of democracy. Following this analysis, I further assess how legislation 
drafting processes specifically affect the quality of democracy in the sixteen Central and 
East European countries for which data are available, and present preliminary evidence 
that more consensus-based legislation drafting processes are associated with a higher 
quality of democracy.  
 Drafting processes that are centralized in the executive under the partisan control 
of a dominant or majority bloc tend to focus on producing legislation that serves majority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Kaiser, A. (1997). Types of democracy: From classical to new institutionalism. 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(4), 419-444. 
437 Dahl, R. A. (1982). Dilemmas of pluralist democracy. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
438  Kaiser, A. (1997). Types of democracy: From classical to new institutionalism. 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9(4), 419-444. 
439 Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in 
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or dominant-faction ends, as the preceding chapters suggest. In more democratic regimes, 
this can translate to coherently drafted legislation responsive to the majority coalition, 
answering responsibly to voters; in more authoritarian regimes, this tends toward 
legalistic totalitarianism (as in Belarus). Fragmented drafting processes, although 
potentially porous to the interests of anyone who “yells loud enough,” are likely to 
produce the text of legislation in less than transparent ways that favor the connected and 
the organized (as in Ukraine) and bypasses the disapproval of experts and affected 
parties. In Eastern and Central Europe, the “heavenly chorus”440 participating in these 
types of drafting processes sings a note that often sounds suspiciously like a choir of 
oligarchs with lawyers, and the legislation produced through these processes is frequently 
regarded by legal experts and practitioners who must use it as discordant in the extreme: 
full of violations of the hierarchy of law, conflicts of law, inequities and inefficiencies, 
unpredictability, loopholes, and impenetrable language tuned to the particular interests of 
the few who have the resources to carry the majority with them. (While hardly ideal from 
many conceptions of democratic norms and legal quality, these inequities are the stuff 
dreams are made of, politically; the “winners” get legislation curiously well-crafted to 
their sometimes opaque preferences, while the “losers” can seize on procedural 
unfairness and irregularities in the drafting process or obvious flaws in the resulting legal 
texts as grounds for contestation).  Consensus-based drafting processes bring expertise 
and formal input from those to be affected by draft legislation into the drafting dialog. 	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  Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of 
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Political actors may have legal authority and political power that permit them to ignore 
this expertise and input, but they often find it in their interests to pay attention, and the 
resulting legislation can prove legally more coherent, substantively more responsive and 
predictable, and politically more enduring when they do. The analysis offers preliminary 
evidence that consensus-based drafting processes are associated with a higher quality of 
democracy. 
 The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 1 offers theory and hypotheses. 
Section 2 discusses variables and data. Section 3 is an analysis of the relationship 
between the number of veto points in institutions and widely used measures of 
democracy, the University of Maryland Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management Polity IV index and the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties indices. This section provides evidence about whether greater numbers of veto 
points in a system are associated with a higher quality of democracy in the nation. This is 
followed by an assessment of the effects of drafting processes on the quality of 
democracy, using new data. 
Using Veto Points Theory to Assess Democracies 
The level or quality of democracy has been broadly defined as the degree of 
political competition and political participation.441 Dahl further identifies conditions 	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necessary for political competition and political participation to exist:  the right of 
citizens to formulate and signify preferences and to “have preferences weighted equally 
in conduct of government.”442 These conditions require freedom of assembly and 
expression, a free press, the right to vote and compete in free and fair elections, and 
institutions that translate preferences into government policy.443 It should be noted that 
the quality of democracy is related to but still distinct from the concepts of political 
stability and democratization,444 concepts that are beyond the scope of this study. 
A number of theories have identified factors that might contribute to the level of 
political rights and civil liberties.  In the tradition of Max Weber, Lipset445 and 
Burkhart446 theorized that a large proportion of Protestant citizens in a nation contributes 
to a high level of democracy, perhaps because the individualist “Protestant work ethic” 
accords with democratic ideals. In the same vein, other studies have hypothesized that 
civic culture contributes to the quality of democracy.447 However, Muller and Seligson 
found that only one element of civic culture—a widespread “support for gradual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Bollen, K. A., & Jackman, R. W. (1989). Democracy, stability, and dichotomies. 
American Sociological Review, 54(4), 612-621.	  
445 Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy. American Political Science 
Review, 53, 69-105. 446	  Burkhart, R. E. (1997). Comparative democracy and income distribution: Shape and 
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reform”—had any effect on the quality of democracy,448 and Jackman and Miller and 
Roy found no evidence that any aspect of political culture affected the quality of 
democracy.449  Socioeconomic conditions have been linked to democratization and 
stability of democracy,450 but less clear connections exist between these conditions and 
the level or quality of democracy.451  Somewhat controversially, Burkhart has written, 
“Former British colonies appear to be better prepared to assume the democratic 
mantle…with Britain putting in place representative governmental procedures that gained 
acceptance from the native population”452; the empirical evidence in past studies seems to 
support this claim. However, this also appears to be a factor affecting democratization 
and stability rather than democratic quality.  Finally, ethnic heterogeneity has repeatedly 
been shown to have negative effects on the quality of democracy, the level of political 
rights and civil liberties.453 
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of causal relationships. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 635-652.	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  Jackman, R. W., & Miller, R. A. (1996). A renaissance of political culture? American 
Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 632-659. Le Roy, M. K. (1995). Participation, size, 
and democracy: Bridging the gap between citizens and the Swedish state. Comparative 
Politics, 27(3), 297-316.	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  Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1995). Economic determinants of democracy. 
American Sociological Review, 60, 805-821.	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  Ibid.	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  Vanhanen, T. (1990), The process of democratization: A comparative 
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Following previous research, then, while controlling for ethnic heterogeneity, 
British influence, war, Protestant majority, education, and per capita income, this study 
first investigates whether the quality of democracy is affected by the number of actors 
empowered to exercise veto power in a political system. McCarty and others have 
demonstrated the importance of veto power.454 Tsebelis has developed extensively the 
theory of “veto players,” which are “specified in a country by the constitution…or by the 
political system” and “whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo.”455 
He predicts and demonstrates empirically that increasing the number of veto players 
increases policy stability. Finally, he identifies specific institutional and partisan features 
that create opportunities for veto players to exercise their veto powers, including the 
following: 
1. Regime style.  Presidential regimes often have more veto players than 
parliamentary or semi-presidential regimes, since the president and a separate 
legislature must agree to a change in the status quo.456 A totalitarian regime might 
have only one veto player —the dictator.457 	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(1985), Economic and noneconomic determinants of political democracy in the 1960s, 
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Journal of Political Science, 44, 506-522.	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  Tsebelis, G. (1995), Decisionmaking in political systems: Veto players in 
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2. Party system. In parliamentary systems, single-party governments will have only 
one veto player, since the majority party can set the agenda and carry its 
program.458  Multi-party governments formed with a minimum winning coalition 
will possess as many veto players as there are parties in government, since each of 
these can assert control of the agenda.459  This is especially true when the cabinet 
must collectively approve a confidence vote.460 
3. Referendum. The use of a referendum adds a veto player, the public, to the 
existing number of veto players.461 
4. A federal structure. Federal systems usually include at least one of the following, 
each of which adds a veto player: 
• Bicameralism. If the legislature has two houses with power to 
veto, both count as veto players.462 
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Princeton University Press.	  
458 Ibid. 
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• Qualified Majorities. Requiring a “supermajority” gives veto 
power to a minority.463 
5. Judicial review. If the judiciary has power to overturn legislation or veto it before 
it is submitted for legislative or presidential approval, a judicial veto player 
exists.464 
Although Strøm and Swindle suggest that there are players that do not possess 
veto power but do strongly influence the outcome,465 these players are outside the scope 
of the larger cross-national analysis in the first part of this study because they do not 
possess formal, institutional control of policy outcomes.466  I begin from the premise that 
the level of democracy is affected by the number of actors formally empowered to 
exercise veto power, since these actors can represent a wide array of minority interests, 
thus contributing to political participation and political competition. 
H1:  There will be a positive relationship between the number of actors 
empowered to exercise veto power in a polity and the nation’s level of democracy. 
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Many studies have applied the dichotomous labels “democracy” and “autocracy” 
to polities, suggesting that nations in the two categories are not comparable to one 
another.467  However, Dahl rated the level of democracy in 114 nations; non-democracies 
received the lowest rating, indicating that these nations had the lowest level of 
democracy.468  Tsebelis argues “that most of the differences between regimes discussed 
in the traditional literature can be studied as differences in the number, ideological 
distances, preferences, and institutional powers of the agenda setters.”469 Bollen and 
Jackman state that  
in quantitative empirical analyses including societies with diverse levels of 
 political inequality, a simple dichotomous distinction between democratic and 
 nondemocratic is hard to justify…We share [Cutright’s] premise that political 
 democracy is a continuous concept and that our measures should reflect 
 this…Democracy is always a matter of degree.470  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  467	  Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man: The social bases of politics. New York: Anchor. 
Rustow, D. (1967). A world of nations: Problems of political modernization. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution. Hewitt, C. (1977). The effects of political democracy and 
social democracy on equality in industrial societies: A cross-national comparison. 
American Sociological Review, 42, 450-464. Muller, E. N. (1988). Democracy, economic 
development, and income inequality. American Sociological Review, 53, 50-68.	  468	  Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.	  469	  Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 67.	  470	  Bollen, K. A., & Jackman, R. W. (1989). Democracy, stability, and dichotomies. 
American Sociological Review, 54(4), 612-621.	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
324 
In fact, to exclude nondemocracies from this analysis would be to select cases on the 
basis of the dependent variable.471 Therefore, all cases for which data are available should 
be included in the analysis of the first hypothesis. 
 This study seeks to demonstrate whether majoritarian or consensus systems are 
associated with higher quality of democracy. Kaiser theorizes that, in contrast to a 
majoritarian democracy, a negotiation democracy has relatively more “veto points”—
mechanisms in the institutional design that allow participants to stop the consideration, 
passage, or implementation of a new policy.472 In sum, one interpretation of veto points 
theory holds that the more veto points a political system has, the farther along the 
continuum toward consensual or negotiation-based democracy the nation is.  Advocates 
of negotiation or consensus government predict that such systems contribute to a greater 
quality of democracy.473 If this is true, there should be a positive relationship between the 
number of veto points in a system and existing measures of democracy.  Conversely, 
advocates of majoritarian systems argue that such systems contribute to a greater quality 
of democracy, although they are identified with relatively less veto points.474  If this is 
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true, there should be a negative relationship between the number of veto points in a 
system and existing measures of democracy.  
H2: In established democracies, political systems that have relatively more veto 
points will have a greater quality of democracy. 
As a test of this hypothesis, this study will analyze the subset of nations classified 
as “Free” by Freedom House; in other words, only established democracies will be 
considered in the second stage of tests. Despite their objection to the use of a 
dichotomous democracy/autocracy variable, Bollen and Jackman concede “we may label 
nations as democratic to isolate countries with the highest levels of political democracy 
for more intensive study.”475 
Finally, I analyze the subset of Central and East European cases for which data 
are available concerning the effects of the legislation drafting process on quality of 
democracy. Here, I follow Strøm and Swindle in testing the effects of institutional 
“players” in the drafting process who, although they cannot formally veto decisions, 
possess an institutional role from which they can exert a strong influence on the 
outcome.476 Here again, following Kaiser477 and the concepts described in Chapter 2, I 
suggest that the more of these points a drafting process has, the farther along the 	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continuum toward a consensus or negotiation-based system it is. If Lijphart and others 
who argue that consensus-based systems have a higher quality of democracy are correct, 
consensus-based drafting systems should be associated with a higher level of democracy. 
H3: In Central and East European transitional states, states whose legislation 
drafting processes are relatively more consensus-based will have a greater quality of 
democracy. 
Data and Variables 
The dependent variable is the quality of democracy. The concept of a nation’s 
level of democracy will be defined as the rating that the nation receives on two widely 
used indices of democracy, based on data collected a decade after transition:   
1. The University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management Polity IV 2001 index (-10 to 10) and  
2. The Freedom House World Democracy Audit 2001 (1-7). 
Although these indices are imperfect (both are categorical), they are commonly used by 
scholars whose example will be followed in this paper.478 These scores will be used as 
successive alternate measures of the quality of democracy, not averaged or aggregated.  
 The Polity IV scores are figured by adding Autocracy scores (-10 to 0) to 
Democracy scores (0 to 10); these data are assembled annually.  The Democracy score is 
additive and comprised of variables shown in Table 10.1. 
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1) Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (Election = 2; Transitional  
= 1) 
2) Openness of Executive Recruitment (Dual/Election = 1; Election = 1) 
3) Constraint on the Chief Executive (Executive parity or subordination =  
4; Intermediate category=3; substantial limitations=2; intermediate 
category=1) 
4) Competitiveness of Political Participation (Competitive = 3;  
Transitional = 2) 
Table 10.1 Components of the Polity Democracy Score (adapted479) 
 
The Autocracy score is comprised of the component variables shown in Table 10.2. 
These scores are subtracted from zero. 
 
1) Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (Selection = 2) 
2) Openness of Executive Recruitment (Closed = 1; Dual/designation = 1) 
3) Constraints on the Chief Executive (Unlimited authority = 3;  
intermediate category  = 2; Slight to moderate limitations = 1) 
4) Regulation of Participation (Restricted = 2; Factional/restricted = 1) 
5) Competitiveness of Participation (Suppressed = 2; Restricted =1). 
Table 10.2 Components of the Polity Autocracy Score (adapted480) 	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 Because the Executive Constraints component variable in the Polity IV index is 
closely related to the concept of veto points, this study subtracts the Executive 
Constraints variable scores from the total and includes a smaller range of scores (-7 to 6).  
The subtraction of this component has an additional benefit: it answers Gleditsch and 
Ward’s criticism of the Polity data for the weight assigned to executive constraints.481 A 
second threat to the validity of this study is the question of whether the Polity IV 
variables adequately operationalize the concept of democracy. Munck and Verkuilen 
have criticized the aggregation scheme and the lack of emphasis on political 
participation.482 For this reason, the Freedom House World Democracy Audit Political 
Rights index provides an important second test for the hypothesis. 
 The World Democracy Audit Political Rights index measures the degree to which 
citizens may exercise political rights on a scale that ranges from 1 (high level of freedom 
to exercise political rights) to 7 (absence of freedom to exercise political rights).  The 
index includes component variables shown in Table 10.3; these data are assembled 
annually. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Ibid. 481	  Ibid.	  482	  Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: 
Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5-34.	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
329 
 
1) Election of the executive in free and fair elections 
2) Election of legislative representatives in free and fair elections 
3) Fair electoral laws, campaigning opportunities, and tabulation of ballots 
4) Real power residing in the elected officials 
5) The right to create competing/opposition parties 
6) The existence of an opposition 
7) Freedom from military domination and foreign imperialism 
8) Self-determination or participation for minorities 
Table 10.3 Components of the Freedom House Political Rights index (adapted from Freedom House, 2001) 
 
 This source is also problematic, since the coding of component variables is not 
available.  Freedom House does not specify the steps that have been taken to insure the 
reliability of the coding, nor have the sources of the data been cited.  This presents 
reliability problems and problems with internal validity.  A more difficult problem with 
the validity of this study is the fact that the fifth and sixth of the component variables are 
related (though not identical) to the idea of veto points, again raising the issue of 
endogeneity. These similarities include the extent to which citizens can “endow their 
freely elected representatives with real power,” the presence of a “significant opposition 
vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase 
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its support or gain power through elections.”483 However, there is not a clear way to 
separate these variables from the rest, since the components are not recorded separately.  
A final difficulty with the Freedom House scores is that they include a number of 
socioeconomic characteristics and “freedom from war”—attributes “which are more 
fruitfully seen as attributes of some other concept”484 and for which this study controls.  
Nevertheless, this index is a widely used measure of the quality of democracy, and 
ratings are available for all nations included in this study. 
In order to capture a second aspect of the quality of democracy, the Freedom 
House Civil Liberties scores will also be used.  This index includes component variables 
shown in Table 10.4. 
 
1) Free cultural expression 
2) Free religious institutions and religious expression 
3) Freedom of assembly and demonstration 
4) Free trade unions and professional and private organizations 
5) An independent judiciary 
6)  Rule of law, equality before the law, and civilian control 
7) Protection from unjustified imprisonment and from torture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  483	  Freedom House. (2013). World democracy audit. 
http://www.worldaudit.org/polrights.htm	  484	  Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: 
Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5-34.	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8) Freedom from extreme indifference and corruption 
9) Open public and private discussion 
10) Personal autonomy in travel, choice of residence, and employment 
11) Security of property rights 
12) Personal freedom including gender equality, choice of marriage  
partners, and size of family 
13) Equality of opportunity and freedom from exploitation by or  
dependency on landlords, bureaucrats, etc.  
Table 10.4 Components of the Freedom House Civil Liberties score (adapted from Freedom House, 2001) 
 
Like the Political Rights index, the Civil Liberties index does not have clearly 
defined coding criteria or controls for coding reliability, and some components may be 
redundant or unrelated to the concepts being measured,485 but it is widely used, and 
ratings are available for all nations included in the study. 
The independent variable of interest is the number of veto points. The number of 
veto points has been assessed by assigning to each polity points as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  485	  Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: 
Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5-34.	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Regime/Party Veto Points486 
• Add one if there is a chief executive. 
• Add one if the chief executive is competitively elected. 
• Add one if the opposition controls the legislature. 
In presidential systems: 
• Add one for each chamber of the legislature. If the president’s party has a 
majority in the lower house AND a closed list system is in effect, no point is 
added, since these conditions indicate stronger presidential control of the party, 
and therefore of the legislature. 
• Add one for each party coded as allied with the president’s party and which has 
an ideological (left-right-center) orientation closer to that of the main opposition 
party than to that of the president’s party. 
In parliamentary systems: 
• Add one for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are 
needed to maintain a majority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Regime and party data are drawn from the World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, T., & et al. [2001], New tools and new tests in comparative 
political economy: The database of political institutions [dataset]), from the “Checks” 
component. The coding criteria are adapted from Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto players: How 
political institutions work, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and from the Variable 
Descriptions Manual (Beck et al., 2001). 
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• Add one for every party in the government coalition that has a position on 
economic issues (right-left-center) closer to the largest opposition party than to 
the party of the executive. 
 In parliamentary systems, the prime minister’s party is not counted as a check if 
 there is a closed rule in place – the prime minister is presumed in this case to 
 control the party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
334 
Referendum Veto Points487 
• Add one for use of a referendum. 
Federal Veto Points488 
• Add one for an upper house in the legislature, the members of which represent 
sub-national units. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487Coding of referendum veto points is based on analysis of national constitutions and the 
use of at least one national referendum between 1975 and 2000. English translations of 
constitutions in effect in 2000 were obtained through International Constitutional Law 
(ICL).  Since it is possible that constitutional requirements may not represent political 
realities in all cases, or that some referenda are not formally mandated by the 
constitution, the use of a national referendum at least once within the 25 previous years 
served as an arbitrary but reasonable confirmation that a popular referendum could 
realistically constitute a veto point; this period has been used by LeDuc (2002, 
Referendums and initiatives: The politics of direct democracy, in L. LeDuc, & et al. 
(Eds.), Comparing democracies 2, London: SAGE Publications) in a study of referenda.  
Not all referenda are legally binding, raising the question of whether such referenda 
create additional veto points. As LeDuc (2002) observes, however, “legally binding or 
not, governments…would be ill advised to ignore a formal vote of their citizens on an 
important public issue.  Hence, this distinction in practice may not be as important as it 
once seemed to be.”  
488Upper house representation data are from the World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, et al., 2001).  Since qualified majorities are usually constitutionally 
specified for certain policy categories, this type of veto point is more relevant to the study 
of issue-specific policy quality and stability; for a treatment of this subject, see Tsebelis 
(2002). 
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Judicial Veto Points489 
• Add one if the judiciary are empowered to exercise review and veto of legislative 
decisions.  
Supranational Veto Points490 
• Add one if supranational entities are empowered to exercise veto power over the 
national regime’s attempts to change the status quo. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) have devised a formula by which a “Judicial Power 
Score” may be derived, a score that takes into account whether judicial decisions can be 
overturned, whether the constitutional court may exercise a priori review, the term of 
office for judges relative to other political actors, the selection process for judges, the 
process by which court procedures are established, and the conditions of judicial removal.  
However, these data are available only for 20 post-communist nations. Numerous other 
studies offer similarly limited data (Cappeletti, 1988; Clark, 1975; Hartwig, 1992; 
Melone, 1997; Sabaliunas, 1996; Schwartz, 1998; Tate, 1993; Utter, 1994).  This study 
uses data on the existence of judicial review—either consultative and preventive or 
specific and a posteriori— compiled by Mavčič (2004); extent of judicial power is not 
coded. 
490 As the war in Iraq demonstrates, the United Nations does not necessarily constitute a 
veto point for national actors (in this case, neither Iraq nor the United States was 
constrained by the United Nations).  However, the European Union (EU) does possess 
veto power over changes in the status quo by national members.  EU members therefore 
have been assigned an additional veto point.  NATO members recently negotiated an 
agreement that would allow for the expulsion of member states for violations of basic 
democratic norms (Associated Press, May 9, 2003).  Since expulsion from NATO would 
probably be considered an unduly high cost for member states, implementation of this 
rule would probably give NATO members an additional veto point, at least for the 
purposes of this study of the quality of democracy. 
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Legislation Drafting Process Veto Points491 
For research to support drafting: 
• Add one if legislation must be supported by ministry research. 
• Add one if legislation must be supported by legislative staff research. 
For public input to the drafting process: 
• Add one if notice and comment procedures or public hearing procedures are used. 
• Add one if surveys or commissions of experts and affected parties are used. 
For technical legal drafting: 
• Add one if the legislature has professional technical legal drafting capacity. 
For professional, non-partisan assessment of the quality (and impact): 
• Add one if legislation must be assessed by executive staff. 
• Add one if legislation must be assessed by legislative staff. 
• Add one if legislation is subject to ex ante judicial review. 
 This study also controls for ethnic heterogeneity using the Index of Ethnic 
Heterogeneity,492 for the presence of war or civil strife, for British rule, for religion 
(majority Protestant), and for income per capita. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 As noted above, these “veto points” are not strong veto points as described by Tsebelis 
(2002), but are instead players who can exert a strong influence on the outcome and 
whose veto may represent a serious political obstacle (Strøm and Swindle 2002). 
Following Kaiser’s (1997) logic, these points might more precisely be described as 
“negotiation points.” Due to this conceptual difference, the effects of these institutions 
are tested in a separate analysis of the sixteen countries for which data are available.  
492 Although Vanhanen’s (1999) work has been controversial, this index is cited by Neto 
and Cox (1997).  The advantages of this index are its comprehensiveness (182 nations 
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Effect of Veto Points on Existing Measures of Democracy 
 Due to the heterogeneity of national governments and the related dangers of a 
small-N study, this study begins with the universe of polities for which both Polity IV and 
World Democracy Audit data are available (118 total). All cases have been used in the test 
of the first hypothesis, regardless of whether they are commonly classified as democracies or 
autocracies, in order to avoid selection on the basis of the dependent variable.493  For each 
case, veto points were assessed on the scale outlined above.  
A positive correlation between the number of veto points and the nation’s rating 
on the Polity IV index is expected by and would lend tentative support to the hypothesis, 
that the number of veto points in a system is associated with the nation’s level of 
democracy. This correlation being found, I specify	  an	  empirical	  model	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy: 
 
Di  = b0 + b1 Vi + b2Wi + b3 Ii + b4 Ei + b5Bi + b6 Hi + ei 
where, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surveyed) and the fact that it accounts for racial, linguistic, and religious components of 
ethnicity.  For each of these three categories, a percentage of the total population is 
figured for the largest group; these three scores are added and inverted (to convert the 
score to a measure of heterogeneity rather than homogeneity).  A smaller dataset (Neto 
and Cox 1997) is available using Taagepera and Shugart’s (1989) formula to calculate the 
effective number of ethnic groups, as suggested by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994).  
When regressions were run using the data for this subset of observations, the results for 
the ethnic heterogeneity variable were similar to results based on the Vanhanen index. 493	  Geddes, B. (1990). How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection 
bias in comparative politics. Political Analysis, 2, 131-150.	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D = quality of democracy 
V = veto points 
W = war 
I = per capita income 
E = education 
B = British colony/mandate/protectorate 
H = ethnic heterogeneity 
 
I estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS). A strong positive effect is 
found on quality of democracy (Adjusted Polity 4 measure); and the result is highly 
statistically significant (p<.001).  The results are shown in Table 10.5. 
Dependent Variable: Adjusted Polity 
Score 
Independent Variables 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Veto Points  1.443*** 0.158 
War/Civil Strife  1.016 0.842 
Per capita income  0.000 0.000 
Education  0.238 0.135 
British colony/mandate/ protectorate  1.037 0.725 
Ethnic Heterogeneity -0.007 0.009 
Constant -7.688 1.612 
N of Obs.= 80 
Regression performed using Stata 8.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 10.5 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Quality of Democracy 
 
 Since an increasing score on the Freedom House Political Rights index represents 
a decreasing quality of democracy, a negative relationship between the number of veto 
points and the nation’s rating on the Political Rights Index is expected by and would lend 
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support to the first hypothesis. When OLS is used to control for ethnic heterogeneity, 
war, education, per capita income, and British influence, a statistically significant 
negative relationship is found between veto points and the quality of democracy 
(Freedom House Political Rights measure). Education level also exerts a statistically 
significant positive effect on the quality of democracy. The results are shown in Table 
10.6. 
Dependent Variable: Political Rights 
Score 
Independent Variables 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Veto Points -0.619*** 0.754 
War/Civil Strife  0.010 0.392 
British colony/mandate/ protectorate -0.582 0.345 
Education -0.228** 0.064 
Per capita income -0.000 0.000 
Ethnic Heterogeneity  0.007 0.005 
Constant  8.931 0.763 
N of Obs.= 83 
Regression performed using Stata 8.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 10.6 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Quality of Democracy 
 
Since an increasing score on the Freedom House Civil Liberties index represents 
a decreasing quality of democracy, a negative correlation between the number of veto 
points and the nation’s rating on the Civil Liberties Index is expected by and would lend 
support to the first hypothesis. When OLS is used to control for competing hypotheses, as 
expected, a statistically significant negative relationship is found between veto points and 
the quality of democracy (Freedom House Civil Liberties measure). Education, income, 
and ethnic heterogeneity also exert a statistically significant effect (again, it should be 
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noted that the dependent variable is coded such that a negative effect would be expected 
for income and education, and a negative effect for ethnic heterogeneity). The results are 
shown in Table 10.7. 
Dependent Variable: Civil Liberties 
Score 
Independent Variables 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Veto Points -0.471*** 0.057 
War/Civil Strife -0.001 0.298 
Education -0.175** 0.049 
Per capita income -0.000* 0.000 
British colony/mandate/ protectorate -0.589 0.263 
Ethnic Heterogeneity  0.010** 0.004 
Constant  8.041 0.581 
N of Obs.= 83 
Regression performed using Stata 8.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 10.7 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Quality of Democracy 
 
These results lend support to the hypothesis that the number of veto points is 
positively related to the quality of democracy, and that consensual systems are likely to 
have higher quality of democracy than more majoritarian systems. 
In order to provide an additional test for the second hypothesis—whether within 
established democracies a system that is relatively more consensual will have a greater 
quality of democracy— OLS models were tested for the subset of nations labeled “Free” 
by Freedom House. Due to the low number of observations, a series of model 
specifications was estimated (results are shown just for the effect of veto points; 
additional specifications found no significant effect of the other variables, probably in 
part due to the small sample size, and the effect of veto points was similar and similarly 
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significant). A relationship between the number of veto points and the Polity IV score is 
positive but only moderately statistically significant. The results are shown in Table 10.8. 
Dependent Variable: Polity IV Score 
Independent Variables 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Veto Points 0.469* 0.188 
Constant 6.077 1.129 
N of Obs.= 19 
Regression performed using Stata 8.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Table 10.8 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Quality of Democracy (cases categorized as “Free”) 
 
The number of veto points and the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties scores are weakly correlated for the nations labeled “Free,” and the results of 
regression are statistically insignificant.  These results are possibly a function of the small 
N, and of the fact that there is very little variance in the dependent variable when case 
selection is limited in this way. These tests lend little additional support to the second 
hypothesis. 
 To evaluate the third hypothesis, the effect of (weak) veto points in the legislation 
drafting process on the quality of democracy is tested. Due to the small N, a series of 
model specifications was estimated, and since the results were similar, the results shown 
are for a restricted model controlling only for war and ethnic heterogeneity.494  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  494	  Tests of models including only the effect of veto points in the legislation drafting 
process on quality of democracy produced similar coefficients and similar levels of 
significance. The other variables did not have a statistically significant effect in any 
specification. For these tests, due to missing data in the Vanhanen index, average 
fractionalization data (Alesina et al., 2003) described in Chapter 2 are used. British 
colonial experience is obviously omitted from all specifications for Central and East 
European data.	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I specify an empirical model of the level of democracy as follows: 
 
Di  = b0 + b1 Vi + b2Wi + b3 Hi + ei 
where, 
D = quality of democracy 
V = veto points 
W = war 
H = ethnic heterogeneity 
 
I estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS). As anticipated, the number of 
veto points in the legislation drafting process had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on quality of democracy in tests using the Polity 4 measure of quality of 
democracy, and a negative and significant effect on quality of democracy in tests using 
the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties measures, lending support to the 
hypothesis that more consensus-based drafting processes are associated with higher levels 
of democracy. The results are shown in Table 10.9. 
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Quality of 
Democracy:  
Adjusted Polity 4 
Score 
Quality of 
Democracy: 
Political Rights 
Score 
Quality of 
Democracy:  
Civil Liberties 
Score 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients 
 
Coefficients 
 
Coefficients 
 
Veto Points in 
Drafting Process 
0.896* 
(0.358) 
-0.567** 
(0.179) 
-0.473  
(0.154) 
War 1.341 
(2.460 
2.812* 
(1.230) 
2.014  
(1.059) 
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity 
-6.266 
(4.846) 
1.912 
(2.260) 
2.212  
(1.945) 
Constant 1.127 
(2.799) 
4.425 
(1.352) 
4.662  
(1.164) 
N. of Obs. 14 16 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 10.9 OLS Analysis of the Determinants of Quality of Democracy 
 
 Although these preliminary tests of H3 rests on a small-N analysis due to the 
limited number of countries for which legislation drafting process data are available, they 
offer tantalizing initial evidence that legislation drafting processes are linked to the level 
of democracy in a country. Specifically, these results suggest that more consensus-based 
legislation drafting processes are associated with a higher level of democracy. As more 
data become available, further and more sophisticated tests will allow for a more 
thorough investigation of this relationship.  
Conclusion 
 
 Veto points scores measure the number of players formally authorized to veto a 
policy’s passage or implementation and the extent to which political bargaining is 
required for a change in the status quo, while the Polity IV index and the World 
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Democracy Audit indices measure the quality of democracy—the extent of political 
competition and participation in polities.  The relationship found between the number of 
veto points in a political system and the polity’s score on existing indices of democracy 
lends support to the theory that higher numbers of veto points are associated with greater 
quality of democracy.  This in turn provides tantalizing empirical evidence that consensus 
systems may indeed contribute to the quality of democracy, and specifically, that 
consensus drafting processes can make part of this contribution.  If confirmed by further 
research, this has practical significance for institutional designers.  However, although 
institutional design offers a practical process through which the quality of democracy can 
be improved, changes in institutional rules (and specifically in the drafting process) can 
by no means be asserted as the sole key to improvement.   
 As additional data are assembled and validated, future research might usefully 
examine what types of veto points most significantly relate to quality of democracy.  This 
might be carried out in a series of cross-sectional studies comparing polities with a 
certain type of veto point to those without that type (e.g., federal versus unitary systems; 
centralized drafting processes versus consensus drafting processes), or in a panel study of 
polities that have recently adopted a new type of veto point. Additionally, more 
sophisticated measures of (weak) veto points (or negotiation players) in the legislation 
drafting process, especially over time, along with data from additional regions and 
countries, would allow for a more complete and robust analysis of these relationships.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION 
How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  to	  change	  the	  world?	  
	  
Twenty-­‐one	  years	  and	  nine	  months.495	  
	  
	  
 Over twenty years after the transitions from communist rule, former Soviet and 
Eastern bloc states, including Belarus, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine, have diverged 
widely in their choices of legislation drafting processes. As a generation that was born 
after those transitions comes of age, they take their places in a political history that has 
been unfolding for centuries, and around them they find traces of institutions that persist, 
the legacies of past policies, and the innovations that their parents and grandparents 
borrowed from their neighbors. But they also take their places in a context in which the 
structure of factional conflict continues to evolve, shaping the incentives that drive the 
development of political institutions, including the choice of drafting process. In Belarus, 
some of these students are engaged in a quiet discourse of opposition to an authoritarian 
regime, a regime that centrally drafts the legislation that governs them, that legalizes 
abuses and legitimizes arbitrary governance with law. In Estonia and in Poland, 
legislation drafting processes depend on expertise and public input and debate, and to the 
extent that the transition generation engages these processes, they have the opportunity to 
shape not just the institutions but also the text of the legislation that governs them. In 
Ukraine, where the drafting process, like the larger legislative and political processes, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 A question and answer posed by an anonymous Ukrainian legal expert in a round table 
discussion. 
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fragmented, and where legislation is often unclear and conflicts of law and loopholes 
carve out benefits for some and constrain others, young Ukrainians have found grounds 
for dissent and for protest that has upended the structure of factional conflict once more, 
setting the evolution of political institutions in motion again. 
A Diversity of Legislation Drafting Processes 
 Legislation drafting processes comprise five major functions – formulating the 
policy concept, providing research to support development of the draft, incorporating 
public input, technical legal drafting, and assessing draft legislation for quality (and 
impact) – and they carry out these functions in relatively more centralized or more 
fragmented ways. Within the three types of drafting process (centralized, consensus-
based, fragmented/pluralist) is further variation; Estonia’s legislation drafting is 
increasingly coordinated through its Ministry of Justice, while in Poland the drafting 
process plays out across the ministries and the parliament in a coherent but not as 
coordinated way. In Ukraine, competition for control of various parts of the drafting 
process scatters across the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, the 
Verkhovna Rada and its parties, committees, and factions, as well as factions in society.  
 This variation exists at a more nuanced level, too, within each of the five 
functions. In some polities, policy formulation is formal and produces clear policy 
concept documents, often in the executive, which might even produce a legislative 
agenda that governs the priority of drafting projects. At the other extreme, policy 
formulation may be an afterthought, as the urge to “do something” results in technical 
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legal drafting of text that enshrines half-baked policy proposals in legalese and secures 
them against more considered research, input, or analysis. Between these extremes, 
consensus-based policy formulation processes distribute responsibility for formulating 
policy across the executive and the legislative branches, but in both, legislation 
developers and legal drafters start from a clearly defined policy document that limits their 
discretion and guides their drafting choices under a politically responsible principal. 
 Research to support drafting similarly falls across a continuum. Many developing 
and transitional polities must forego this function altogether due a lack of professional 
staff with expertise to support them, while others might have access to professional 
research but lack specialists in policy analysis who can apply scholarly work to the task 
of developing effective legislation. In some cases this deficiency is hardly even noticed, 
as the drafting process foregoes policy formulation and research altogether and goes 
straight to technical legal drafting. As in Belarus, some polities consolidate the research 
function in the Administration or in Cabinet ministries. Others provide the ministries and 
the parliament with deep research capacity, employing and organizing research staff in 
coherent ways. In the most fragmented or pluralist processes, research is supplied not just 
by ministry staff, parliamentary services, and universities affiliated with the state, but 
also by organized interests and social factions, and sometimes by extranational entities.  
 Technical legal drafting is often centralized in the Ministry of Justice, or at least 
overseen by the Ministry of Justice or another executive drafting office. But in consensus 
based systems, various ministry offices and the parliamentary services and committee 
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staff may possess this capacity as well. Toward the more fragmented end of this group, 
some legislatures provide individual MPs with staff to perform technical drafting as well. 
And at the end of the continuum, some polities allow outside factions and organized 
interests to submit draft legislation to an MP or other entity possessing the right of 
initiative.  
 Public input processes in legislation drafting range widely as well. In the most 
centralized systems, decisions about legislation are purely political, made by either 
responsible parties or an authoritarian executive. In these systems, public preference is 
aggregated mostly at the ballot box or the barricades, although notice-and-comment 
procedures often emerge (perhaps in response to a diffusion of democratic norms in less 
centralized processes). The most consensual systems include those to be affected by 
legislation, often along with experts, in drafting commissions or surveys; others require 
broad participation in notice-and-comment procedures through notification of those to be 
affected. Fragmented systems tend to include a diversity of input mechanisms, some 
more transparent than others: online “wiki-government” fora that allow citizens to 
comment on draft legislation line by line, committee hearings, notice-and-comment, and 
lobbying and direct dialog with MPs and ministry officials.  
 Assessment of draft legislation can be highly centralized, as in Belarus, where the 
same office that drafts all legislation also assesses it; centralized assessment of draft 
legislation can also be less caricatured, requiring analysis for legal quality and regulatory 
impact in the ministries. More consensus-based systems situate this capacity not just in 
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the executive ministries but also in the parliamentary services, often requiring assessment 
and certain standards of legal quality before draft legislation can be enacted. In the most 
fragmented systems, as in Ukraine, although the capacity to assess draft legislation may 
exist in many places, assessment procedures are neither coordinated nor compulsory.  
The Origins of Legislation Drafting Processes 
 While some features of the drafting process tend to persist through time and 
transition, in these cases, institutional persistence tends to explain the context in which 
the structure of factional conflict emerges rather than the origins of particular features of 
the drafting process. This finding seems more likely to occur in post-communist 
transitional states, where most of the pre-communist traditions of drafting were set aside 
by communist regimes, often in the wake of war or other traumas that had already 
constituted exongenous shocks to the existing drafting process and its personnel. Even in 
cases where significant elements of the pre-communist drafting process are revived, 
within this study these are often deliberate choices by contemporary framers, officials, 
and legislators to appropriate certain features of the past that serve their interests or 
further their political narratives in the present. When Estonian courts ruled that pre-Soviet 
legislation had force in independent Estonia, or when Poland renamed its parliamentary 
library with its pre-war name, these are examples more of the agency of modern political 
factions situating themselves in a story of continuity with desirable features of the past 
than of the continuity of old political institutions through path dependence. What tends to 
endure for some period of time (a period not yet fixed as many transition-era drafters are 
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still working) across these cases is the mode of technical drafting that lawyers employ in 
creating the text of legislation; the skill to draft legal provisions is highly specialized and 
slow to change, and though many lawyers at transition led the way to reforming the legal 
code and deficiencies in the drafting style, those who were younger at transition have 
adapted more quickly than those who already had sizeable investments in the professional 
skills of the previous regime.  
 The diffusion of institutional innovation also is at work in these cases, but 
examples of diffusion also appear idiosyncratic and often subject to the choice of 
contemporary framers, officials, and legislators rather than to any clear pattern of 
diffusion. Estonia’s borrowed drafting features are from Sweden, Germany, the EU, and 
the Netherlands (to name a few), but resemble very little the US drafting process or those 
of Estonia’s neighbors to the south and east. Poland’s drafting process looks toward 
Poland’s European neighbors rather than toward the US, which provided extensive early 
technical assistance and resources, or toward any state to the east, despite the fact that 
Poland long ruled several of these polities, or toward Russia, despite the fact that Russia 
ruled partitioned Poland. Ukraine, ruled by Poland for much of its history, has a drafting 
process that instead resembles that of its other historical hegemon, Russia, despite the 
fact that Ukraine deliberately broke away from the USSR and distanced itself from 
Russia during transition, a case of two states following a common path rather than 
learning from each other’s post-communist innovations.  
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 Instead, this analysis lends support to the core argument that the structure of 
factional conflict produces the incentives that shape the features of the drafting process. 
Where a conservative political faction dominates at transition and social factions are not 
highly organized or connected, partisan incentives drive the development of centralized 
drafting, as in Belarus. Where balanced conservative and reform/radical factions compete 
in high-magnitude districts at transition, connected to highly organized social factions via 
interactive communication networks, informational incentives drive the development of 
consensus-based legislation drafting, as in Estonia and Poland. And where fragmented 
political factions compete (especially across fragmented political institutions and regional 
or sectional divides) and social faction organization and connectivity are uneven, 
distributional incentives drive the evolution of fragmented or pluralist legislation 
drafting, as in Ukraine. The timing of elections in relation to transition can affect the 
structure of factional conflict and the shape of coalitions during transition: for example, 
elections in Belarus and Ukraine occurred just months before transition, leaving these 
states for a term of several years into the post-Communist era with executives and 
legislatures dominated by conservative factions seated under Communist rule (ten percent 
reform/radicals in Belarus and thirty percent in Ukraine). These findings suggest a 
contribution to theories of legislative organization by demonstrating that the structure of 
factional conflict can help to explain cross-national variation in the incentives 
endogenous to a particular legislature, incentives that previous research has shown to 
affect institutional choice and legislative organization.  
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 One unexpected finding to emerge from these cases is that consensus-based 
legislation drafting does not first arise, as might be anticipated, in the (consensus-
seeking) public-input function of drafting, nor even in the policy formulation function 
where political comity might be expected to cultivate it. Instead, within this sample, these 
negotiation or consensus-driven qualities tend to emerge first in the more technocratic 
features of the drafting process – research to support legislation development and 
assessment of draft legislation. This finding might be a non-generalizable artifact of the 
Soviet-era tolerance for technical skill, and the fact that legislation drafting in post-
communist states tended to start with some research and analysis capacity but not much 
experience in policy formulation (which had been a Communist Party prerogative) or 
public input mechanisms (which had not been used). However, interviews with 
participants in the legislation drafting processes suggests that there might be a deeper 
explanation – that in searching for answers to relatively straightforward analytical 
questions, technocrats sometimes end up asking the people most likely to know: citizens 
and civil society groups, experts and academics. These two characteristics of some 
researchers and analysts working under authoritarian regimes – their apparently non-
threatening scholarly orientation and their curiosity about their work – plausibly may give 
them both the opportunity to gain skill and seniority in the old regime and the impetus to 
seek out public input and expert advice at transition. This suggests that technocratic 
ministry and parliamentary staff can play an important role in shaping the legislation 
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drafting processes – and consequently the legislation – that evolve in their newly 
democratic states.  
The Effects of Legislation Drafting Processes  
 Does it matter? The evidence in these cases suggests that the choice of legislation 
drafting process is an important one with significant effects on the responsiveness of 
legislation, and that it may play a part in determining the quality of democracy. In 
Belarus and in Ukraine, two states with closely shared history and institutions at 
transition, both functioning for most of their transitional years under authoritarian 
communist-successor regimes, the outcomes in legislation could not be more different. 
While Belarus’s Lukashenko has had the opportunity to use a highly centralized drafting 
process to shape legislation governing vulnerable religious minorities, ensuring that every 
executive action taken is precisely legal, regimes in Ukraine have had to craft legislation 
through processes that are fragmented, pluralist, and porous to the interests of numerous 
competing factions. As Yanukovych’s experience demonstrates, using fragmented 
legislation drafting processes to ensure the legality of ongoing special favors for core 
constituencies is a fool’s errand, as the inequities and loopholes and conflicts of law these 
processes produce open up space for contestation and protest. Twenty-one years and nine 
months after transition, a generation raised in independent Ukraine believes that the law 
should respond not just to the interests of the oligarchs, not just to one region or another, 
not just to old industries and sectors or particular foreign interests, but to them. 
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Meanwhile, in countries using consensus-based legislation drafting processes, this 
study finds preliminary evidence for a happier outcome than in cases further to the 
extremes: that these processes can contribute to a higher quality of democracy. By 
bringing more voices and more evidence into the legislation drafting process, these 
countries ensure that their legislation responds to a broader array of interests, aggregates 
more preferences, balances more competing claims, and remains more stable upon 
implementation in a real world it has anticipated accurately for drawing on more sources 
of information. Further research drawing on new data will be required to test this 
relationship, but this finding, too, provides encouraging evidence that institutional 
choices can influence the outcomes that concern citizens, democratic theorists, and 
development professionals.
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APPENDIX A 
Origins of Legislation Drafting Processes: Additional Variables with Null Effects 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Type of Drafting 
Process 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Bicameralism  -0.7 1.415 
Constant 11.2 0.866 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Dependent Variable: Type of Drafting 
Process 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Presidentialism   0.536 0.755 
Constant 10.435 0.981 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Dependent Variable: Type of Drafting 
Process 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Federalism   2.2 2.793 
Constant 10.8 0.698 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Dependent Variable: Type of Drafting 
Process 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
PR 1.674 1.062 
Constant 8.217 1.840 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Dependent Variable: Type of Drafting 
Process 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
EU Membership -0.090 1.490 
Constant 11.0 1.236 
N of Obs.= 16 
Regression performed using Stata 13.0.  *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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APPENDIX B 
OECD Standards for Achieving Regulatory Quality496 
 
System Standards: 
• Coherence, consistency, and balance between competing policies; 
• Stability and predictability of regulatory requirements; 
• Ease of management and oversight, and responsiveness to political direction; 
• Transparency and openness to the political level and to the public; 
• Consistency, fairness and due process in implementation; 
• Adaptation to changing circumstances 
 
Standards For Regulatory Instruments: 
• user standards, e.g. clarity, simplicity, and accessibility for private citizens and 
businesses; 
• design standards, e.g. flexibility and consistency with other rules and international 
standards; 
• legal standards, e.g. structure, orderliness, clear drafting and terminology, and the 
existence of clear legal authority for action; 
• effectiveness standards, e.g. relevance to clearly defined problems and real-world 
conditions; 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 OECD. (1997). Law drafting and regulatory management in Central and Eastern 
Europe. SIGMA Papers, 18, 12. 
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• economic and analytical standards, e.g. benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness; 
measurement of impacts on business, competitiveness and trade; 
• implementation standards, e.g. practicability, feasibility, enforceability, public 
acceptance and availability of necessary resources  
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